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TRANSFORMING EMERGENCIES: 
THE RISE OF A HUMANITARIAN  
IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1959-1987 
 
This dissertation is situated within the historiography of humanitarianism in U.S. 
Foreign Relations and seeks to make better sense of when and how Americans choose to 
act in humanitarian encounters. To fully explore the dynamism of modern 
humanitarianism, this work traces its meteoric rise between the years 1959 and 1987 and 
analyzes key ideas that propelled forward the movement. It argues that conceptions and 
perceptions of children were the central ideas that spurred emotional, financial, and 
security investment in emergencies abroad from the American public. A variety of actors, 
including large and small NGOs, government agencies, and the media, grappled with the 
meanings of childhood as a means to advance forward different understandings of 
humanitarian efforts. Each of these meanings had a decisive and at moments divisive 
influence in debates around the U.S. role in its interactions with the world vis-à-vis 
humanitarianism. By the end of the years under study, these arguments had cemented an 
ideology in which the American people expected U.S. involvement in crises raging 
throughout the world. This work explores that journey. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
On April 5, 1975, camera bulbs popped and questions flew as photographers and 
journalists crowded around President Ford standing at the open door of a Pan Am 
airplane.   Smiling flight attendants and nurses flanked his sides.  The center of the hub-
bub was a chubby Vietnamese baby, smiling and gurgling, held by the President.  The 
child’s arrival, along with over two thousand other children, was the product of a hurried 
U.S. evacuation of Vietnamese children, ostensibly identified as orphans from Saigon to 
the United States.  Ford said of the babies’ arrival that he was “deeply touched at the 
plight of the South Vietnamese people and especially by the thousands of innocent 
Vietnam war orphans.”
1
 As images of the children filtered through newspaper and 
magazine outlets and prompted discussions of why and how the children should be 
brought over, others in the United States began to question the fate of their peers 
throughout the world and what the United States would do to help those other children.  
President Ford received many of these inquiries.   One came in a letter from a young 
Brooklyn student of Hispanic descent.  He had heard of the humanitarian flights and 
asked about the nature of the children in Operation Babylift, “are these babies 
immigrants? If they are, why don’t you let in other immigrants from other countries as 
well...Do you think this is fair to them?”
2
 In a deceptively simple question, the young 
student captured an important characteristic of American interaction with the world, 
pointing out in his comparison that some emergencies mattered more and prompted more 
attention than others. 
                                                             
1
 “Ford Meets Jet Flying Children Out of Vietnam,” New York Times 6 April 1975. 
2
 Ford Library, White House Central Files, Box No. 69. 
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The Brooklyn student’s words exposed the highly contingent American response 
to humanitarian emergencies throughout the world in the last half of the twentieth 
century. The wariness many Americans felt about involvement in emergency situations 
belied the rhetoric of altruism and helping for the good of mankind.  The internal debates 
about the nature of humanitarianism, the need for it, and the methods of it constituted an 
ongoing dialogue that contributed to the rise of a neoliberal humanitarian ideology that 
has been central to the growing strength of American political, military, and cultural 
influence throughout the world.  It is no coincidence that humanitarian thought started to 
saturate American culture, gaining significant cultural capital in the process, and 
presented an important means of mapping American interaction with the world at the 
same time that an industrial military complex arose in the United States.  
Humanitarianism was deeply entwined with the U.S. decision to spearhead the struggle 
for a capitalist vision in a world fractured by Cold War politics and decolonization 
processes.  Both the U.S. government and leaders of humanitarian aid groups 
increasingly asked American citizens to take on more responsibility for the humanitarian 
problems of the world which stemmed both directly and indirectly from foreign policy 
decisions.  Both also refused to acknowledge the source of the increased need in 
humanitarian assistance – U.S. foreign policy.  The result was a paradoxical cycle in 
which American military and foreign policy presence contributed to the rise of 
emergencies and American citizens were asked to direct their humanitarian impulses 
towards ameliorating those emergencies; while American military power and American 
aid appeared as polar opposites, they were mutually reinforcing and worked to keep each 
other afloat.  
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Although the rise of American humanitarianism and an American military 
presence worked in concert, the ascendancy of a humanitarian ideology to undergird this 
relationship was never guaranteed.  Rather, the beliefs that constituted this ideology 
evolved slowly through spurts and stops as Americans worked to make sense of the ideas 
that would guide their intervention in emergencies throughout the world.  Negotiating the 
process of humanitarian action revealed the diversity of American thoughts about the 
world and their role in it and shaped a tenuous agreement between citizens, groups, and 
the U.S. government about how humanitarian action would proceed in each particular 
emergency.  These debates evolved into a humanitarian ideology, an amalgamation of 
consumption, transformation, and citizen responsibility, which worked alongside 
American political maneuverings to expand and extend American influence while 
simultaneously acting as deflection for the difficult conversations about the consequences 
of foreign policy decisions and the extension of American influence throughout the 
world.  
* 
  Children, both literal and figurative, lay at the heart of these debates and became 
one of the most important sites of contestation about the nature and changing conceptions 
of humanitarianism.  The discourses attached to children in emergencies acted as a 
powerful inducement, persuading many Americans to engage with the world in a large-
scale, on-going humanitarian capacity.  This dissertation argues that representations and 
perceptions of children were central to the birth and evolution of a neoliberal 
humanitarian ideology in the United States as a way to transform the world between the 
4 
 
years of 1959 and 1987.
3
 The issue of children provides a unique lens for understanding 
the broader currents of U.S. humanitarianism.  This was in large part because of 
children’s discursive associations with innocence, ideals of malleability, and potential for 
transformation.  Thus rectifying emergencies and saving innocent lives became a 
conversation about how that rescue could remake the world in a myriad of ways by 
harnessing and shaping the transformative potential of malleable children.  The image of 
the child, then, and its interplay with aid serves as one kind of map of how Americans 
made sense of the fluctuating world order in the late twentieth century.  In the four cases 
under study, the 1967 Nigeria-Biafra Civil War, the 1975 Operation Babylift, the 1984 
Ethiopian famine, and the 1987 Palestinian Intifada, children figured prominently in each 
and proved an important moment in adding to, entrenching, or shifting humanitarian 
thought.  While there were several other humanitarian moments that occurred during the 
time period under study, these four were particularly evocative within the United States 
because of the central role that children played in discussions that unpacked the nature of 
the emergency and represented a pivotal moment in the evolution of humanitarian 
ideology.  Looking at each case singularly and also within a larger framework of 
emergencies reveals the evolution of humanitarianism and the ways in which such an 
ideology gained currency through an emphasis on personal responsibility, 
commodification, neoliberal population management, and human rights.  
                                                             
3
Annie Mcclanahan argued in a recent talk at the 2016 Futures of American Studies Institute at Dartmouth 
College that the term neoliberal is problematic because the economic antecedents of the years that scholars 
like David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) have dubbed 
“neoliberal” were brewing  long before the 1970s. I use the term neoliberal as a way to get at the particular 
cultural byproducts this economic shift that shaped personal behaviors and choices during this period as a 
result of capitalist/financial decisions. It is not used to suggest that neoliberalism was an entirely new 
phenomenon. 
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 The 1967 Biafra-Nigeria Civil War, for example, reveals the emergence of 
personal responsibility for both the aid recipient and the aid donor in the new 
humanitarian ideology.  Aid groups admonished Americans to exercise personal 
responsibility in ending the tragedy of child starvation.  They also admonished Biafran 
nationalists to end their fight for independence as a means to save their own children 
from starvation.  While the expectation of personal responsibility on the part of 
Americans could be fluid in nature and executed in varied, almost a-la-carte, fashion, it 
set up rigid, circumscribed prescriptions for how “victims” were to behave if their were 
to receive U.S. largesse, be enfolded within the framework of brotherhood of humanity, 
and help transform the world.  
 Meanwhile, the 1975 Operation Babylift magnified and entrenched consumption 
practices in aid giving, rearticulating in public form the long-standing private practices of 
commodification that had undergirded many previous humanitarian efforts centered on 
children.  Giving money to aid specific causes had been an important humanitarian tactic 
since before 1975.  However, Babylift made explicit the link between transformation and 
a financial, emotional, and ideological return on investment of Vietnamese children 
through act of consumption, a process that changed from a hope of transformation to an 
expectation of transformation.  
 By the time of the 1984 Ethiopian famine, the everyday purchasing power of 
humanitarianism was a staple in invoking public participation in ending disaster 
conditions abroad.  Indeed, the Live Aid spectacle that has come to symbolize the 
Ethiopian famine exposed the depth of commodification as a conceptual framework for 
humanitarianism in the United States.  This work, however, shows how this moment also 
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emphasized the neoliberal concept of personal responsibility of famine victims in both 
the onset and resolution of the famine.  Children were at the heart of this dynamic of 
personal responsibility as aid donors expected aid recipients to pass on to their children 
neoliberal lessons of productivity and efficiency as seeds of transformation.  As such, this 
case highlights another important moment of evolution in the humanitarian ideology – aid 
became about managing family relationships of parent and child through a neoliberal 
framework of population management within the context of humanitarian emergencies.  
 With the lessons learned from Biafra, Vietnam, and Ethiopia, the 1987 Intifada 
became the testing ground for the ascendancy of this neoliberal framework as aid groups 
strategically used the ideas of it to remake the Palestinian problem into a legitimate 
humanitarian concern in which Americans could invest in at all levels.  Groups relied on 
discourses of personal responsibility and commodification and added the new and 
powerful human rights discourse to keep events in Gaza and the West Bank at the 
forefront of American consciousness as an important site of potential victim 
transformation.  Like previous humanitarian efforts before it, calls to aid Palestinians in 
the Intifada rested on conceptions of children and how they could be remade, this time 
through human rights.  By the 1987 Intifada, humanitarian ideology worked to expand, 
ameliorate, and justify U.S. foreign policy decisions.  
The concept of transformation was key during these years – many Americans felt 
that an emergency moment provided the perfect opportunity for transforming the world 
into something better and brighter.  That transformation, however, took very specific 
forms that were often an extension of domestic concerns at the moment.  As a result, 
humanitarianism used as a means of transformation was a highly fluid and malleable 
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concept -- a shapeshifter that could be molded to take on a particular message for the 
moment.  Children provide the lens to view this shape shifting because they were 
considered a visible and dramatic, yet empty, vessel into which the public, aid groups, 
and the government could pour their message.  This malleability proved the success of a 
humanitarian ideology as it at once became a tool of the Cold War framework and 
transcended it to address a fractured world increasingly affected by processes like 
decolonization and globalization.   Children became ground zero as aid groups, the 
American people, and the U.S. government engaged in pitched media battles over the 
symbolism and meaning of children’s past, present, and future located in emergencies to 
show just how that aid should or should not take place.  The core of these representation 
debates highlights how groups within the United States organized, by supporting or 
challenging, the meaning of a variety of conflicts throughout the world vis-à-vis 
humanitarianism.  
If these years marked the beginning of an “empire of humanity,” that remapped 
American interaction with the world in many predictable ways, this work also aims to 
show the jaggedness of this path and the self-imposed limits it experienced.
4
 One of its 
primary claims is that there was never an assurance in the rise of humanitarian activity, 
the kind of shape it would take, or the ease of an expanding empire (whether 
humanitarian or otherwise).  Rather, the shape of this path emerged at key moments when 
aid recipients contested definitions and understandings about children in the emergency 
in ways that challenged American understandings of what constituted appropriate aid 
recipient behaviors and roles and necessitated a public reckoning of how Americans 
                                                             
4
 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2011): 220-222.  
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understood the world and their role in it.   As a result, the “empire of humanity” as some 
scholars call it, was carefully regulated to include only those that fit in the controlled 
paradigm of victim.  This, however, was a highly emotional calculation that rested on 
specific expectations of donors and was predicated on the idea that aid was not just about 
saving victims but transforming them.  Those aid recipients that conformed to 
expectations were allotted careful consideration of their emergencies.  In contrast, those 
“victims” that pushed back against prescribed roles in unanticipated ways were often 
excluded from the larger brotherhood of humanitarianism.  Importantly, the unstated 
consequences of this tension between conforming to specific roles and aid expectation 
resulted in a prioritization of emergencies in which some emergencies clearly mattered 
more than others, perhaps the most well-known manifestation of which was U.S. 
reluctance to get involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  The reluctance to extend aid 
equally was in large part due to anxieties about engaging with parts of the world that had 
often been understood as “backward,” “undeveloped,” or “primitive.” To counteract this 
reluctance, NGOs had to work very hard to convince Americans to pull from their 
personal ideological, financial, and emotional coffers to provide aid to those struck by 
conflict or disaster. The remainder of these pages tells that story and how NGOs, the 
government, and the American public debated with each other the role of children to help 
sort through this ideological minefield.  
* 
The focus on the relationship between NGOs and the American people departs 
from many historical studies of humanitarianism in foreign relations scholarship.
5
 Olivier 
                                                             
5
 Most often these studies look in detail at the relationship between groups and the US government or 
analyze the roles of the largest philanthropic and aid organizations. For example, Olivier Zunz’s study of 
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Nunez, for example, provides a compelling analysis of how humanitarianism grew by 
looking at important leaders of philanthropic movements.  He, however, invests these 
personages with a significance that cannot be understood unless explored within the 
context of how they interacted with the American public.  Although he does attend to the 
American public, the emphasis remains on how leaders affected the public and leaves 
open questions about how public concerns and anxieties affected the growth of 
humanitarianism.  Refocusing attention to an analysis on American perceptions of 
emergencies between the years 1959-1987 reveals the dramatic increase in humanitarian 
influence and how that came to be through the delicate dance that took place between 
NGOs and the American people.   The four emergencies under scrutiny, the 1967 Biafran 
Civil War, the 1975 Operation Babylift, the 1984 Ethiopian Famine, and the 1987 
Palestinian Intifada, showcase the rise of humanitarian power and the critical role that 
NGOs had in shaping it by attending to the American public’s concerns and anxieties and 
grounding them in ideas and perceptions of children.   Over these almost thirty years, aid 
groups established a powerful sphere of influence by capturing public interest and 
commitment to rescue children.  This allowed them leverage to appeal for specific 
conditions and actions to take place in emergencies that sprung up throughout the world.  
Their influence loomed so that it appeared that by the end of this study, they had 
wrested away much of the authority of the U.S. government in planning and engaging aid 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
American philanthropy, which can be viewed as the predecessor of humanitarianism, focuses on the 
important leaders of large philanthropic foundations such as the Ford Foundation and their relationship 
with the US administration. While they may have been the most visible face of humanitarianism, they 
could not have advanced their agenda without the support of a larger movement. Philanthropy in America: 
A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012): 159. He does analyze the idea of a “mass 
philanthropy” but his analysis often rests on the leaders of the fundraising movement only tentatively 
exploring the negotiation that took place between fundraising leaders and the average donor; 45. Likewise, 
Julia Irwin’s focus on the Red Cross as a quasi-government entity is another example of emphasizing the 
relationship between an aid organization, the Red Cross, and the government.   
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abroad in emergencies; it looked as though it were a movement driven primarily by the 
altruistic impulses of the American people and the NGOs that led them.  This, however, 
was a deceptive image.  The narrative of humanitarianism, so often portrayed as a 
divergent, moralistic pursuit of American people rather than the administration, actually 
evoked  a subtle refrain of the same objectives that so many of its adherents vilified.
6
 
This work shows how it was the subtle echo of hegemonic understandings deployed by 
NGOs that allowed Americans to full invest in this humanitarian ideology.   The pages 
that follow place much of the burden of change for the transformation of 
humanitarianism into a useable, market-based ideology squarely on the shoulders of 
NGO humanitarian groups’ intense gaze on children.  Because they had to rely so heavily 
on the public for interest and investment in the disasters abroad, in their representations 
of crisis they invariably turned to themes, tropes, and vocabulary that had proven 
successful in other contexts.  It makes sense, then, that this narrative privileges NGOs 
and their relationship to the American people as the primary focus of this work.   
Previous works have mostly looked at these cases in isolation.  Utilizing a single 
case framework buttresses the narrative of the United States as a benevolent presence and 
evades an important dialogue about how many in the United States view the victims that 
they are purporting to aid.  Such perceptions of the aid victims go the heart of why some 
emergencies capture American attention and others do not.  In contrast, this work adds to 
the field by showing that studying humanitarian events in relation to each other can help 
better explain these perceptions of aid victims which, in turn, addresses the gap between 
                                                             
6
 Tamara Myers, ”Local Action and Global Imagining: Youth, International Development, and the 
Walkathon Phenomenon in Sixties’ and Seventies” Canada” Diplomatic History 38 (2014): 292. Myers 
discusses a similar effect within Canadian humanitarianism.  
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American rhetoric of humanitarianism and the reality of its performance.
7
 Specifically, 
humanitarian ideology gained traction precisely because continuity of ideas proved an 
important element of drawing larger numbers in the humanitarian orbit.  Yet the 
continuity of ideas undergirding humanitarianism did not imply stasis.
8
 If 
humanitarianism as an ideology found its identity in the 1959 World Refugee Year 
campaign, the year that begins this study, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, saw a continuous 
evolution and adaptation of core ideas.  Such reworking often relied on flexibility in the 
ways core ideas could be shaped and molded to fit particular circumstances.
9
 Of 
particular importance, humanitarian ideology often adapted to incorporate prevailing 
domestic concerns at the moment when crisis emerged.  For example, in 1967 
humanitarianism was also about nationalism, in 1975 it was about colorblind liberalism, 
in 1984 it was about neo-liberal subjectivities, and in 1987 it was about security.  An 
emphasis on children allowed groups to sharpen and focus these concerns.  In the end, 
transference of anxieties onto children created a zero-sum game of humanitarianism 
which closed off opportunities of dialogue between donors and aid recipients about how 
aid should proceed.  So while humanitarian ideology always rested on ideas of 
transformation and investment, it also remained relevant by cultivating present-day 
anxieties and concerns.  This dissertation sets out to complicate the narrative of American 
apolitical benevolence via non-profit aid groups by untangling the ways that these groups 
                                                             
7
 Marilyn Baseler’s “Asylum for Mankind” America 1607-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) 
and Samantha Power’s Problem from Hell: America  and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2013) both  address different facets of this phenomenon. Baseler discusses this within the context of the 
early Republic and Powers situates her discussion within the rise of human rights and, more particularly, 
within the branch of genocide. 
8
 Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987): 15.  
9
 Nicholas Danforth explores the idea of malleability in his article, “Malleable Modernity: Rethinking the 
Role of Ideology in American Policy, Aid Programs, and Propaganda in Fifties,” Diplomatic History 39 
(2015): 478.  
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subtly reflected, albeit in reimagined ways, the dominant understandings of the Cold 
War, neo-liberalism, and decolonization processes in their charity and fight for social 
justice to aid victims. 
* 
Humanitarianism is a rich and complex term with a long usage in the United 
States.  Surprisingly, it has not yet produced an equivalent rich and complex 
historiography.  Studies of early aid efforts often appear disjointed and embedded only 
within a specific context like that of the abolition movement.
10
  Scholars of the turn of the 
century also usually provide stories of single moments of humanitarianism which 
underscore that particular context’s defining characteristic as an explanation for 
humanitarianism.
11
 For example, Julia Irwin’s persuasive explanation of humanitarianism 
falls within the single context of the Great War and looks to the patriotism of that war to 
help explain America’s humanitarian birth.
12
 Scholarship of humanitarian efforts in the 
last half of the twentieth century continues a similar trajectory.   Karen Dubinsky’s 
influential work, Babies without Borders, looks at one slice of humanitarianism; she 
analyzes why and how the Christian evangelical movement and nationalism began 
describing international adoption as a humanitarian effort.  
13
 While her work provides a 
compelling explanation for the rise of international adoption, the missing context of a 
larger humanitarian movement forming at this time would help readers situate 
                                                             
10
 See, for example, Karen Halttunen, “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American 
Culture,” The American Historical Review 100 (1995): 319.  
11
 See, for example, Dominique Marshall, “Humanitarian Sympathy for Children in Times of War and the 
History of Children’s Rights, 1919-1959” in Children and War: A Historical Anthology with a foreward by 
Robert Coles, ed. James Marten (New York: NYU Press, 2002), 185 
12
 See also, Dominique Marshall, “Humanitarian Sympathy for Children in Times of War and the History 
of Children’s Rights, 1919-1959” in Children and War: A Historical Anthology with a foreward by Robert 
Coles, ed. James Marten (New York: NYU Press, 2002), 185 
13
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international adoption as being in concert with other structural forces rather than as the 
result of two seemingly disparate contexts.   
Additionally, in the last half of the twentieth-century, the definition of 
humanitarianism has narrowed and is now closely linked to delivering emergency 
measures of survival to those affected by man-made or natural disasters.
14
 Indeed, the 
coupling of provision of aid and disaster in the 1990s has facilitated the 
professionalization and bureaucratization of humanitarianism as a large and profitable 
industry.
15
 The chronic emergencies that emerged with the end of the Cold War and the 
large humanitarian bureaucracies charged with easing the suffering found in those 
emergencies fused the action of humanitarianism with the abstract ideals of human 
rights.
16
 Fiona Fox calls this the “new humanitarianism” and characterizes it as “human 
rights based, politically sensitive and geared to strengthening those forces that bring 
peace and stability to the developing world.”
17
 Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity 
extends this definition further by explaining the ways in which modern nation states, 
especially Western ones, co-opt humanitarianism to further their own political goals in 
the international arena.
18
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Self-reflection by the humanitarian community, especially its practitioners, 
lamented this new foray into political territory through the protection of human rights 
stating that the new post-Cold War humanitarianism was fraught with slippery slopes.
19
 
Although there was much hand-wringing over this new humanitarian model, other voices 
such as Janice Stein made the point that much of “what humanitarians have done in the 
past several decades under the cover of neutrality and independence has been deeply 
infused with liberal values.”
20
 The new humanitarianism of the 1990s simply donned a 
more visible political identity than previously had been done.  The above iterations of 
humanitarianism highlight the vibrant and dynamic role it has played in multiple facets of 
American life.  Groups of all kinds have appropriated its name, definition, and use as a 
means to further their particular visions of how the world should function.   
Yet, scholars of U.S. Foreign Relations have until recently ignored this potentially 
fruitful topic of historical investigation of how humanitarianism has shaped American 
interaction with the world.  Most recently, Julia Irwin broke this pattern with her study 
Making the World Safe.  She looks at the adoption of humanitarianism as an important 
strategic objective for the U.S. government through the rise of the American Red Cross, a 
“quasi-governmental organization.”
21
 However, this burgeoning scholarship is 
problematic in at least one regard.  Many of the studies about the average person’s 
understandings of humanitarianism are often described as stemming from either religious 
zealousness, patriotism or are tied directly to American foreign policy objectives of a 
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benevolent reordering of the world order.
22
 This makes sense given the time periods of 
most of these studies.  This dissertation adds to a newly started conversation by looking 
at humanitarianism during the Cold War.  It suggests that unlike in previous eras, the 
buy-in of the American people during the years of this study traveled a slow, fractured 
path precisely because it was not tied to religion, patriotism, or official government 
policy.  Belief in the power of humanitarianism was not assured and did not in fact 
blossom until aid groups tapped into lingering ideas about race, consumption, and 
paternalism in ways that made humanitarianism palatable and expected on a wide scale.  
Seen in this light, humanitarianism becomes much more about extending everyday 
practices of management of transformation into new arenas.
23
 Revealing the role of 
everyday practices in humanitarian ideas and actions is a result of focusing intensely on 
the relationship between aid groups and the public in shaping humanitarian ideas.  
Current humanitarian scholarship in U.S. Foreign Relations is also problematic in 
a second way.  Most humanitarian studies have focused on the turn of the century and the 
Great War.  On the other hand, few studies have been undertaken within the discipline of 
history to discover more about the role of humanitarianism after World War II.
24
  
Humanitarianism has long been a topic of interest in other fields including political 
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science and anthropology.
25
 Political Scientist Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity is 
the most comprehensive account of modern humanitarianism.  He begins with the late 
nineteenth century and ends with the late 1990s and firmly plants his work in a global 
context.  His experience as a professional humanitarian allowed him important insights 
into the professional organizations and aid groups.  Didier Fassin tackles 
humanitarianism from the perspective of an anthropologist.  Fortunately, historians of the 
post-war years are beginning to add their own insights to this ground.  For example, some 
scholars recently have looked at U.S. humanitarianism within the context of refugee 
repatriation and U.S. attempts to salvage a reputation of benevolence.
26
  
As disparate as these post-War works are, they are loosely united by a common 
theme.  In these works, the Cold War acts as the explanatory anchor to expose American 
global intentions via humanitarianism.  Michael Barnett does discuss decolonization as an 
element in humanitarian calculations, but he treats it as a function of Cold War politics.  
He writes of decolonization and liberation movements, “The global South, was once 
again, swept up into the high-stakes game of global geopolitics.”
27
 In contrast, while the 
Cold War is important in this work, it does not take center stage.  This is primarily 
because the Cold War has limited explanatory powers when analyzing how American 
citizen’s attention and action focused on events in the Third World.  Other factors were at 
work and served as the catalyst for involvement.  The other impulse that this work draws 
on to explain the rise of everyday humanitarianism is neoliberalism.  In the existing 
works, none have attempted to analyze the role of neoliberal tendencies on either the 
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reception or shaping of humanitarian ideas.  This, then, is the final contribution of this 
dissertation; this work seeks to expose the influence of the emerging neoliberal 
framework on the evolution of humanitarian ideology.   
* 
To explore humanitarianism as an ideology, this work looks at key events in the rise of 
those ideas.  Chapter one begins in 1959, the year in which most important tenets of 
modern humanitarianism emerged as a loosely coherent blueprint for how to engage with 
the world in a humanitarian capacity.  The 1959 United States Committee for Refugees 
led a yearlong educational campaign in the United States in which they identified, 
refined, and disseminated the key ideas of modern humanitarianism –consumption, 
transformation, and citizen responsibility.   Chapter one looks at the ways in which 
American audiences of the educational campaign reimagined aid victims as possessing 
the ability to transform and find their place in an ever-increasing liberal world through 
the tutelage of U.S.  aid efforts.  However, just as the humanitarian orbit expanded to 
administer aid to larger numbers, it also contracted in a number of ways.  Not all 
emergency victims in this new imaginary fit the mold of the deserving victim according 
to field reports and newsletters from aid groups; clear limitations were placed on just how 
far the new emotional and financial investment of humanitarianism would extend.  
Chapter one explores both the expansion and contraction of humanitarian ideas.   The 
remaining chapters in this essay look at these ideas in the context of a world witnessing 
national liberation movements, Cold War politics, the rise of neoliberalism, and the ever-
present dialogue of human rights.  
 The 1967 Biafran Civil War stands as the first testing ground for this coherent set 
of ideals that the World Refugee Year packaged to the American people, grounding the 
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abstract in a concrete example.
28
 Biafra reaffirmed the centrality of understandings of 
transformation for the American people and legitimated a discourse around aid recipient 
behavior that NGOs would apply to future emergencies.  As such it is a pivotal moment 
in this story because the stakes were so high for how Americans approached future 
emergencies.  This crisis showcased the elevated profile of children in emergencies, 
which fed into concerns about liberation movements and self-determination in the Third 
World, the growing demands and claims placed on victims by donors, and divisive 
debates about the motivations of humanitarianism and the lack of will by presidential 
administrations.  The response of NGOs to these questions helped create a narrative that 
resonated with the American people and created a larger, more intensified acceptance and 
approval of humanitarian action abroad.   
Chapter three, which focuses on the 1975 Operation Babylift, looks at the ways in 
which different groups persuaded many in the American public to enact humanitarian 
efforts at the close of the Vietnam war.  These groups included the Ford administration, 
adoption agencies, and media.  The resulting tangle of voices, each hoping to persuade 
the United States towards a particular course of action, raised the question of who would 
ultimately prevail in standing as guardian of these ideas and charting the course for action 
in emergencies.  This chapter looks closely at this struggle.  As in Biafra, the 
humanitarian effort did not manage to bring about a unified consensus as to what actions 
the people of the United States should take during their last days of the war.  However, as 
this chapter shows, the debates did help entrench a specific understanding of what 
constituted humanitarian effort, profoundly shaped perceptions and expectations of both 
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aid givers and receivers, and highlighted the importance of flexibility in applying 
humanitarian ideals in practice.  NGOs were the primary beneficiaries of this process by 
solidifying humanitarianism as a commodity in which children could be purchased to 
help facilitate the process of transformation; children were seen as an ideological 
investment that occurred because of a financial investment and expectations grew that 
donors would be intimately involved with and direct the course of such an investment.  
As claim-making became cloaked in rights language, the conflation of rights of donors 
overlapped, and at times contested, the rights of aid recipients.  With this in mind, a large 
part of chapter three centers on the ways in which donors felt emboldened to direct the 
course of the children’s lives, and by extension the world, because of their purchasing 
power.  
 Chapter four traces the continued trajectory of rising power aid groups 
accumulated through their concentration on children’s lives and how they channeled that 
energy into one of the most visible, public displays of influence in humanitarian history.  
This occurred in 1984 during the Ethiopian famine.  Although this crisis had been in the 
making for more than two years, it remained little more than a footnote in the 
international sphere until Western journalists captured live, real-time television coverage 
of mass death and sick bodies.  Importantly, they recognized their anger as the catalyst 
that moved the Reagan administration to act in the famine.  The desire to send aid to 
alleviate such suffering culminated in one the largest humanitarian responses to date, and 
it spanned several nations, utilized a vast array of media technology, and provided huge 
segments of the Western population a common experience in which to participate.  This 
last point was critical because this common experience helped Western individuals, 
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group, and business donors make sense of the tragedy in Africa by deploying a familiar 
East-West Cold War narrative that also absorbed questions about the global South.  The 
narrative centered on as questions about the liberation movements and on-going civil war 
as much as it did about the East-West Cold War struggle and became important when 
some donors began to doubt the efficacy of aid.  Chapter four, then, analyzes the ways an 
aid focus on children shaped the U.S. response and negotiated anxieties about relief.   As 
donor money poured into aid efforts, this ushered in a new sense of accountability by 
NGOs for the outcome of aid especially when reports painted Ethiopian famine victims 
as politically immature and with little wherewithal to successfully manage their transition 
into the market-oriented world.  Relief became more than just providing for immediate 
needs like health, food, and shelter.  Increasingly, specific visions of the aid recipients’ 
futures underwrote aid campaigns and generated an overwhelming sense of responsibility 
on the part of American citizens to help change the world through their humanitarian 
efforts.  In this way donors discussed the famine as a way to alleviate distress and as a 
way for Americans to fulfill their responsibility by charting the future course of Ethiopian 
citizens and their nation.  Through the vision of aid and the specific conditions donors 
attached to relief, donors continued to assert their role as the appropriate standard bearer 
to change world course and delineate their rights to stake a claim in the future of famine 
victims through humanitarian aid. 
If chapter four highlights the most visible manifestation of aid power, chapter five 
looks at the subtler impositions of that power in the context of the 1987 Palestinian 
Intifada as NGOs influenced the emergency in ways previously not seen.  By this time, 
NGOs had undertaken much of the management of humanitarian crises.  Because of their 
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accumulated experience, financial independence, and public clout they directed the shape 
and outcome of the Intifada crisis by appropriating a human rights discourse.  The 1987 
Intifada provides a useful lens to view this deep rooted humanitarian power because of 
the ways in which they wrangled a rapidly shifting American opinion on the conflict.  
Media footage of Israeli tanks rolling towards Palestinian children wielding rocks as 
weapons spurred American sympathy, but within weeks this outpouring of solidarity 
abruptly reversed.  This was in large part because here, too, children played a pivotal role 
as they morphed into ideological symbols of the future.  For a brief period, observers 
presented Palestinian children as the hope of a bright future limited only by the gross 
mismanagement of their people by Israel.  They also, for a brief moment, emblematized 
the very struggle of human rights and social justice.  Within a very short period this 
consensus of a bright future reversed and reports painted Palestinian children as the tool 
of their own demise.  In short, the inherent individual limitations of Palestinian children, 
derived from long-standing racial assumptions, limited the prospects of their national 
flourishing.   Once again, throughout the conflict concerns about nationalism arose and 
decidedly shaped the kind of humanitarianism Americans were willing to extend to 
emergency victims.  
Aid NGOs deftly maneuvered this volatile change in public opinion.  As public 
support for the emergency swelled and then receded, ate first glance it seemed as though 
humanitarian ideals and the subsequent action they necessitated were in danger.  
American anger at Israeli action against Palestinian children soon morphed into fear of 
the Palestinian refugees.  But, rather than disavow humanitarianism, many Americans 
and their NGO counterparts turned to and elevated discussions of humanitarianism as the 
22 
 
only means available to solve the on-going conflict.  Action in the conflict rested on the 
core ideas of Americans as individuals and concerned groups working beyond 
government capacity to transform emergency victims abroad.  They tackled doubts about 
transformation by addressing the very root of what hindered that make-over: behavior.  
As such aid groups turned their focus to peace education in this time of emergency and 
managed to convince many observers in the United States that humanitarian aid based on 
character modification was the only method of saving a people and a future nation.   That 
they were able to persuade the American people not to give up on the Palestinian children 
and mollify public anger and anxiety through peace education programming defining 
such education as a human right is a testament to the influence of their ideas by the late 
twentieth century.   
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Chapter Two: Laying the Foundation: The 1959 World Refugee Year and the seeds of a 
humanitarian ideology 
 
Introduction 
  The horrors of World War II caused massive numbers of displacement rendering thirty 
million people homeless.
1
 This figure shrunk by the end of the war, but it was still large: eleven 
million people found themselves in need of assistance outside of their home country.
2
 The post 
war years did not provide a reprieve in migration flows.
3
  What World War II helped trigger, the 
establishment of the Cold War cemented as a permanent fixture of the twentieth century.
4
 The 
three principal causes of refugee movements in the second half of the twentieth-century, World 
War II, the Cold War, and decolonization, combined to create such huge numbers of refugees 
that the UN named the period the “Century of the Homeless.”
5
 The UNHCR summed up the 
experience of homelessness in their publication “To Have a Key” with a refugee’s own words.  
When asked what he wanted most, this refugee replied, “A key to a door behind which I could 
have some privacy for me and my family, a place I could really make my home.” The United 
Nations Refugee Fund sought to establish concrete solutions to the refugee problem that included 
resettling refugees in third countries, integrating refugees in their current country of asylum, 
“placing in institutions, homes and sanatoria the old, infirm and chronically ill refugees,” and 
providing emergency assistance to those in the greatest need.
6
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Though the agency possessed a clear vision of how to address the refugee crisis, 
countries throughout the world hesitated to provide the kind of aid needed to implement the 
agency’s solutions.
7
 The UNHCR made no bones about the lack of support when they wrote that 
“the programme is running behind schedule because of financial shortfalls.” According to the 
agency, without the support of the nations and peoples of the UN the refugees of the camps were 
destined to remain in despair and lethargy.
8
 Geographical and temporal limitations codified in 
international law compounded the migration crisis.  By 1951, international aid for refugees was 
“limited to assisting European refugees” and the UNHCR Convention of 1951 specifically 
limited aiding those displaced by events that took place after January 1, 1951.
9
 Those displaced 
by national liberation movements or caught in the cross-fires of Cold War politics outside of 
Europe were largely left to fend for themselves until the 1967 Protocol passed, and even this was 
no guarantee for support for displaced groups.
10
  
With limited income and a refusal to take in more refugees, the UN faced an imminent 
crisis.  The problem also caught the attention of concerned citizens around the world.  In Britain, 
in order to raise awareness of refugee issues, four young activists advocated for a World Refugee 
Year.  They intended the campaign as a means to inform the British people of the problem and 
urge their contribution to durable solutions.
11
 In 1959, prominent citizens came together to create 
the United States Committee for Refugees.  They met in response to President Eisenhower’s 
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request that the United States increase activity in global humanitarian affairs as a means to 
further U.S. foreign policy goals.
12
 The swelling numbers of refugee flows throughout the world 
proved an apt opportunity for just such action as Europeans and Americans asked what to do 
about the scores of uprooted in Hong Kong, Korea, Vietnam, Palestine, Algeria and India in 
addition to the European refugees from World War II.  After much discussion, the United States 
Committee for Refugees (USCR) decided to implement a World Refugee Year educational 
campaign across America, much like the program the United Nations had adopted at the 
instigation of the British activists.
13
 The primary aims of the campaign were to increase 
American attention on the plight of refugees throughout the world and direct more funding 
towards those issues from the U.S. Congress and the American people.
14
  Though the campaign 
got off to a slow start, by the end of the year, the USCR had raised $7.5 million above their usual 
annual collections highlighting WRY as an important public education campaign.
15
  Newly 
emerging volunteer and non-profit groups like the USCR offered the average American citizen a 
way to understand and participate in American claims in the international realm by illuminating 
the vast amount of suffering taking place in the world.
16
 The humanitarian theatre proved one of 
the most important ways that non-state actors helped shape American action in the world.   In 
consequence, aid groups like the USCR took on increasing importance in shaping ideas about the 
ways Americans could and should interact in the world through its humanitarian presence.    
In asking the U.S. population to stake a claim in the humanitarian theatre and address the 
myriad of problems resulting from natural and man-made disasters, USCR’s World Refugee 
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Year detailed coverage of the refugee crisis fixed the idea of transformation as a defining 
element for how to evaluate and proceed with humanitarian aid.  Transformation became the 
bedrock of other key ideas, namely that it was the citizens’ responsibility to transform the world 
and that consumption facilitated this transformation process.   This chapter explores the 
centrality of world, national, and individual transformation to the USCR campaign, and 
ultimately to humanitarian thought, through renderings of a specific kind of childhood.  Groups 
discussed certain groups of children as the embodiment of entrenched positive and negative 
assumptions about the transformative ability of peoples outside of the United States; children 
magnified both hopes and concerns.  As a result, the USCR acted as a facilitator for the 
American people in the adjudication of the transformative potential of certain refugee groups 
based on observations of and interactions with the children of those groups.   To explain this 
process, this chapter analyzes the cultural productions created and disseminated by the USCR 
during the World Refugee Year campaign.  Photos, images, and stories of children littered 
campaign material, often acting as the fulcrum on which formulations of humanitarian aid and 
the refugee plight rested.  The USCR offered fictional accounts of children alongside non-fiction 
witness-bearing testimony of children to groups of adults and children alike as a means to induce 
sympathy from the American people.  The first section highlights how the USCR used children 
as a way to highlight the potential transformation of all groups in the brotherhood of man.  The 
second section explores the ways in which particular children from around the globe evoked 
certain understandings about different groups of refugees throughout the world that either 
sustained this hope or contracted it.  
Focusing on WRY provides two important historiographical contributions.  First, scholars 
have paid relatively little attention to the 1959- 1960 World Refugee Year campaign.  Peter 
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Gatrell has written the only monograph on the campaign, but it is written from the European 
perspective.  More recently, Becky Taylor has written about the effects on the campaign on sick 
refugees within the United Kingdom.
17
 As these two examples highlight, what work that has 
been done on the campaign often takes place outside of the United States.  The only substantial 
work done on this event in the United States comes from Micheal Gill Davis’s dissertation which 
analyzes this campaign within the context of domestic refugee policy.
18
 This chapter broadens 
the historiography of this overlooked event by analyzing its consequences within the United 
States from a cultural perspective and placing it within a larger humanitarian context.  The 
discursive approach and the material of the campaign adapted by the USCR to persuade the U.S. 
public of their humanitarian responsibility during this time period had far reaching consequences 
for the evolution of humanitarian ideas.  Second, while Cold War politics remained a powerful 
incentive for nudging potential U.S. donors to get involved in humanitarian aid for refugees, this 
chapter shows that the unleashed forces of anti-colonial politics and decolonization were also 
powerful inducements for pulling American viewers into tragedy.  Border-crossing during this 
period became so closely associated with Cold War politics that at least one historian has 
commented that for the majority of people in the United States, “refugee equals European, 
anticommunist.”
19
 However, the historiographical emphasis on political refugees during this 
period overshadows other major causes of migration movements, which include 
decolonization.
20
 Peter Gatrell is one of the few scholars to discuss decolonization refugees 
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alongside World War II refugees.
21
  This work builds on Gatrell’s by revealing the ways in 
which they were both intimately related to the ongoing process of building a humanitarian ethos 
within the United States.   In characterizing and presenting the refugee flows of Europe and the 
refugee flows of the Third World as emanating from different, if overlapping causes, the USCR 
made a solid case via cultural productions for conceptualizing and prescribing dissimilar 
humanitarian approaches in both areas of the globe: while Cold War vulnerabilities dominated 
Europe, nationalist vulnerabilities dominated the Third World; while one shared similar liberal 
democratic values with the United States, the other would need intensive tutelage to adopt such 
values; while one was reimagined as easily integrating into the burgeoning global economy, the 
other would require extensive behavioral lessons on how to adapt to such a new environment.  
World Refugee Year: Brotherhood and citizen responsibility 
A disparate group of individuals that ranged from the career humanitarian Edward B. Marks to 
the AFL-CIO president George Meany formed the backbone of the group that took up the UN’s 
World Refugee Year program in the United States.  Working under the mandate of keeping “the 
people of the United States currently informed about the refugee situation throughout the world,” 
the group started working in January 1959 under the name the United States Committee for 
Refugees.
22
 To meet the pressing problem of displacement, the USCR understood that solutions 
required a greater amount of interest from the public.  They took seriously their role as an 
advocacy and information agency, and, to this end, they emphasized the role of the citizen as the 
instigator of humanitarian change over and above government channels.  For the USCR, the 
American citizen became the most important actor in the humanitarian calculation, a way to bend 
US political will towards a more humanitarian approach, as they invited a wide range of groups 
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and individuals to take part in World Refugee Year.  This position echoed Eisenhower’s own 
belief that it would take much more than U.S.  policy to change the situation.  He acknowledged 
as much when he wrote, “It is most gratifying to me that the United States Committee for 
Refugees has been willing to assume a major responsibility for mobilizing the private resources 
of this country to meet the objectives of World Refugee Year.”
23
 In light of the importance of 
public participation, they declared, “The USCR is an organization of Americans from many 
walks of life and of representatives of voluntary agencies who are concerned by the appalling 
human sorrow represented by the millions of refugees living in limbo in the free world.”
24
 They 
wanted everyone to consider the refugee plight a shared responsibility, an issue that touched 
every person in the United States and were “concerned with the public indifference to an 
international problem that seems unending.”
25
 As a result they strove to make refugees an issue 
that cut across political, racial, and religious boundaries characterizing the displaced as “not far 
different from many of our own ancestors who came to the United States.”
26
 Even the board of 
directors was composed of a wide range of personalities, and the disparate nature of the coalition 
was seen as an organizational strength.  The USCR saw itself as an example of Americans 
looking past their political, religious, and economic backgrounds to address the “appalling 
sorrow” of the refugee crisis.
27
 
However, although the USCR presented the refugee crisis as uniting a variety of 
Americans, it was not clear that this is how many in the public received this message.
28
 In 
presenting its appeal for public investment in the crisis, the USCR had to promote the 
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humanitarian problem of refugees as something more important over and beyond the many other 
causes and projects that already claimed the devotion of individual American interest.
29
 World 
Refugee Year would prove to be a difficult sell at first.  Writing to the States’ President of the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the national president, Chloe Gifford, summarized this 
problem.  She wrote that even though the General Federation of Women’s Clubs had agreed in 
June 1959 to support World Refugee Year, the Federation found that their other ongoing 
fundraising projects like CARE and Radio Free Europe left little time or energy to devote to the 
campaign and that “we have not urged special activity in the refugee field, despite its importance 
and our commitment.”
30
 After they published a bulletin on the “urgency of the problem,” 
representatives of several women’s organizations suggested “that they make the week of April 
18 a special ‘refugee week.’
31
 They also mentioned in this letter that “apparently, the World 
Refugee Year program has been relatively more successful in other countries, notably Great 
Britain, than in our own country.”
32
 Gifford’s words neatly captured the USCR’s problem.  For 
the program to attain the kind of success that it eventually did, it had to make refugees and 
humanitarianism relevant.   
In hopes of involving large numbers of people in the campaign, the USCR approached 
their work in an ingenuous way.  They used the foundation of a common humanity, or 
brotherhood of man, to reach a greater number of people and propel them into the humanitarian 
orbit.  Stressing the idea of a common humanity served to separate aid supporters from 
governments and officials by focusing on a perceived innate desire to help others in distress.
33
 In 
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hoping to break down national differences and frame the refugee problem as a world problem in 
need of a world solution, to prevent “the presence of large numbers of refugees in any country” 
that “contributes to its instability,” the USCR deployed the language of family and 
neighborhood.  Deploying familial language sounded familiar to both secular and religious 
organizations already incorporating such discourse in their humanitarian acts.
34
 In their 
informational booklet that they disseminated to the charity groups and amongst the public, they 
constantly reiterated the sameness of the refugee and a nearby neighbor.  To hammer home this 
point, the USCR offered a hypothetical: “Suppose you discovered that a family in your 
neighborhood – father, mother and two children – were living in a cellar where they’d been 
trapped by some disaster then years ago.  They hadn’t been able to dig their way out.  Would you 
care?”
35
 As the reader contemplates their answer to this rhetorical question, the USCR predicts 
what the reader would do, “You’d be grabbing a pick-ax yourself to hack away at that cellar, 
you’d be calling the fire department and the police, you’d be rounding up the neighbors into 
rescue squads, you’d be lining friends to give these people a hand and help them get back on 
their feet.”
36
 They rested their argument on the claim that, “you’d be doing all of this simply out 
of a feeling for humanity.” In planting this disaster within a neighborhood context, the USCR 
played on the idea of similarity or humanity of all men.  They succinctly highlighted this 
humanity by stating that, “two and a half million refugees are much more than a statistic.  They 
are families.  They are men, women, and children.  They have unused skills, unfulfilled 
aspirations, frustrated needs.”
37
  The idea of frustrated needs and unfulfilled aspirations became a 
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generic script that recalled a link to America’s own revolutionary history and marked a common 
bond between oppressed peoples of the world and the American people. 
38
  
Although the universal, secular definition of brotherhood remained an important 
understanding of the meaning of humanitarianism, it was not the only one that the USCR 
accommodated in their campaign to generate American interest.
39
  The USCR defined a common 
brotherhood in such an expansive way that it became flexible enough for individual people and 
groups to map onto it their own understanding and make it something unique that resonated with 
their particular cause and sense of personal responsibility.   The USCR well understood the value 
and strength in framing World Refugee Year as a flexible, multiplicity of brotherhoods – a 
formula that allowed humanitarianism to become all things to all people.  Even as the USCR 
promoted the common humanity of the crisis, this formula allowed citizens “from all walks of 
life” to bring together varying visions what brotherhood entailed.  Ultimately, the lenses these 
different personalities used to frame their understanding of the crisis melded together to create a 
potent explanation of why individual American citizens needed to shoulder more of the burden in 
refugee and humanitarian crises throughout the world.  For Christian groups, for example, 
brotherhood often centered on Christ and doing Christ’s work.  Many of these groups already 
had long established humanitarian traditions and understood philanthropy, charity, and 
humanitarianism as a way to live out God’s mission.
40
 Due to this tradition, it was easy for them 
to gravitate towards a flexible rendering of humanity and brotherhood.  In short, World Refugee 
Year proved fertile ground for religious groups to extend their own understanding of 
humanitarianism and universal brotherhood.  The refugee crisis proved especially prophetic 
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because of the important role of exile and refugee in both the Old and New Testament.
41
 In this 
way, religious texts such as the bible provided a concise road map of how to approach the 
refugee crisis.  
The Jesuit Missions Magazine was just one such publication that reminded its readers of 
the parallels between biblical parables and lessons and the current refugee crisis.  They dedicated 
an entire issue to World Refugee Year highlighting the similarities between modern day refugees 
and Christian persecution of the past.  They declared that “long ago it was the Son of God –made 
–man fleeing before the murderous madness of the despot, Herod.  Now, millions flee before the 
humanity of modern despots.  Then it was from Bethlehem to Egypt.  Now it is from East Berlin 
to West Germany; from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Jugoslavia to Germany….”
42
 Just as the 
defining features of exile and persecution rendered modern day refugees similar to the first 
Christians, the editors of the magazine asked readers to use bible script as a way to address the 
present day crisis.  The authors reminded them when they wrote, “How very pertinent to our 
times is the word of Christ, ‘I was a stranger and you took me in.’ What a sad commentary on the 
boastful age, when millions of refugees and expellees wander the roadways of the world or are 
herded into camps.  As the horror mounts, so must the charity show to the least of Christ’s 
brethren.”
43
  Underwriting all of these humanitarian acts, whether they were helping people out 
of Egypt or providing a safe haven for Chinese refugees, was the notion of caring for Christ.  In 
this context, many religious groups found a deep connection to the present day refugee crisis and 
encouraged their parishioners to participate in the campaign as an act of love for God.
44
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If religion or humanity failed to highlight humanitarianism as each individual citizen’s 
responsibility, then patriotism did the trick.  To emphasize the American citizen’s role in the 
refugee crisis, origin stories of the refugees often emphasized Cold War politics.
45
 In this way, 
the refugees were more than just unfortunate victims of natural disaster.  Instead, they were 
political warriors as was the case with “the million refugees in Hong-King –  [who] like the 
130,000 in Western Europe – are in a sense hostages to the idea of freedom.  They fled tyranny, 
often at grave personal risk, in search of a promise that has yet to be fully redeemed.”
46
  As the 
primary bulwark against communist aggression and tyranny, Americans held a special 
responsibility to ensure that these freedom fighters gained their proper reward of protection.  The 
USCR chided that, “the bulk of the world’s refugee have made this choice – freedom as they 
understand it….the rest is up to us.  We who proclaim….equality of opportunity, liberty of 
conscience, freedom from fear and want…We can bring our principles to life, but only if we care 
enough to translate worlds into action.” This call to action placed Americans as the prime 
liberators of refugee rescue because of their special role in the Cold War drama. 
This Cold War paean was familiar.  Only three years earlier the Eisenhower 
administration went to great lengths to incorporate Hungarian refugees into American life under 
the idea of a brotherhood, although they narrowed this vision of brotherhood to a capitalist, free 
world brotherhood.
47
  This concern stemmed directly from the Hungarian uprising of 1956.  
Eisenhower understood this first revolt against socialism as an important litmus test for the ways 
in which the United States would respond.  Watching the uprising unfold before the public’s 
eyes, Eisenhower felt compelled to support in some small way the burgeoning resistance to 
socialism.  Ultimately, Eisenhower opted not intervene in the uprising because of separate policy 
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considerations, but this did not imply that he was content to simply act as a witness.  Looking for 
a way to indirectly support the rebels, Eisenhower opened the possibility of asylum to those who 
managed to flee Hungary once the Soviets defeated the protesting forces.
48
  
  Only three years later, in 1959, Eisenhower saw an opportunity to once again agitate 
against socialist forces on a much grander scale and in a way that would continue to underscore 
America’s humanitarian inclinations.  Eisenhower wrote to the USCR board chairman stating 
“this Administration will support the World Refugee Year and will continue to cooperate with 
our own citizens’ groups and with the other governments of the free world to help resolve the 
grave humanitarian problem of refugees.” However, a key difference emerged in Eisenhower’s 
understanding of the 1956 and 1959 refugee campaigns.  In 1956, he relied on government 
activity to ensure a warm reception of Hungarian refugees by the American people.
49
 By 1959, 
he shifted that role to private groups and commended the USCR for its role stating that “it is 
most gratifying to me that the USCR has been willing to assume a major responsibility for 
mobilizing the private resources of this country to meet the objectives of World Refugee Year.” 
A further boon to the USCR’s efforts was Eisenhower’s explicit explanation of the refugee crisis 
as one of citizen responsibility.  He stated that “The task of refugee care is not one for 
governments alone.  IT can be done only with broad and devoted citizen support.  As leaders in 
your own communities, I know you will want to assume the greatest responsibility to this 
humanitarian cause.”
50
 This admonition neatly buttressed what the USCR had been advocating 
for all along – the importance of the U.S.  citizen in shaping the humanitarian agenda.  
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Throughout the 1959-1960 campaign, other groups also used the crisis of brotherhood to 
bolster their own organizational interests and legitimize the linkages between overt self-interest 
and aid efforts.  Indeed, intensifying the personal links of humanitarian giving was one of the 
greatest effects of the way the USCR approached World Refugee Year – by making it all things 
to all people, groups easily personalized the high stakes of the campaign.  George Meany, AFL-
CIO president and USCR board member managed to make humanitarianism for Hungarian 
refugees, and later World Refugee Year refugees, relevant to the lives of thousands of union 
carrying card members by connecting humanitarian acts to their own self-interest and livelihood.  
In 1957, as discussions took place in Congress over the liberalization of immigration laws like 
the Walter-McArren Act and the role of Hungarian refugees in those policies, the AFL-CIO took 
a decided interest in the outcome of those debates.  The AFL-CIO legislative representative, 
Hyman Bookbinder, stood before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Pending Immigration Bills 
and stated that greater liberalization of immigration policies should happen in order to “reflect 
the democratic and humanitarian traditions of our country.”
51
 According to the AFL-CIO the 
pending acts were rooted primarily in racism and xenophobia.  As the AFL-CIO framed the 
immigration debate, Congress needed to combat the restrictive immigration policies because they 
hampered the progress of America.  Indeed, the AFL-CIO took as its starting point the image of 
the foreigner coming to American shores and giving everything possible to make the country 
better.  In return, they reaped the benefits of hard work.  It was the myth of meritocracy in full 
force as an article in The Federationist declared, “We are all foreigners or descendants of 
foreigners – all except for those few whose ancestors were here to welcome Christopher 
Columbus in 1492.  And we have all contributed to making our country the strongest in the 
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world.”
52
  Even as The Federationist couched AFL-CIO support of the refugees and liberal 
immigration policies in terms of building on a long-standing tradition, the refugees were more 
than simply symbols of American strength and greatness, however.  They also represented an 
important route for labor empowerment acting as a bridge between self-interest and humanitarian 
calculations.
53
 
The AFL-CIO understood the Hungarian refugees and other immigrants seeking 
opportunity in America as one way to swell the ranks of union.  They wrote that “evidence is 
impressive that these Hungarian refugees possess intellectual and industrial skills which will add 
further strength to America, just as other millions of immigrants throughout the years have 
enriched our country.” The industrial skills of the refugees remained key to how the AFL-CIO 
viewed the crisis.  The AFL-CIO considered such numbers a possible boon to shore up the 
organization’s power.  To help pave the way for easy membership, the 1956 Executive Council 
“had approved a program for the rapid employment and acceptance into union membership of 
refugee Hungarian workers.” In addition, affiliated unions were urged to take into membership 
any Hungarian worker who held a union card in his native country and waive their membership 
fee. 
54
 
 The organization was careful not to conflate the admittance of refugees and immigrants 
with open borders.  They did advocate for the government to raise its immigration quota, but 
they offset this by qualifying the admittance of immigrants based on “sound criteria” that 
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included an assessment of “our country’s technical and professional needs.”
55
 In addition, 
descriptions of the increased quota reflected an immigration scheme in which only small 
numbers of individuals would come to the United States.  The Federationist painted such an 
image when they wrote that with the increased quotas “we would welcome to our shores one 
carefully selected immigrant for every 700 Americans.  Is this irresponsible?...Is there any 
community that could not easily absorb one more soul?”
56
AFL-CIO interest in the Hungarian 
refugee crisis spilled over to other refugee crises throughout the world and helps explain their 
diligence in promoting World Refugee Year.  George Meany wrote to one thousand national and 
local affiliates that “The United States has much more to do in support of adequate refugee 
activities, especially during World Refugee Year.” He reiterated the unanimous resolution of the 
AFL-CIO affiliates that they must “participate in activities organized through the United States 
Committee for Refugees in observance of World Refugee Year.” Even as the AFL-CIO 
promoted immigration and later WRY, their emphasis remained on the individual refugee with 
employable skills with little mention made of the family networks that often develop and thrive 
within immigrant and refugee communities.
57
 Limiting humanitarianism also suggested a 
limitation on brotherhood.  Brotherhood, in this case, came to mean a brotherhood of union 
members. 
The AFL-CIO message, like that of the Red Cross and Christian groups, is an important 
example of the way the USCR promoted World Refugee Year to various groups in such a way 
that allowed these groups to define humanitarianism in their own way.  They used a core base of 
brotherhood that could easily be personalized according to the needs of the group being solicited 
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for aid.  In this way the USCR tapped into a variety of different organizations willing to advocate 
for the campaign according to a particular understanding of humanitarianism.  At first glance it 
appeared that the varied groups the USCR managed to wrangle together rallied around and 
uplifted the notion of brotherhood however it was defined.  Closer inspection reveals that the 
strength of brotherhood had fragile roots.  Many of the groups struggled to fully accommodate an 
expansive brotherhood.  For many, the aid victims were too different for full inclusion into 
brotherhood.  In trying to reconcile these tensions, two distinct narratives emerged about the 
refugee crisis, and humanitarian aid victims more generally, and the humanitarian efforts to solve 
the problem.  The USCR played a crucial role in developing these two narratives through World 
Refugee Year through their campaign materials.  For better or worse, these two stories laid the 
foundation for how many Americans understood the aid recipient’s role in future emergencies.  
A tale of two victims: Katya and those “who hate us” 
Although the USCR’s efforts to create a flexible meaning and application for humanitarianism, a 
process that emphasized citizen responsibility, did generate interest in the humanitarian crisis, 
they still faced an uphill challenge in transitioning interest into commitment.  Internal notes from 
the USCR highlighted this exact problem stating that, “the refugee cause arouses universal 
sympathy among the American people but that sympathy must be translated into effective 
action.”
58
 To help secure public commitment, consistent appeals for WRY appeared throughout 
media outlets.  Newspapers ads remained an important means to reach the general public in 
seeking aid as a way to help the “hungry and ragged…living in caves, tents and mud”
59
  Even the 
comic book hero Superman engaged in public service announcements to have children “help, 
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too, by being friendly toward boys like Sandor (a newly arrived refugee).”
60
 In many cases, these 
appeals for aid did prompt concrete action.  The Gary Polish New Immigration Club, for 
example, helped sponsor and resettle refugees like Mr. and Mrs. Bielaj from Belgium, and the 
American Junior Red Cross raised over fifty thousand dollars to aid Algerian refugees.
61
  
Yet a great deal of ambivalence underwrote these appeals for commitments.   Although 
descriptions of America often cited it as a melting pot, a circumscribed vision of American 
identity based on white, middle class images ultimately prevailed.
62
 Questions about the nature 
of a universal brotherhood continuously resurfaced and suggested that popular belief in the idea 
of a global family remained elusive and that for some segments of society finding a place within 
the global family would always be difficult.
63
  Even Superman acknowledged as much.  In the 
PSA in which he starred, he flew down to an unidentified neighborhood to help foster goodwill.  
With his super attuned hearing he heard some young boys looking for playmates.  When one of 
the boys suggests that they ask the new neighbor, Sandor, along, they respond, “Aw, Jim, we 
don’t want Sandor along.  Those refugee kids can’t speak English or play ball or anything.” 
Although the analogy of a global family was beginning to carry some cultural weight and sought 
to include all groups, many U.S. citizens were unable to reconcile the racial, political, and 
cultural differences of refugees.
64
  Welcoming such individuals into the national community did 
                                                             
60
 Clipping, Box 8, WRY, USCR Collection, Edward B. Marks Collection. 
61
 The Gary Post Tribune, The Journal of the American Red Cross, Box 8, WRY, USCR Collection, Edward B. 
Marks Collection.   
62
 Margaret Peacock, Innocent Weapons: The Soviet and American politics of childhood in the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014): 47-51.   
63
 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945-196 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003): 145-146; Benedict Anderson Imagined communities (New York: Verso Press, 2006): 154.  
64
 Klein, 151-153. Klein discusses how Cold War integration world view used adoption discourse as a powerful 
metaphor so that “Asians did not actually have to enter the United States in order to become tied to Americans 
through family bonds.” 
42 
 
not materialize because some Americans felt the differences could not be surmounted.
65
 As a 
result, acting on mistrust of the refugee and the differences they represented, many in the United 
States put the onus of fitting into the global family on the refugee.  Dean Sayre’s prayer for 
refugees at the National Cathedral highlighted this tension in his speech when he spoke of 
refugee groups like “the children of Arabs whose lives are enclosed in barricades of bitterness.”
66
 
His prayer reminded readers that while God loved and blessed everyone and the global family 
included all, those refugees whose lives were so depraved by bitterness, poverty, and difference 
would require extra attention and prayers from congregants to bring them into the familial fold.  
As a result, conflicting perceptions of and engagement with the victims shaped how many in the 
United States understood the crises.  As Dean Sayre suggested, the categorization of different 
kinds of victims necessitated different kinds of humanitarian responses  
One solution to motivate American humanitarian aid involved reworking dominant 
perceptions of victims so that they appeared as able to easily fit a prescribed image of a global 
family based on American identity.
67
  This meant that aid organizations had to confront 
stereotypes of certain national groups as untrustworthy, lazy, or mentally deficient and rework 
them as hardworking, intelligent, and patriotic.
68
  However, WRY materials did not paint all 
refugee groups with the same brushstroke of easy assimilation.   Aid groups developed a two-
pronged approach in discussing humanitarian efforts towards different kinds of refugees.  In this 
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approach, aid was paradoxically expanded and circumscribed based on the group needing aid.   
This fluid expansion and contraction worked to legitimize the differential treatment that victim 
groups received.  In particular, humanitarian aid expanded to accommodate certain European 
refugee groups as WRY educational materials transformed them from people previously 
described as suspect and other into individuals valorized as heroic, hard-working, trustworthy.  
Such was the case when American youth heard stories about how “the Communist government 
of East Germany was very strict with us farmers.  If a farmer was found trying not to pay the 
government the percentage of crops he was due to pay, he might be taken to jail, beaten, and his 
family left all alone to support themselves.” 
69
   
In these cases, educational materials emphasizing the political leanings of Europeans, 
both East and West, overrode previous concerns about race, culture, or language. The 
government, media, and aid groups worked assiduously to remake these refugees in ways that 
made them culturally, politically, and morally acceptable to many in the U.S. public.
70
 The 
USCR felt that without this pertinent political information, “even the most warm-hearted and 
energetic citizen can’t be moved to action…unless he understands the whys and wherefores” of 
the refugee experience.
71
 Because political background was so critical in the eyes of the USCR, 
they created a Community Handbook Guide that provided explicit methods and means for the 
local branches of the USCR to package this information.  The first step included creating a 
“working party” committee whose most important goal entailed “explaining the refugee situation 
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to the public.” To explain this situation, the USCR handbook suggested that the working parties 
“write a series of vignettes” for the newspapers.  They provided a detailed model of what such a 
story should look like: The story focused on six-year old Katya, a refugee child   born in a shack 
in Austria.  Originally, her parents fled communism and had no place to go except for the 
refugee camp.  Katya never lived in a real house, her father had no job, and her mother had no 
kitchen.  She had no school, had never seen a school, and without future assistance afforded by 
sympathetic Americans had no hope of ever going to school.  Importantly, Katya instinctively 
knew that schooling was important and it remained one of her dearest wishes to attend.
72
  
Although this example provided vivid details of Katya’s life, it remained a fictional 
account suggesting that if actual refugees could not be found to fit the idealized background 
story, it was acceptable to simply create a fictionalized account.  As a result, commonplace 
tropes and stereotypes remained important flashpoints for transformation in fictional vignettes 
created by readers, and helped make some European refugee groups from the east more 
recognizable to the U.S. public.
73
 In this way, the fictionalized Katya, and the themes found 
within her story, morphed into an archetype of Eastern European refugee as worthy and heroic.  
Her story acted as an important guidepost that helped U.S. citizens easily differentiate among 
refugees groups and formulate their responses accordingly.  When juxtaposed against other 
refugee stories, Katya’s stood out for her demonstration of hegemonic values perpetuated in the 
United States.
74
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Katya and her family, and the European  refugees they stood in for, symbolized heroic 
victims that Americans could easily root for and help support: Katya’s mother displayed an 
unflappable devotion to home even in the face of the constant filth and grime of a refugee camp, 
her father’s belief in the free world and the choices that provided for his children remained 
undaunted even under strained conditions in a camp life compromised hopes for prosperity, and 
Katya inherently knew that school remained the only viable path to a productive future even 
when she had never been to one.
75
 The heroism Katya’s mother, father, and, even herself, 
embodied appropriate enactments of gender, political, and moral understandings in the victim-as-
hero account.  As Katya’s story unfolds, the white, middle class, heteronormative performances 
of mother, father, and child retained great relevance for donors in the United States, and were 
integral to gaining support for humanitarian endeavors like World Refugee Year, particularly 
against the political backdrop of the Cold War in which “traditional” values seemed under 
siege.
76
  Indeed, one of the most important ways of reimagining European refugees revolved 
around ideas of family, childhood, and gender, which Katya’s entire story emphasized.  Reports 
of refugees often emphasized themes of family, childhood, and gender, all of which played on 
the ideal of a universal brotherhood; seeing refugees enact familiar parenting and family roles 
shortened the distance between those considered outsiders and those in the United States and 
helped establish a link of responsibility.
77
  
Media reports, for example, portrayed European and Eastern European refugees in camps 
as carefully adhering to perceived idealized U.S. gender roles in the context of the family, which 
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include nurturing mothers and strong, dominant fathers.
78
 The magazine Ave Marie explicitly 
laid out one version these roles and reminded readers “a mother and a father are unique persons 
to children.  They are not supposed to be their pals, their playmates, their recreational directors 
albeit they may portray some of these roles some of the time.”
79
 Seeing mothers and fathers like 
Katya’s work unceasingly to shape and mold the future by adhering to U.S. understandings of 
parenting cemented similarities between emergency victims and those in the United States.
80
 
Although Katya’s story may have been a fictionalized account of what refugees in Europe looked 
and sounded like, journalistic pieces appeared that reinforced the themes her story introduced 
and included familiar reference points, such as mothers and fathers taking on specific roles that 
each in their own way helped nurture a strong child capably of defeating enemies.   While fathers 
began to see some flexibility in their role in the home, women remained the bedrock of home and 
private life, at least in middle class conceptions.
81
   
Public images of Eastern European refugee women took pains to associate their work 
with the care and cultivation of family and home.  The WRY story of one Polish refugee family, 
the Rankins, highlights the association between women, home, and the emotional strength 
needed to maintain the two.
82
 Although after the death of her husband, Mrs. Rankin did all 
within her power to maintain the family home, she was  at last “obliged to at last ask for charity” 
as the task of keeping her family together and raising successful children proved too much. 
83
 By 
allowing other experts, in the form of social workers, into her family to help her raise Cold War 
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warrior children, Mrs. Rankin epitomized the role of ideal mother.
84
 In exposing the Rankin 
family’s tragic history, the author highlights Mrs. Rankin’s actions to save her family, and by 
extension the global future, as the necessary actions of an ideal mother.  Ultimately, the piece 
demed her a worthy mother and global citizen through her tireless efforts to save her family and 
children.  When reports foregrounded her role as a mother, Mrs. Rankin’s actions and devotion 
to family made her, and the Eastern European refugees that she represented, relatable to some 
American readers and ameliorated troubling aspects of difference like cultural and language.  In 
the Catholic magazine Signs, an editorial by Sally Leighton weighed in on the necessity of 
women revering their own roles as mothers as a way to protect the future generation of adults. 
She wrote that children, especially girls, are greatly influenced by the demeanor their mothers 
displayed toward motherhood as they prepared for their future lives.
85
 Girls who lived with 
women unhappy with their lot as a wife and mother raised girls who “must naturally have great 
difficulty in seeing the positive aspects of life as wife and mother at all.  Regardless of their 
selection of careers, they will never be womanly or loving.  Their training turned them into tight 
little islands of self-protection.  Fear in mothers flowers into neurosis in daughter.”
86
 Such 
sentiments suggested that women must focus their energies on maintaining a home environment 
that protected future generations and created strong children able to combat the internal and 
external dangers posed by communism.
87
 In this particular view of raising children, the USCR 
portrayed the Eastern European Mrs. Rankin, much like Katya’s mother, as an ideal mother 
because of the lengths she went to in order to protect the private home that nurtured her children.   
                                                             
84
 Kordas, 38-39.  
85
 “To Have a Key,” USCR Collection, Box 8.  
86
 Ibid.  
87
 Kordas, 111-112; Peacock, 87-89. 
48 
 
Media reports also reflected on the role male refugees played in the family.  Descriptions 
of European refugees focused heavily on the male presence in camps and portrayed them as 
enacting a similar role performed by many men in the United States.  The similarity between the 
two rested on their commitment to the family unit and helping raise strong, morally upright 
children..
88
 Elaine Tyler May explains how the Cold War rearticulated expectations of 
fatherhood.  While still maintaining links with the public-outside world, fathers were also 
expected to play a more active role in the home – fatherly activity and leadership prowess 
expected to prevent the nurturing of “sissies” in America.
89
 In the face of concerns about 
American fathers being weak and domineered by overbearing mothers, it was crucial that refugee 
fathers appear strong.
90
 In remaking male Eastern European refugees into familiar figures of 
fatherhood, the migrants transformed into a symbol that many in the United States could easily 
invest in during an emergency.  The UNHCR magazine made explicit reference to the valor of 
European refugee fathers and the lengths they went to in order to sustain the family unit and 
provide a safe haven for their children.  One story recounted the history of barber Constantinos 
Janopoulos, a Romanian refugee on the Greek island of Tinos.  In his story, readers learned that 
his wife died of TB one year after their arrival and he was the sole caregiver for his only son, 
Dimitri.  Facing an uphill battle in applying for resettlement, readers are told that in a promise to 
his dying wife to not let his child fall ill, he everyday he walked “across the island, carrying a 
little bag with shaving gear and scissors, trying to make his fifteen drachmae with which to buy 
the extra food for Dimitri.”
91
 He told the refugee camp counselor that “I shall work like a devil 
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until I own my own shop and can give Dimitri a decent start.” Although stereotypes around 
language, culture, and even race had historically distanced Eastern Europeans from Americans, 
these markers of difference broke down in the face of a common familiarity linked by parental 
roles long enough to demonstrate humanitarian concern.
92
 Just as motherhood remade Eastern 
European women into familiar figures, fatherhood did the same for male refugees.     
Gendered parental roles received so much attention, and in the process helped remake 
European refugees in American eyes, because of “the politics of childhood.”
93
 American readers 
needed to see refugee parents using proper parenting techniques to raise children that would be 
productive, efficient, morally upright, and able to combat communist dangers throughout the 
world.
94
  In this way, children like Katya served as the lynchpin in the remaking of Eastern 
European refugees because they were both the symbolic image of the future world order and the 
tool used to bring that future to fruition.
95
 In their community handbook, the USCR, for example, 
provided readers of WRY with a ten-minute play analyzing the importance of refugee mothers 
and fathers in maintaining traditional roles at all costs.  The short play interviews a refugee 
family, the Torvaks, residing in a camp in Italy.  As the interviewer asks Mr. Torvak why his 
family fled their home country, which is unnamed, his wife replies that they left when they 
discovered the father was about to be arrested.  Although the father “hadn’t done anything bad,” 
he “had been very outspoken against government.” They received word that the arrest was going 
to be made from an old friend who was also a Party member.  When asked at the end of the 
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“interview” what he wanted most, Mr. Torvak replies, “Opportunity to live as a normal 
family.”
96
 Through this play, and other educational materials like it, WRY defined a successful 
family as one that thrived in an open society where a father can voice opinions about conditions 
that relate directly to his ability to raise his family and mothers can focus on raising strong 
children. 
 Pope John XXIII reminded readers of the link between families and Cold War politics 
when he wrote that the war served as a place where “families (are) divided up in spite of their 
own wishes, husbands separated from their wives, children kept away from their parents.”
97
 
Separating families or preventing men and women from participating fully in their parental roles 
had profound familial and political consequences.  The UN took seriously the consequences for 
youth in camps that either divided them from their parents or did not support parenting roles.  
They wrote a pamphlet of such concerns noting that camps potentially bred delinquency and 
mischief stating that children needed protection from the vices of camp life including “drinking, 
rowdyism and open sexual activity (that) take place in some barracks before the eyes of the 
smallest child.”
98
 Although danger and reprehensible ethics lurked in the background of camp 
life, USCR’s World Refugee Year educational materials reminded readers that American donors 
could easily help European children overcome such a fate.
99
 Their financial largesse could 
provide the parents of camp children with self-help programs that would allow them to recover 
from the disaster of flight.  Just as importantly, these programs would allow parents to model 
appropriate behaviors like perseverance and hard work that their children could emulate.  
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Such political potential carried much currency, even in humanitarian emergencies 
because children reminded donors and potential donors that childhood, mothering, and fathering 
each held their own innate political importance.  Thus this “politics of childhood” remained a 
vital calculation in the newly evolving, and Cold War oriented, humanitarianism and helped to 
remake previously unwanted European refugees into worthy and heroic victims.  The same could 
not be said, however, for refugee flows from the Third World.  Children as political agents were 
less reassuring when the political context sifted from explicit Cold War politics to anti-colonial 
or nationalistic politics.  They, too, experienced a reimagining from U.S. aid groups and media, 
but the profound entrenchment of racial understandings and stereotypes and the presence of 
nationalism played a key role in limiting the kind of aid many Americans were willing to extend.  
Just as aid expanded for certain groups like European refugees based on ideas of an imagined 
community, universal brotherhood, and transformative potential, it contracted for many others 
who were understood as having less capacity to transform to model behavior.  The magazine 
Friends World News encapsulated the dilemma of caring for different refugee categories when 
they wrote that “our concern for refugees is of such long standing that it may seem impertinent to 
ask what more we can do; but a concern is not worthy of the name unless constantly renewed and 
revisited in the light of new circumstances.  The refugee problem, which is dynamic not static, 
continuously presents us with new demands on our energies, our ingenuity, and our 
compassion.”
100
  In referencing the dynamic refugee problem, the author was discussing the 
many groups outside of European refugees: the one million refugees described as “the most 
needy refugees in the world,” over 200,000 Algerians living in Tunisia and Morocco in “shacks 
and crude shelters constructed themselves” and the largest group of refugees, those from 
Palestine, that had such voluminous numbers that they required their own UN Agency, the 
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UNWRA.
101
 Such diverse groups required “revisitation” and “renewal” and posed a different 
sense of investment in the refugee problem than the uprooted in Europe presented.  In a latter 
edition of the magazine, the author, Duncan Woods, presents the situation in much starker terms.  
He writes that while many are concerned about the large numbers of displaced, “most people 
feel, nevertheless, that to spread their money evenly among the 25 million uprooted people in the 
world would not be very effective, and that it would be better to concentrate their energies on 
one or two sectors of the problem.”
102
 Woods notes that for most people, these one or two sectors 
are locations of European refugees.   
 The Providence Journal, for example, exposes the conflation of refugee and European as 
it urged American readers welcome ‘hard core’ refugees into the nation.  The definition of hard 
core included refugees refused entry because of health, age, and illness, and such cases were 
dispersed throughout the world.  The journal, however, explicitly referenced only the hardcore 
cases of Europe, leaving aside other cases in Africa, China, and the Middle East.  The 
accompanying photo reinforced sympathy towards a specific European population by showing 
an example of a hard core refugee whose white skin marked him as European.
103
  Some 
exceptions did occur to this pattern as when the Catholic magazine The Sign wrote a full expose 
on refugee populations that were not European.  They wrote that, “World Refugee Year is 
designed to shake the conscience of the world; here are the Hong Kong refugees, the most 
forgotten of all.”
104
 Yet, even as reports presented the forgotten refugees like those in Hong 
Kong through the analogy of a common humanity, they also placed these same groups on an 
                                                             
101
 Friends World News, July 1959, USCR Collection, Box 8.   
102
 Duncan Woods, Friends Journal: A Quaker Weekly , 28 May 1960 
103
 Providence Journal, December, 1959, USCR Collection, Box 8. Edward B. Marks, Matthew Fry Jacobson, 
Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999): 201-202. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: 113 
104
 The Sign, USCR Collection, Box 8.  
53 
 
uneven footing within that family.  Ave Marie, even as it spoke of similarities, remarked on the 
many ways that refugees in places like Algeria, Hong Kong, and the Middle East stood apart 
from donors in the United States and refugee groups in Europe.  Hygiene, for example, came to 
represent insurmountable approaches to daily life activity.  In this portrayal, dirt and filth 
highlighted individual and cultural deficiencies rather than issues related to poverty and a lack of 
access to resources.
105
  A reporter stated of the refugees left over from the 1947 India and 
Pakistan partition, “I have seen them living on the streets of Calcutta in a bewildered daze.  They 
crowd vacant lots in a confused mass of people, sleeping exposed to the elements, hidden 
beneath the pall of smoke from fires built to keep them warm.  The peripatetic sacred cows get 
more sympathy and attention than these unfortunate humans.”
106
 Such statements that questioned 
the religious and moral systems implied that such people and nations would have difficulty 
assimilating into the global family of liberal democracies.
107
  
As the USCR worked to promote ideals of brotherhood, the images they used to urge 
people into action worked in quiet ways to undermine the rhetoric of a global family that they 
championed.   For example, the image of neighborhood and helping neighbors proved an 
important point of reference that the USCR continuously referred to in their appeals for aid.  It 
was also an image that held a double-meaning as at once a bounded space of inclusion and 
exclusion.
108
 As a means to conflate conceptions of sameness and refugee, the USCR offered a 
hypothetical to potential donors: “would you care if someone in your neighborhood were trapped 
                                                             
105
 Carmen Martinez Novo, Who Defines Indigenous?: Identities, development, intellectuals, and the state in 
Northern Mexico (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2006): 96 
106
 Ave Marie, USCR Collection, Box 8.  
107
 Klein, 22-23. 
108
 Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006): 45-46; Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the making of modern conservatism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005): 105. 
54 
 
in their home by a disaster?”
109
  In planting this disaster within a neighborhood context, the 
USCR played on the idea of similarity and brotherhood of all men declaring that “two and a half 
million refugees are much more than a statistic.  They are families.  They are men, women, and 
children.  They have unused skills, unfulfilled aspirations, frustrated needs.”
110
  If the use of a 
neighborhood context was intended to evoke a common bond, other unacknowledged meanings 
of neighbor and neighborhood lurked alongside themes of similarity.
111
 In an era of 
suburbanization spurred by racial fears, neighborhoods also declared fixed, non-porous 
borders.
112
 As the growth of suburbia and its accompanying racial undertones surged forward, 
discussing refugees in terms of helping a neighbor did meet with some resistance.
113
 Shortly after 
World Refugee Year ended, The New York Times ran an article that served as a warning for 
excessive inclusion into neighborhoods, towns, and communities.  The article spoke of an 
Albanian refugee welcomed into the hearts and homes of a small British town where residents 
found the young man a job and supplied his wife and young son with clothing and provided the 
family with a house.  Dissatisfied with the working conditions, the young Albanian refugee 
decided to seek his fortune in London.  The British Council for Aid to Refugees called the 
Albanian an “ingrate” and “treated his friends (who established him in a new life) very badly.” 
Furthermore, the article suggested that he should have behaved more like his fellow refugees 
who “are settling down happily and gratefully into their new homes.”
114
 The article made clear 
that welcoming strangers into the neighborhood came with the prospect of allowing morally 
suspect and ungrateful elements into the community, ultimately changing the composition for the 
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worse.
115
 The author also included the important lesson that no amount of welcoming embrace 
could obscure the differences of language and culture that refugees brought with them.  It was 
noted that part of the reason for the flight to London was because the refugee felt loneliness and 
his young wife “wanted to be in London among persons who spoke her language.” Such 
comments and observations lay the onus of community disruption at the door of the refugee; it 
was entirely the refugee’s deficiencies that caused such rancor and uproar in the community.   
Aid groups also embraced the notion that refugees and aid victims from outside of 
Europe were fundamentally different from those in the West and, in consequence, in need of a 
different kind of aid system.  The Reverend of the National Cathedral, Francis Sayre, summed up 
this sentiment when described his visit to Middle East refugees in which he met many who 
“simply hate us.”
116
 Discussions of most European refugees marked them as appropriate, worthy 
victims with inherent value systems similar to values held by many in the United States, although 
there were limits even to this as the report on the Albanian refugee revealed.  Such shared values 
suggested that aid to reimagined European refugees would be of short duration and limited in 
scope because of perceived close cultural associations between Europe and the United States.
117
 
When discussions around third world refugees emerged, however, aid groups pointedly 
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discussed the different kinds of approaches needed for non-European refugees and the more 
arduous challenges faced when trying to help people whose lives were encased in bitterness.  
Addressing a large audience at the 1959 refugee meeting in Washington, D.C. about the need for 
relief in areas other than Europe, the preacher Sayre wrote, “I don’t believe this has been quite 
said before, at least entirely.  A lot depends on how this work is done, and how the assistance is 
given.”
118
 It was clear from such sentiments that aid would take much longer and require a 
greater commitment to root out the transformative potential of Third World emergency aid 
recipients.  
In order to illustrate the intensive aid necessary in refugee areas like the Middle East, 
Sayre discussed his encounter with a young boy who, upon their first meeting, looked at the 
pastor with “black hostility in his eyes, a look of pure hatred, the sort of thing that brings you up 
short.” He explains to readers that although boys like the one he has encountered has received 
“seeds of excellent corn, and chickens, and in this case, a school built by one of our American 
foundations for these boys,” they “nevertheless, hate us.” Readers are left with little doubt that 
the aid recipients in underdeveloped areas like the Palestinian refugee camps are fundamentally 
different, unable to accept, appreciate, and express gratitude for the aid gifts they are given.  
Eventually, according to the preacher, the young boy momentarily lapsed into smiles; the 
preacher had won him over by teaching him the “Virginia Reel.” Although the preacher relayed 
the story as an inspirational moment highlighting the kind of change that can occur through 
individual interaction, it also exposed the assumptions about what aid groups would face in the 
Third World when providing humanitarian aid.  In thinking about emergencies beyond Europe’s 
borders, aid groups declared that the “refugee problem in Europe was almost over,” they 
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simultaneously discussed the need for a well-entrenched plan for any aid measures taking place 
outside of the West as the refugee numbers there continued to rise at an alarming rate. 
Aid groups understood that the huge numbers of emergency victims were intimately 
related to the decolonization process, a situation that according to Sayre’s interpretation required 
greater commitment and endurance on the part of U.S.  citizens and aid groups.  They linked the 
dangers of a restless, nationalist refuge population in the Third World to the vulnerability of 
world stability.
119
 In pleading for aid, the USCR stated that the 230,000 Algerians in Tunisia and 
Morocco “are not only a serious drain on the impoverished economies of these new nations; they 
are potentially a sources of political unrest and contribute to strained and hostile relations in 
North Africa.”
120
 Such comments spoke to wary undercurrents about decolonization and the 
ways in which migrants and refugees posed potential problems to nations already understood by 
U.S. policymakers as incompetent.
121
 Questions about the ability of new nations to successfully 
manage the potential political danger of refugee groups were exacerbated by the perceived 
significant portion of youth refugees in the third world like the “180,000 refugees (in Tunisia and 
Morocco), a large proportion of them aged persons and children” or the refugees in the Middle 
East “that now number over a million” and which “40% of whom are less than fifteen years old.”  
Facing the prospect of literal and figurative young nations raised fears about whether a young, 
immature non-European population could truly transform into politically responsible world 
citizens as they tread the road of decolonization.
122
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The UN publication The Tragedy of the Child Refugee discussed with alarm the high 
stakes of world stability with so many young, rootless nationals.  A full page photo of two 
children in a refugee camp underscores the political consequences of family life in camp.  As a 
young girl sits on a stoop, eating her meal, a young boy slouched in a chair sits next to her.  He 
looks off in the distance with an unreadable expression.  The caption helps the reader imagine 
the state of the mind of the child as it declares of the boys, “He has already been stamped by 
camp life, had become unruly, and unless removed immediately from the camp may develop into 
a bitter, cynical delinquent with a chip on his shoulder.” The unruly boy came to represent an 
entire generation; it was not only his individual future course that was at stake.
123
 Rather, “one 
unsettled childhood may thus reproduce its ill effects in a widening circle” by influencing his 
peers and those in his society.  Such descriptions of camp life painted a picture whereby 
relationships in such a setting easily lapsed into crime, violence, and aggression for unproductive 
youth and marked children as having an expiration date.  If the aid programs could not 
rehabilitate and teach children in the Third World to subsume their feelings of nationalistic pride 
in or internalize loyalty to a larger world order underwritten by individualism, efficiency, and 
market orientations within a certain time period, their impending adulthood would threaten the 
very foundation of democracy and liberalism.
124
 This was especially true when discussions of 
young boys and adolescent boys arose in areas outside of Western Europe.   UNRWA, for 
example, repeatedly pointed to the importance of education for Palestinian youth as a means to 
“salvage the talents of refugee youth” and channel them in productive ways.
125
 In another photo 
showing a Chinese refugee child not much older than a toddler, the caption reads, “Seeds of 
                                                             
123
 Kordas, 135; “The Tragedy of the Refugee Child,” USCR Collection, Box 8.  
124
 Judith Sealander notes that the same conversations were taking place in the United States about boys who were 
not white, The Failed Century of the Child: Governing America’s young in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 48-49. 
125
 “A Program for Palestine Refugees,” USCR Collection, Box 8, Edward B. Marks Collection, WRY Box.  
59 
 
distrust are fostered in youngsters by the struggle for survival.  One result is a high rate of 
delinquency.”
126
 The caption made clear that someone needed to save the child before he 
destroyed himself, his community, and wreaked havoc on the international order. 
In their campaign to sustain public interest in the humanitarian effort, the USCR spoke 
pointedly to increasing concerns about the numbers of children and their future role in their 
communities and in the world, children who are “growing into manhood with eyes dulled by the 
chill gloom of living in a refugee camp.”
127
 Although many in the United States felt distance 
between those “who hate[d] us,” groups like the USCR assuaged fears of these boys by 
generalizing victims as innocent and malleable children and mothers --  a process which 
endowed refugee groups in developing countries with important potential for transformation.  
The coupling of refugee and women and malleable children became so ingrained that the 
UNHCR ran a later campaign reinforcing the linkages as it made clear in educational material 
that “the majority of refugees are women and girls.”
128
 In 1959, educational campaign materials 
were just beginning to code refugees and refugee camps in gendered and generational language.  
A constant reaffirmation that refugee meant women and children took place in various ways.  In 
text, the European Director of Catholic Relief Services noted that most Americans were 
“unsympathetic because they have never seen a refugee.  If they ever saw a refugee child 
languishing in a camp, their hearts would be opened.”
129
 Photos also provided powerful visual 
cues that refugees meant women and children.  Photos of the camps in Hong Kong, for example, 
provided glimpses into different aspects of daily life.
130
 Photos highlight women’s activities as 
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they work in grimy streets or sift through garbage with children strapped to their backs.  Children 
constitute the other half of the photographic formula as they are shown barefoot and engaging in 
manual labor.  Other photos managed to capture some of the most private and important daily 
life rituals like meal time further underscoring refugee as female and child.  Such intimate 
moments continue to emphasize the role of women and children and mark men as conspicuously 
absent.  If men are photographed they are in the shadows as part of the background.  Other are 
depicted as old or infirm posing little threat to the world and with little potential to protect and 
guide their families.  By using gendered and generational language and visual cues to discuss the 
refugee problem, humanitarian aid groups worked to make peoples in the third world less of a 
threat. ”
131
 For example, UNRWA continuously pointed to the role of education as one of the 
most important solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem deflecting important political 
questions about the situation.  They even quoted Palestinian parents as saying, “Take away our 
rations, but let our children go to school!”
132
 These were groups to be pitied and molded rather 
than feared. 
As a result of differences in the representations between refugee groups, aid became a 
two-tiered structure with clearly demarcated limits ideas about universal brotherhood and 
humanitarianism.  Two important distinctions appeared in the kind of aid humanitarian groups 
suggested for varied refugee groups.  First, differences in the duration of aid became clear for the 
two groups.  Groups advocating for aid painted European refugees as needing little on-going 
assistance.  It was assumed they had the appropriate background, values, and behaviors to 
succeed with only minimal assistance while refugees from other areas would need greater 
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commitment.
133
 Second, disparities emerged in the extent of aid offered, especially with regard 
to resettlement.  As the campaign offered lists to readers about the numbers of rootless in the 
world, some worried that the refugees “were bent on immigration to the United States.” The 
USCR directly addressed this issue in popular media outlets by offering comfort that the vast 
majority of refugees would not, nor did they want, to arrive on American shores.  Writing to the 
Ladies Home Journal about admissions processes, Edward B. Marks reassured his audience that 
while the USCR did recommend an increase in the immigration quota numbers they also 
recognized that “not all the refugees in today’s world regard the United States immigration to be 
a practical possibility, or even an objective.  Only token numbers of the million Chinese refugees 
in Hong Kong will ever reach our shores.  The same is true of almost a million Arab refugees, 
more than 200,000 Algerian refugees now in Tunisia and Morocca, and those latest refugees, the 
Tibetans streaming into India.”
134
 Referring to the token numbers of third world refugees helped 
reassure donors that aid for these groups worked within prescribed boundaries and excluded the 
possibility of life within the US. In effect, many concerned and humanitarian minded American 
citizens were content to place limits on a universal brotherhood of love manifested in 
humanitarianism.  For them, reimagining the world certainly had its limits.  
Conclusion  
 In order to involve more Americans in the humanitarian process and flesh out the 
expectations of aid donors and recipients, groups like the USCR had to raise the profile of 
emergencies and transform Americans into consumers of humanitarian emergencies, which they 
did by focusing on the role of children.   In the process, the WRY campaign established a critical 
paradigm for understanding humanitarian victims by focusing on the children of displacement.  
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Images of children at once collapsed suffering into one large generic category and particularized 
it.  In generalizing suffering, the Catholic Magazine Ave Maria reminded readers that the World 
Refugee Year Program “will attempt identification by showing that refugees are people like 
ourselves.”
135
  Comparing the idea of “others” and “ourselves” proved a useful starting point 
when discussing obstacles the refugee faced.  The Junior Red Cross Magazine reminded readers 
of common bonds when they defined refugees by stripping away basic essentials of life 
circumstances, “Take away home.  Take away loved ones.  Take away place and function in life.  
Take away, in many instances, hope.  What is left is a refugee.”
136
 This article wanted to 
reinforce that only a fine line separated refugees from readers.   For those who took seriously the 
idea of a global family, it was problematic to remain as only an observer to swelling refugee 
numbers around the world.  Indeed, one of the primary goals of the USCR included reflecting 
“an American concern for refugee problems wherever they exist in the world” and stimulating 
“the maximum assistance to refugees from the American people and the U.S. Government.”
137
 
The constant refrain of a common humanity, often represented through images of children,  
compelled many to embark on action in some capacity: the group United Church Women carried 
articles on the refugee problem in every issues of their journal, the YMCA recruited members to 
participate in a letter writing campaign to senators on behalf of refugee assistance, Girl Scout 
Troops collected “Clotheslines of Clothes” to send to refugees, the Washington League of 
Women’s voters created a special program around the theme of refugees, in New York the local 
USCR committee held the Broadway production of “At the Drop of a Hat” which raised 7,000 
dollars, and Hollywood developed  the short video, “A Call from the Stars,” about refugees and 
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which featured stars such as Harry Belafonte, Bing Crosby, Burl Ives, Paul Newman, Joanne 
Woodward, and David Niven among others.  Although all children were symbolic of the larger 
brotherhood of humanity and the future of the world, the USCR campaign teased out threads of 
decolonization, poverty, and imagined racial difference by underscoring each child’s geographic 
biography.  The particular characteristics of each child’s suffering marked them  as different and 
outside of the larger community of brotherhood.  In this way, the future of the child and their 
potential for transformation, and by extension the nation and world, was very much attached to 
the land from which they came.  Increasing awareness of situations around the world like the 
“forgotten” refugees in Hong Kong through an investigation of the lives of children in those 
emergencies created a shorthand script for how to think about America’s place in the world vis-
à-vis humanitarian aid.    
Just as the campaign helped reimagine victims of emergencies, the campaign helped 
Americans reflect on and establish their own role in humanitarian action.  Modern 
humanitarianism gained a permanent foothold, or struck its “bullseye,” working beyond a 
particular geography and time scope only once it was formulated as an ideology that Americans 
could relate to financially, ideologically, and culturally.  Although civil wars in Africa may not 
have directly affected the lives of American citizens in the same way that World War II did, the 
cause of brotherhood widened the possibilities of connections.  Linking Americans and 
emergency victims through this fragile web of brotherhood and humanity created a new role for 
Americans – that of emergency consumers – in which Americans consumed the spectacle of 
suffering via media and consumed emergencies via their pocketbook.  Emergency consumers 
watched, listened, and waited for developments on areas around the world experiencing vast 
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amounts of suffering waiting for an opportunity to alleviate this suffering.  USCR’s campaign 
was critical to this development. 
USCR’s World Refugee Year campaign had success in establishing important 
humanitarian ideals, laid the groundwork for this new role of emergency consumers to guide 
American interaction with the world, and acted as an important blueprint in how aid groups 
talked about aid.  However, there were limits to this burgeoning ideology and the next big 
emergency that captured American attention – the 1967 Nigeria- Biafra civil war -- helped flesh 
out these limitations.  Like the USCR campaign, understandings of childhood lay at the heart of 
American reluctance to increase or continue aid.  While aid groups pulled Americans into the 
plight of the Biafran struggle by circulating images of starving children, Biafran’s own use and 
understandings of childhood stood in opposition to the many understandings of American 
childhood that overlay the photos of children from the war.  This meant that organizations like 
the USCR who were working to illicit a certain mode of American sympathy had to carefully 
plan how they would present their humanitarian plea to the broader American public.   
If they wanted participation in a non-war time period, they had to learn how to strike the 
right chord.  World Refugee Year struck that balance by both recognizing the transformative 
potential of aid recipients that adhered to a specific victim role and legitimizing American 
anxieties about the Third World through discussions of those nations’ inability to transform.  
Both recognizing hopes and legitimizing American concerns hinged on the cultural productions 
and understandings of and about children that aid groups utilized in their aid campaigns.  The 
next chapter explores how these hopes and concerns over children advanced a humanitarian 
ideology within the context of the 1967 Biafra- Nigeria Civil War.  It does this by looking at the 
fragile alliance between NGOs and the American people as they debated the core tenets of 
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American aid.  These debates represented a key moment that further advanced the importance of 
transformation in the evolution of a humanitarian ideology as the American people staunchly 
reaffirmed that aid recipients that broke the victim role and struck out on their own 
transformative path would have sever repercussions in the arena of aid.  
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Chapter Three: Casualty of War: Transformation, Biafran babies, and U.S. humanitarianism in 
the 1967 Nigerian-Biafran Civil War 
 
Introduction 
If World Refuge Year highlighted the importance of transformative potential in aid victims, 
Biafra showcased how that transformative potential was written on the American public’s terms.  
In the end, the conflict became a powerful warning for aid groups on how to generate, sustain, 
and manage the key element of American public perception in generating humanitarian interest.  
This chapter analyzes the slow demise of American support by unpacking the relationship 
between childhood, humanitarianism, and the discourse of self-determination to explore how the 
U.S. public built upon and extended the rigid limitations on U.S. humanitarian efforts during the 
Nigeria-Biafra war.  It argues that U.S. conceptions of childhood had disastrous implications for 
humanitarianism in emergencies.  Conceptions of childhood stood as the ultimate litmus test of a 
nation’s worthiness to participate in the international arena; there was little sympathy or 
understanding for conceptions of childhood that fell outside of this circumscribed image in a war 
context.   For Biafra, this translated into an initial outpouring of U.S. sympathy followed by 
stagnated interest and eventually a reversal of support.
1
  This reversal of fortune can be directly 
linked to perceptions of inappropriate aid recipient behavior in relationship to their the stewards 
of Biafran children.  
 In 1967, reports began circulating throughout the United States of a brutal conflict taking 
place in the West African country of Nigeria.
2
 The violence centered on a civil war in Nigeria in 
which the Federal Military Government (FMG) attempted to suppress independence demands 
from a minority population, the Igbo, living in the Eastern province of the country.  The Igbos, 
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the dominant social group in eastern Nigeria, began a large scale push for independence in 
reaction to a massacre perpetrated on their group in 1966.
3
 Biafra leader, Colonel Ojukwu, 
claimed the attacks represented an on-going pattern of violence against the Igbo and other 
minority groups in the east.
4
 In consequence, Biafra declared independence sparking moves by 
the FMG to put down the cessation movement.  In their attempts to squelch the rebellion, the 
FMG instigated a blockade of all supplies to the area, intending to starve the population into 
submission, many of whom were children and women.  With armed military men stationed along 
the disputed borders, Biafra was unable to receive food and people began dying from starvation 
as an effect of the blockade.  Visual evidence of the suffering drew world attention to the 
conflict.  In one of the most publicized examples of using food as a weapon of war, reporters 
leaked images of starving children to the international community.
5
 Many of the images 
presented in U.S. newspapers and media outlets centered on the destruction the war waged on 
young children.  Photos of children showed the results of kwashiorkor, distended bellies and rust 
colored hair, and underscored the violence of the conflict on all Biafrans, not just military 
combatants.  Americans saw mothers and children languishing side-by-side, and, in the most 
extreme cases, corpses littering the ground.
6
  
While the conflict had preoccupied British and Irish aid groups for some time, the images 
galvanized newly established groups in the United States to take up the Biafran cause and act as 
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mediators in the crisis.
7
 The groups pressured the Lyndon and then Nixon administrations for a 
variety of outcomes: increased food aid, a stop to the war, and U.S. recognition of the 
independent state of Biafra.  These were not necessarily complementary goals and such diversity 
underscored underscoring that not all humanitarian aid groups that arose in response to this crisis 
in the U.S. held the same objectives for Biafra.  Archives from the largest record keeper of this 
period, the Clearinghouse for Biafra, reveal that at least three different categories of grassroots 
aid groups emerged in the United States during that time with goals that often overlapped.
8
 One 
category included groups whose sole mission was to end the conflict in order to stop the 
humanitarian emergency taking place.  While such groups aided all people in the conflict their 
emphasis generally rested on viewing children as the primary victim of the war warning, “even 
when they’re fed, the starving children of Nigeria Biafra may die for want of medical attention.”
9
 
Often volunteers started these groups.  Volunteer doctor, Michael Rees, for example, organized 
the Medical Support Committee for Biafra –Nigeria Relief to provide medical services to the 
victims of Biafra.
10
 They claimed no political loyalties believing instead that “transnational 
action was related in some way to the transcendent.” 
11
 Several scholars have analyzed these 
purely humanitarian groups working in Biafra, though the focus often rests on the larger scale 
operations and privileges European humanitarianism.
12
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The apolitical humanitarian groups that represented one emerging view of the crisis 
countered a second category of aid group: the political humanitarian.
13
  The most visible of the 
Biafra aid groups in the United States, the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive, managed 
to make important inroads in shaping congressional and white house policy.  A motley 
assortment of individuals steeped in transnational activity led the political humanitarian 
movement.  Paul Connett, ACKBA’s leader, hailed from England and took up residence as a 
university student in New York.  They took a tortuous path in determining how to present the 
conflict to the American people.  Brian McNeil’s analysis of the campaign history of the group 
the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive exposes the conscious decision some 
humanitarians made to make their humanitarian efforts political.
14
 Although the group initially 
focused on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict, they soon decided simply showing photos of 
starving children was not generating the kind of support needed to end the war.  They charted a 
new direction in their campaign and began lobbying for U.S. recognition of an independent 
Biafra as the only way to end the suffering.  In a telling decision, they explicitly rejected a 
humanitarian campaign that focused solely on the suffering of children.
15
 Instead, they crafted an 
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argument rooted in rights discourse that intertwined individual and collective rights.
16
 They 
crafted an argument rooted in rights discourse, but, as McNeil argues they ultimately failed in 
their mission because rights issues did resonate with the administration or the American people.
17
 
Lasse Heerten expands on the role of rights in the international struggle by explaining that the 
Biafra government’s reliance on a genocide discourse even in the face of contrary evidence 
fatefully eroded Biafra leaders’ international credibility leaving little sympathy for Biafra’s 
proclamation that Lagos violated their collective rights.
18
    
To contribute to the scholarship of Biafra and humanitarian studies, this chapter explores 
the understudied efforts of a third category of aid group in the United States.  This group, best 
represented by the Biafra Relief Services Foundation (BRSF), arose in an attempt to straddle a 
middle ground, incorporating apolitical and political humanitarianism drawing on both elements 
when necessary.  They were distinctly different from other aid groups because, first, Biafra 
expats filled leadership positions and, second, they arose out of diaspora networks in the United 
States.  They were invested in humanitarian relief in Biafra because of their nationalist 
connections in a way that groups like ACKBA and Medical Support Committee were not.   
BRSF’s straddling of two worlds to encourage U.S. sympathy required a certain amount of 
fluidity and malleability in their presentation of the conflict and they had to constantly gauge the 
reception of their message.  Children became the baseline by which they judged and were judged 
in the fluid public relations spectacle that was Biafra.  Their understanding and symbolic use of 
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children in their humanitarian campaign distinguished them from their humanitarian peers.  
Unlike their American and Western led counterparts like the Medical Support Committee that 
focused on Western understandings of childhood as a time of innocence, or failed to incorporate 
it at all like ACKBA, Biafran aid groups imbued children with a distinct sense of political 
agency integral to the mission of saving Biafra.
19
 Children as active, fully formed political 
agents, according to this vision, shouldered the same expectation of sacrifice that adults did in 
the struggle for self-determination.  The images of children as politically active, involved, and 
present in the creation of an independent state did share new U.S. conceptions of a citizen-child 
soldier that emerged at the onset of the Cold War.
20
 However, the depth of activity expected 
from the Biafran citizen-child ultimately unsettled deeply entrenched U.S. understandings of 
childhood which viewed children as unable “to form their own view “and moved beyond 
accepted patriotic behavior. ”
21
 Groups like BRSF transgressed important beliefs about the 
childhood experience, namely that children inhabited either an innocent and apolitical world or 
violated the newly emerging norms of how children could participate in a national conflict in 
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socially acceptable ways that still framed them as adults-in-training.  This transgression had 
profound implications for how relief in Biafra unfolded and resulted in the diminished support 
for self-determination and humanitarian relief.  
In conceptualizing children as worthy of sacrifice in the same way as their adult counter-
parts in the pursuit of independence, public aid campaigns led by diaspora aid groups 
unintentionally marked Biafrans as unable to enact a proper role in the international arena and 
thus unworthy of humanitarian aid.
22
  In effect, in pursuing nationalistic goals through cessation 
and asking all Biafrans, even children, to take part in cessation efforts, Biafra undermined its 
credibility as a worthy aid recipient with attendant redeeming transformative potential.  In 
consequence, as those in the U.S.  public and government officials recalculated their 
commitment to Biafra, the children of the war zone began to occupy a liminal space; while 
worthy of interest and concern, based on the political proclivities of their parents, they were not 
quite the safe bet that humanitarians were hoping for in the aid calculus to restack the 
international deck.  Rather than fostering common bonds based on shared visions of the child 
citizen-soldier, the embedded nationalism emphasized by Biafra aid groups in their humanitarian 
appeals dissuaded many in the American public and administration from getting involved.  U.S. 
ambivalence towards supporting the conflict did not stem from confusion over individual and 
collective rights as McNeil and Heerten suggest.  Rather, for many in the United States, the 
tension lay in the perceived abandonment of parental duty to protect children in order to pursue 
the right of self-determination.  As the conflict progressed with no end in sight, the ambivalence 
towards supporting the conflict only increased as a direct result of perceived transgressions that 
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Biafran citizens would willingly sacrifice their children.  Ultimately, the pressure of U.S. aid 
groups to end the war was only partially successful.
23
 Aid did increase, but not enough to prevent 
ongoing starvation; the war did not stop and neither did the white house recognize the 
independent state of Biafra.
24
 This first section of this chapter looks at an expansion in the 
United States of childhood activity in the Cold War era and its interplay with traditional 
assumptions of childhood as a time of innocence.  The second section explores the ways in 
which Biafra aid groups tried to accommodate these understandings without sacrificing their own 
vision of childhood.  Finally, the last section analyzes the ways in which Biafra aid group 
strategies failed to convince the American people of the worthiness of aid and what that meant 
for humanitarianism as a whole.  
Shades of American Childhood: Innocence and productivity  
 In 1967, at a testimony before a hearing of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, when asked for solutions to increase the academic achievement of children in inner city 
schools, Dr. Shapiro, District Superintendent for Lower East and West Side, Manhattan, stated 
that one of the most important things for activists in the city “is to provide to the child who lives 
in the slum, who has been forced to in a sense, become sol self-reliant so early that he has, in a 
sense, been forced to give up his childhood.” For Shapiro, childhood fit within a specific image: 
“It is the hallmark of being a human being to have a long childhood.  A long childhood…you 
might say is the first essence of humanity.”
25
 Shapiro’s comments revealed an important 
perception of what childhood experience in the United States entailed, namely that the children’s 
world reflected a polar opposite of what constituted the adult world: free of worry and work and 
filled instead with a sense of security and love that stemmed from the presence of a strong 
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supportive family.
26
 Additionally, Shapiro’s comments reveal another undercurrent of the 
childhood experience: caring adults needed to protect this time and space, particularly when an 
evolving youth culture appeared to wreak havoc with traditional understandings of authority.
27
 
Although scholars from multiple disciplines have highlighted how wide swaths of American 
children did not experience this idealized image, the perception of an innocent childhood 
persisted.
28
 In the case of Biafra, childhood innocence galvanized American interest and also 
served as a yardstick by which to measure the nationalists leading the independence movement 
For certain segments of American observers, the disturbing images of sick and dying 
children in Biafra that filtered through news outlets and played on childhood as a period in need 
of protection and translated into a call for action, that “if you like children” you needed to help.
29
 
Susan Durr, working for the Public Relations department of  Rumrill-Hoyt, stated after 
establishing the Clearing House for Nigeria/Biafra that “We were concerned  that many 
Americans did not realize their own potential to help the Biafran refugees and even more 
important, did not know how to go about being useful.”
30
  Durr started the Clearinghouse in 1968 
as a way to “distribute facts about the crisis in Biafra to organizations in communities and on 
high school and college campuses.”
31
 For emergency consumers like Durr, Biafra appeared as 
proof that children everywhere needed the kind of protection commonly found in the United 
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States.  Biafran children stood as the consummate aid victim with stick thin legs and bloated 
bellies.
32
 In one case, The Africa Fund, took out a full page ad meant for the reader to send to 
President Johnson.  The group placed a photo of a small, unclothed child lying on his side at the 
top of the page.  The letter to Johnson wrote that “within twenty-four hours of the time you have 
read it [the ad], six thousand will have died.  And half of them will be children.” The letter goes 
on to ask, “But who speaks for the children? Those children who will never live long enough to 
learn to speak” implying that if the U.S. government could not, or would not, step in to aid the 
children, then private citizens should. 
33
  
As groups seized on starving children as the ultimate indicator that the United States 
needed to take action in the conflict, they placed more pressure on the Johnson administration to 
address the war.
34
 They asked LBJ and members of Congress to increase humanitarian aid and in 
the case of the more politically active groups like ACKBA, recognize independence of the 
fledgling nation.
35
 Increasingly, Johnson had to respond to arguments inside the United States for 
recognition of an independent Biafra.
36
 For example, at the 1968 University of Columbia 
conference on Biafra, a poem read from African nationalist Patrice Lumumba exposed the war as 
a legacy of colonialism in which colonial rulers had a “barbaric right of fist and a white right to a 
whip” and presented independence as the only way to fully resolve the lingering effects of this 
former system.  The poem ended with the exhortation that “The dawn is here, my brother, dawn! 
Look in our faces; A new morning breaks in our old Africa.”
37
  It was a statement that could not 
be ignored.  Lumamba’s rhetorical connection between past and future in the poem revealed the 
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saturating presence of nationalism on the continent and that “the struggle going on in Biafra has 
a significance that ranges far beyond Africa, that has tremendous implications for the African 
continent.”
38
 Tanzania’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Akili Danieli, also emphasized the 
importance of nationalism in the war.  He explained that the viewpoint made by many 
international institutions and governments that the “Biafra question is purely a humanitarian 
problem which could be solved by a massive injection of food and medical aid” was “a 
deliberate distortion of facts,” that the “Biafran-Nigerian conflict is fundamentally a political 
problem and, in fact, the solution must be political.”
39
  
Johnson, however, skirting the humanitarian aspects of the conflict referred to the civil 
war as an internal matter and placed his public expectations for a resolution firmly within the 
seat of the Organization of Africa Unity, a response shaped in large part by the U.S. role in self-
determination politics.
40
 With world attention focused on Vietnam and increasing 
characterizations of American action in that country as imperialistic, LBJ had to carefully 
navigate international scrutiny.  He took advantage of every rhetorical opportunity to portray the 
United States as an ally of liberation movements, even if actions and policies suggested 
otherwise.
41
 Even seemingly innocuous world celebrations such as the third anniversary of the 
African Organization for Unity, which garnered considerable attention from NSC staff, served as 
an important venue to show U.S. public support of newly established and fully independent 
regional and national governing bodies.  The multiple drafts, memos, and conversations 
surrounding the OAU speech reveal the importance the White House attributed to showcasing 
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Johnson’s reluctance to intervene in African affairs as evidence of his belief in their ability to 
self-govern.  In the OAU speech, Johnson reflected that though the United States and many 
African nations shared deep bonds that foregrounded a love of freedom, it was ultimately the 
OAU that would have to nurture and protect those still-fragile elements in a means to lead the 
region to prosperity, not the United States.
42
  
Although the U.S. publicly maintained that the OAU had ultimate authority to resolve 
conflicts like Biafra, LBJ and his NSC staff still closely monitored events in Africa and used 
multiple means to shape revolutionary activity towards an outcome favorable to U.S. interests.
43
 
In Africa, this primarily meant cultural and economic programming.
44
  Persistent discussions 
around aid and its ability to undercut radical forces underscore the U.S. obsession with 
maintaining influence over rising nationalism and the lengths it pursued to bolster nations allied 
in this same cause and reveal that the administration did not relegate Africa to the foreign policy 
hinterland as historians claim.
45
 As early as 1964 in the LBJ presidency, when Congolese rebels 
appeared resistant to the demands and conditions that accompanied aid and were “prepared to 
forego U.S. aid rather than abandon their struggle for domination at this stage,” staffers alluded 
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to halting aid.
46
  According to the NSC, no aid over conditional aid appeared as the most logical 
solution to induce some sort of change in radical thought and behavior.  A memo sent from 
Dakar described the dramatic effects of aid as “bolstering confidence of our friends in 
themselves, in us and in our common sense of values.”
47
 To this end, they poured aid money into 
friendly nations in hopes that economic development and health initiatives would forestall 
radical elements.
48
   
In addition to economic aid, the United States afforded moderate states in the region an 
important role in directing the political future of Africa.
49
 Considered a moderate state, with a 
successful history of transitioning out of colonial rule and a prognosticated future of prosperity, 
the United States accorded Nigeria an important position in shielding the area from nationalist 
fronts.
50
 The United States encouraged Nigeria, and other states, to pursue several means of 
extending their influence and helping their neighbors control subversives.
51
 This included joining 
counter-groups to the Radical African coalition, relying on America for discreet guidance, and 
even providing their own emergency and development aid.  The United States encouraged 
moderate states to “coalesce to form a bloc of moderates with the OAU.”
52
 The role ascribed to 
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Nigeria by the United States as a mediator and its characterization as a moderate state had 
important consequences for how the Johnson administration would view Biafran nationalism and 
the resulting1967 civil war and would decline U.S. intervention of any sort.
53
  Even as Johnson 
deferred to Nigerian authorities and the OAU to resolve the conflict, anxieties underlay these 
public decrees.  NSC staff saw Igbo and other tribal nationalism as a threat to Nigeria’s ability to 
maintain stability in the region, but OAU’s track record did not invite confidence from the 
Johnson administration on solving the issues.   Only two years before in 1965, the OAU’s 
performance in the Congolese crisis proved disappointing to officials in the State Department.  
During that time period the OAU joined the Casablanca group in a confederation to analyze and 
solve many of the problems facing the continent.  The United States supported a merger with 
radical elements in hopes that “the OAU would subvert radical influences.” Instead, U.S. 
officials found the reverse as “the OAU has little ability to control the subversives.”
54
  Although 
publicly the Johnson administration adhered to its understanding of the conflict as an internal 
matter, they could not turn a blind eye to the unfolding drama.  Intense media scrutiny on the 
country complemented by graphic photos of starving children, and the cause for concern and 
action that it inspired, suggested a real opportunity that Biafra might actually win its 
independence, fracturing regional stability.
55
 
To compensate for the OAU’s lack of leadership, Washington embarked on more private, 
diplomatic channels to contain the intensification of the war and maintain a unified Nigeria.  
Johnson pursued multiple avenues of diplomacy including bargaining with the influence of 
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Nigeria’s close neighbor, the Ivory Coast.
56
 Fearful of the ramifications of Nigeria’s conflict on 
other countries, George A. Morgan, the U.S. ambassador to the Ivory Coast, and Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, closely monitored the civil war and met 
several times to weigh the question of recognition, assistance, and support. As Houphouët’s 
sympathies shifted towards Biafra and ultimate recognition, he became increasingly agitated that 
the United States refused to take a stronger stance on the situation. Morgan reminded Houphouët 
that “we too want cessation hostilities and political solution, but problem is to find viable 
formula for compromise” and that “whether some more flexible formula might be devised which 
would not involve humiliation for either side”.
57
  Conversations between the two reveal that U.S. 
understanding of the war as one in which a nationalist victory by Biafra eliminated the 
possibility of leveraging U.S. influence in the future.
58
 LBJ’s clandestine attempts to quell the 
conflict in Nigeria did little to bolster a domestic image of presidential care and concern.  His 
credibility continued to diminish when reports quoted him as saying of the conflict, “just get 
those nigger babies off my TV set.”
59
  Such comments underscored the callousness of LBJ’s 
continued adherence to a policy of “One Nigeria” and prompted continued distress from 
American aid groups over U.S. policy decisions in the conflict.
60
 Challenging LBJ’s perceived 
indifference to the children of Biafra, outraged humanitarian and interest groups used arguments 
around protecting childhood to buoy the call for international aid.  
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A letter to the editor of The New York Times reveals the urgent need of some in the 
United States to save Biafran childhood.  The author reminds readers that “babies are dying in 
Biafra.  They are not talking ideology or sovereignty or other rot.  They’re just dying 
painfully.”
61
 For this reader, the essence of childhood experience is one in which children are 
free from the constraints of politics and even one in which children do not have the ability to 
form opinions about the world around them.  He reiterates that, “Sovereignty is nice, I suppose, 
if games that like amuse you, but babies exist.  They have no countries but their mothers, no 
cause but their lives, and no salvation but food and love.”
62
 Placing images of an apolitical, 
carefree childhood at the forefront of campaign appeals highlighted what was at stake for Biafran 
children.  One campaign appeal in Rochester, N.Y. wrote, “We cannot overpraise the generosity 
of Rochester citizens who have to save the lives of innocent children trapped in a political 
conflict they cannot even understand.”
63
 For many humanitarian groups, the catalyst for aid to 
Biafra lay in the violence experienced by the children which exemplified a clear violation of a 
childhood experience free from harm.  
In emphasizing cultural conceptions of childhood as innocent in their campaigns, aid 
groups eschewed other understandings of childhood, primarily that children could be active 
producers in the state-making project, particularly given the proper tutelage of model adults.  In 
the United States, since the early republic, parents, particularly mothers, understood childhood, 
at least in part, as a way to support and protect the future state.
64
 Later, during the Civil War, 
children’s magazines extolled the patriotism of some Northern youth, shoring up the values of 
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the union and encouraging readers to exhibit the same kinds of behaviors.
65
 The sense of 
preparing children to face the nation’s internal and external threats had not diminished with the 
onset of the Cold War.
66
 If anything, the increasing anxiety around the Cold War politics 
refocused attention on the ways in which children needed to increase their ability to combat the 
communist threat.  As a result, civic organizations like the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts 
incorporated a wider variety of activities intended to create the model citizen capable of beating 
communists in all facets of life.  Although grooming children to support the future state took on 
more significance during war time, policy makers, adults, and civic groups had often provided 
children with opportunities to contribute in the present throughout American history.  The Girl 
Scouts, for example, actively used their members to assist in the very adult task of 
Americanizing immigrants in the 1920s.
67
  
Although many in the United States  attached different understandings of experience to 
childhood, as a time of innocence and a time of productivity, aid groups continued to privilege 
the experience of childhood innocence in Biafran relief campaigns, a position in which their 
activism stood in direct opposition to the perceived callousness of the USG and other world 
leaders.
68
 Calls to aid Biafra served as the preeminent example of citizens acting without regard 
to politics in a way that the government never could or would in order to save childhood 
innocence; Biafra was the citizens’ burden to carry.  However, just as U.S. humanitarian groups 
were positioning a specific image of childhood as the ultimate, universal experience worthy of 
saving, Biafra aid groups offered a competing vision of childhood and associated reasons for 
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saving that particular experience.  The next section explores how Biafra aid groups like the 
Biafran Relief Service Foundation fused together these competing visions to create an image that 
briefly captured the American imagination. 
Disputed Terrain: Defenseless victim or offensive soldier?  
The BRSF organization had offices around the country with a head office in New York 
led by Biafran Donatus Anywanu.  Biafrans moving between the United States and their native 
land played an important role in generating membership in BRSF.  For example, Dr. Willam 
Norcross who headed the Chicago office of the Biafra Relief Services Foundation discovered the 
plight of Biafra through a former student, Dr. Fabian Udekwu, who worked with refugees as the 
war broke out.   Seeing that his medical supplies were quickly dwindling, Udekwu wrote 
Norcross in a desperate attempt to access more medical supplies as he wrote, “please hurry.  I am 
operating with my last surgical blade.
69
 Moved by the horrific conditions, Norcross sought to 
provide food and medical supplies through the BRSF.   As perceptions of the conflict unfolded 
through personal relationships like those of Anywanu and Norcross, diaspora groups like BRSF 
took on an even greater role in shaping and promoting perceptions for a larger U.S. audience.  At 
a press conference, the Secretary of the Biafra Relief and Rehabilitation Association, Fabian 
Udekwu, an organization located within Biafra, stated that “the success of the Foundation ‘has 
been beyond expectation’ and that “the response and confidence that the Foundation has received 
from the American people has placed the Foundation in the position of being the leading symbol 
of the Biafran people.”
70
  Although it was one of many aid campaigns in the United States, 
BRSF was also fundamentally different in its investment of the conflict from these other 
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organizations precisely because of its connections to the war.  As a result, they presented a very 
different narrative of the conflict than did the others.  
Although Biafran aid groups operating in the United States acknowledged the 
humanitarian logic guiding perceptions of the conflict in the US, this was never simply a child-
centered humanitarian cause for them.  Kurt Vonnegut noted the contrasting understandings of 
the conflict during his travels to Biafra.  He said to one Biafran, “Americans may not know much 
about Biafra, but they know about the children.” The Biafran responded that, “We’re 
grateful…but I wish they knew more than that.  They think we’re a dying nation.  We aren’t.  
We’re an energetic, modern nation that is being born!”
71
 These comments reveal a competing 
understanding of the conflict in which the tragedy of the children was an important part but not 
the whole.  However, the diminished centrality of children in the conflict was not a view 
appreciated by many aid groups that centered their campaigns on the vulnerability of children.  
As a result, children presented a difficult hurdle to navigate for Biafra aid groups operating in the 
United States.  The campaign of the Biafra Relief Services Foundation serves as one example of 
the struggle by diaspora aid groups to balance the competing expectations of victim performance 
in the conflict: while much of Biafra’s representations of childhood reflected similar expectations 
of children as vital pieces in the nation building process held by American civic groups like the 
Boy or Girl Scouts, U.S. observers rejected this role for Biafran children. 
72
 Instead of active 
participants, emergency consumers in the United States expected Biafran children, and their 
parents, to act as passive, defenseless victims.  
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The Biafra Relief Services Foundation led a highly visible campaign that worked to 
balance the Biafran call for inclusive participation in the war with U.S. representations of the 
conflict as a violation of innocence.   They navigated these two contradictory descriptions of the 
war by emphasizing a discourse of protection over a discourse of emergency measures to save 
lives.  The difference was subtle, but important.  Many groups in America, like the Medical 
Support Committee,  talked about the urgent and immediate need to save Biafran children 
through daily food shipments or emergency medical treatment as the only viable response to the 
conflict.
73
 Newspaper ads, working within an urgency framework, admonished readers that 
“within the time it took you to read this, six children died” constrained the children as one-
dimensional objects of pity.  This immediate moment of pity requiring emergency measures 
foreclosed more complicated discussions of the conflict.
74
 In contrast, BRSF emphasized a 
brighter, more hopeful vision of the children’s distant future in need of protection over 
emergency measures.  It was also a vision that appropriated development over emergency 
discourses.
75
 Including a vision for their future removed the constraints of urgency and opened 
possibilities to understand children as more than just a consequence of violent war.  Reorienting 
their campaign towards future protection embedded Biafran children’s present with a past and a 
future, crafting a biography for Biafra’s children that went missing in other aid campaigns 
focused on urgency measures.
76
  By presenting a biography of the children that had the potential 
to evolve  over time, BRSF’s larger narrative reminded donors “Biafra’s story is not the same as 
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yesterday’s – or tomorrow’s” and allowed emergency consumers to envision a childhood that 
was both innocent and a safe space to grow into future adulthood. 
77
  
The discourse of protection also accommodated U.S. understandings of childhood 
innocence by focusing on parental duty to protect children.  For many in the United States, one 
of the most important parental duties was the creation of a safe place for children to mature into 
adulthood and played on dominant U.S. understandings of childhood as a moment of 
vulnerability and dependency on guardianship.
78
  For example, in one public service transcript 
they wrote: “Consider a child in Biafra.  Her parents named her Mercy, a common name in 
Biafra.  Contributions to BRSF have kept Mercy alive for over six months now.”
79
 In these brief 
sentences, the BRSF allowed the American viewer a glimpse of how war disrupted the ability of 
Biafran parents to protect their children.  To restore the ability of parents to protect their 
children, the BRSF sought funding for program development intended to repair “the land of a 
proud people” and provide the internally displaced with “the chance to care for themselves.”
80
 
Rather than simply providing food, the BRSF wanted to build a nation of healthy, vibrant parents 
that could cultivate healthy, vibrant children.  Self-sufficiency and self-reliance remained key to 
this future.  They wrote to potential donors that aid would “restore hope…rehabilitate the 
refugees…repair the land.”
81
 The primary vehicle for this restoration occurred through the 
creation of refugee camps, one of the most important development projects of BRSF.  The 
foundation, much like Ojukwu’s government, envisioned the camps as training grounds for the 
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future citizens.  They served as sites that would “harness the spirit of self-help of the people 
constructing homes, producing food, and engaging in other gainful occupations for their own 
benefit.”
82
 They were to become the towns of the future populated by rehabilitated parents that 
could protect their children indefinitely rather than relying on the largesse of American donors to 
feed the children for a day, a week, or possibly a month.
83
  BRSF explicitly linked the camp 
structure with the ability of parents to care for their children: “all these figures mean that 200,000 
people from around Omuma Isizku (refugee camp) are getting…the incentive and advice on how 
best to care for themselves and their children under the extreme conditions in which they are 
trying to live.”
84
   
BRSF connected parents’ ability to protect to the skills they learned in the camps.  As a 
result, the refugee camps served as an incubator for the transformative potential of parents that 
the BRSF could actively point to in their search for campaign donations.  In one refugee village 
plan, the Ohaju Refugee Settlement in the Owerri Province of Southwest Biafra, the Foundation 
intended to install the “semi-permanent homes by the refugees who will also cultivate the land 
for food they can eat and sell…to stimulate community spirit and reduce construction costs, the 
refugees will themselves do as much of the construction work as possible.”
85
  BRSF used the 
camps to teach and reinforce the kinds of values, like self-reliance, and skills, like sewing and 
farming, new Biafran parents needed if the country were to gain legitimacy on the world stage.  
By teaching the proper work ethic of self-help and placing Biafrans in “whatever area of work 
they are most needed at Omuma Isizku… Caring for the sick, planting, harvesting, cooking, 
sewing,”  BRSF ensured that Biafran parents could meet the needs of their children through the 
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village program and declared  that “a mother of a sick child is not then begging someone to care 
for her child – she is helping to care for her child.”
86
 BRSF, well aware of the need for Biafrans 
to prove themselves to the world, also implemented a PR plan to convince the world of the new 
parent and nation’s legitimacy.  They hired an American television crew to show “that a 
suffering Biafra which was very much reflected in an earlier film produced by the same 
organization, has now survived as a nation fulfilling all the functions of a state.” The refugee 
camps served a vital purpose in showcasing a functioning state restoring parents’ ability to 
protect their children.  The Foundation intended that the crew hired to film them would “reflect 
on Biafra on her second year of independence as a viril [sic] nation
87
.”  
BRSF also used the safe spaces of refugee camps to allow children to contribute to the 
nation building process of the war effort in a process that looked remarkably similar to the 
American creation of “little cold warriors.”
88
  Like civic-building groups in the United States 
such as the Girl Scouts or Boy Scouts, BRSF built in opportunities for children to learn and enact 
adult responsibilities and citizenship duties.
89
  Just as adults received training or advice on 
farming and sewing, photos of the refugee villages showed that youth also benefited from this 
training by having adult expectations and responsibilities extended to them.  In one photo, for 
example, as several very young women use their skills to sew, a female child sits directly next to 
the sewing machines watching their operation.  Her deliberate inclusion in both the activity and 
the photo reveals an understanding of childhood that considered them as both participant and 
observer.
90
 BRSF marketed this training as a means to help rehabilitate a people for the future, 
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but the training also opened space for children and youth to participate in the current crisis by 
contributing their skills to the nation building project.  
BRSF’s discourse of protection and the safe space of camp life also reflected the Western 
idea of children “becoming,” or maturing into, adults rather than “being” present and active 
citizens – an idea that should have resonated with many emergency consumers.
91
 The idea of 
“becoming” an adult, after all, was exactly the kind of sentiment that Shapiro advocated for in 
his testimony to congress.  They did this by discussing children as an important national resource 
whose future needed protection.  By placing Biafran children within the longer context of a 
future nation with bright prospects, BRSF’s campaign underscored future and potential 
citizenship loss through the conflict, a different set of consequences than other campaigns that 
focused their emphasis on emergency measures.
92
  In contrast to BRSF, aid campaigns that 
focused on saving children in the immediate future eschewed any discussions about citizenship 
and how these new citizens of an independent Biafra would fit into the global framework.  BRSF 
used disrupted educational systems to best expose this loss and replacing the broken educational 
infrastructure served as an important rallying cry for the BRSF.
93
 When the internally displaced 
fled into Biafra from other areas of Nigeria, when families could not accommodate them, they 
found shelter in schools.  With schools transformed into temporary housing, the school system 
came to a halt.  BRSF counted the loss of school as “among the most serious effects of the war” 
because of the associations with future prosperity.  Highlighting the seriousness of school loss, 
they wrote, “the education system in Biafra is pretty much in ruins…The longer these people, 
with their great ability to advance themselves through instruction and good books, are prevented 
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from continuing their education, the more the next generation will feel the loss of adequate 
leadership and the slower will be their technological progress.”
94
 
In showing the children and youth of Biafran already reclaiming educational and 
vocational pursuits in the camps, hard at work in a protected space preparing for a future, BRSF 
attempted to simultaneously accommodate U.S. understandings of childhood as both innocent 
and productive.  But in culling from two cultural conceptions of childhood that stood at odds in 
the humanitarian context, they portrayed Biafran children as much more than passive victims of 
terror.  The campaign reframed children as vital participants in the nation building process by 
creating programs that focused on training for the future -- training which paradoxically allowed 
them room to contribute in the present.  In providing new skills like sewing or farming and 
maintaining traditional roles like studying in school, BRSF carved out a stand-alone role for 
youth and children that acknowledged their capabilities to understand and shape the conflict and 
simultaneously set them apart as resources-in-the-making for future Biafra.  In so doing it 
declared children as an integral part of the new Biafra, the “strong, virile” nation, and gave them 
an active role to play through their labor participation and education in order to bring about this 
vision.
95
 In this way, their reformulations of the child victim in Biafra managed to advance an 
understanding of children as important actors in their own right.  It was also an image that 
violated the passive, victim role established by many U.S. aid campaigns.   
Other reports captured similar images of an active youth culture in the conflict that 
appeared in BRSF’s campaign.  Reports of pro-Biafra aid groups made mention of the military 
engagement of the youth.  For example, a pro-Biafran aid group published a letter from a Biafran 
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stating that, “many of our students are serving in the Biafran army.”
96
 One young man writing to 
another aid group described Biafran military successes as a result of “our vigilance coupled with 
our war-like nature had made it possible for the enemy to be kept at bay in this part of our 
country.”
97
 Such descriptions highlight a clear understanding by a youth of the goals of the war 
and an understanding of the means necessary to win a military conflict.  In another case, a 
reporter noted that in refugee camps children not too weak or stricken with kwashiorkor “always 
play war games” and that in these games “Nobody wants to pay the Nigerians.”
98
 The leader of 
the Youth Front who organized the games in the camp declared that “sometimes the play is 
violent.” Images of children practicing for war in a war zone had an undertone of both current 
and future warriors simultaneously preparing for and currently enacting citizenship duties.
99
 The 
last lines of the report emphasized youth militancy when it described how a “small boy raised his 
arm in a salute” as the reporter’s car drove past.
100
  
Rather than displace the political dimensions of the conflict and their effects on the 
citizenship status of Biafran children, the BRSF campaign addressed both of these concerns by 
presenting two understandings of the children as both innocent and active participants in nation 
building.  However, even as BRSF appropriated images and language that echoed two important 
strains of the American childhood experience, emergency consumers in the United States 
ultimately rejected presentations of Baifran children as anything other than innocent, passive 
victims.  Americans were willing to abide, if not support, nationalism as long as observers in the 
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United States could imagine in the conflict familiar aspects of childhood.  Once observers felt 
that a competing understanding of childhood and the accompanying expectations of children’s 
role in war marginalized the notion of innocence, the previous support towards Biafra lapsed into 
a much more muted response to the crisis.  The next section looks at how this muted response 
occurred and the ensuing consequences for humanitarian aid efforts.  
“The World is Watching”: Erosion of U.S. support for Biafra 
 If BRSF’s campaign meant to portray to U.S. observers a vision of Biafra as a strong, 
virile nation peopled by educated citizens protecting an important national resource, their 
incorporation of Ojukwu’s strident calls to maintain the war at all costs consistently undermined 
this objective.  In contrast to Cold War images of children in the United States peacefully 
mobilizing to face the threat of communism, the strident, nationalistic rhetoric of Biafra’s leaders 
portrayed children on par with the adults in the conflict even requiring them to perform the same 
kind of sacrifice adults made for national integrity.  Faced with an uphill battle to gain 
international recognition, leaders of the cessation movement advocated increased militarization 
as the conflict progressed.  Ojukwu frequently cited the average Biafran’s dedication to the cause 
as evidence of the lengths his people would go to gain independence.  When talking to the OAU 
in 1968, he declared that “the uniqueness of the case for Biafra is that from the start of the 
struggle with Nigeria, the people of the Republic have completely backed the mandate which 
they freely and unanimously gave to the Government.”
101
 He further described confidence in the 
government with the statement “fifteen months ago, Nigeria imposed a total economic blockade 
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on our people and since then our business and industries – our means of livelihood were 
completely cut.  Yet, our people have remained unflinching in their loyalty.”
102
   
Ojukwu also considered children and youth integral to building the new Biafra, even 
using them in military efforts to win independence.   Children, for example, were recruited from 
these camps to act as spies in the conflict.
103
  Children and youth under the age of fifteen were 
pegged to “penetrate federal zones for information on federal troops’ movements and other 
plans.”
104
At the onset of the conflict, Ojukwu’s government did not actively recruit child and 
youth soldiers or ask them to take on the role of spy, a role that blurred the lines between civilian 
and combatant.  However, as the war progressed and it became clear that Biafra had neither the 
manpower nor the arms to effectively repel the Federal government, they called on children and 
youth to participate in a wider variety of roles including that of soldier.
105
 If Medicorps depicted 
Biafra children as having their apolitical childhood disrupted by the tragedy of war in which they 
declared that how children or their parents identified in state and national politics made little 
difference and that the critical point remained “children have been dying first and in largest 
numbers,” for Biafra’s leaders, the disruption of childhood remained central to building the new 
state.
106
 Egodi Uchendu’s oral history of childhood participation in the war underscores 
Ojukwu’s inclusive vision for conflict: adult men remembering being tapped for conscription and 
adult women remember having their own role to play as comforters to the troops.
107
  
Ojukwu’s call for all Biafrans to participate in the national struggle extended to those 
living outside of Nigeria’s disputed borders.   Diaspora networks transmitted the self-
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determination narrative across state boundaries and served as a conduit between events on the 
ground in Biafra and a larger U.S. audience, compelling expat Biafrans and other sympathizers 
to maintain loyalty to the burgeoning state.  Many did so by relying on the same militant 
overtones expounded by Biafran national leaders.  On September 29, 1969, two years after the 
start of the civil war, the U.S. section of Daughters of Biafra called for its members to wear black 
and “keep awake” as a means to “pause for a while and think of those dead brothers and sisters 
of ours, invoking their gallant spirits against the Nigerian vandals.”
108
  
The Biafra Association in the Americas, another fundraising and aid group, called for an 
even more dramatic pledge of loyalty to the war effort.  They extolled Biafran expatriates to 
create “a guiding principle towards life, a conviction that life is meant to be purposeful, a 
commitment towards matters affecting one’s own destiny at the individual as well as the 
collective level.”
109
 The Association prescribed specific mandates to help the young Biafran 
nation survive.  They wrote, “What Biafra needs is zealots with boundless interest, devotion, 
zest, and a deep sense of united purpose.  WE MUST SACRIFICE OUR KNOWLEDGE, 
ENERGY AND RESOURCES WITH A MISSIONARY FERVOR.  We must keep in mind that 
we owe a duty of concerted effort to Africa and mankind alike to build a nation worthy of the 
rivers of blood of our heroic brothers and sisters who are laying down their lives in this 
struggle.”
110
  
Mirroring Ojukwu’s militant rhetoric, the persistent use of liberation imagery and language used 
by diaspora groups like The Biafra Association in the Americas highlighted the expectation of 
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sacrifice from all Biafrans.
111
 It increasingly became clear to many in the American public that 
rather than acting as enlightened, valuable members of the world community, Biafra leaders and 
its revolutionaries were willing to sacrifice their most important resource – children.  If Biafran 
leaders considered this a consequence of the full mobilization of the war effort, U.S. observers 
used their own particular understandings of childhood to define such a view as lurid and, more 
importantly, showed Biafrans as unable to transform into appropriate world citizens.
112
 Although 
the plight of Biafra’s children revealed the lengths many in the United States would go to 
provide aid for unknown individuals a half a world away, these same children also exposed the 
rigid boundaries of that aid if aid victims transgressed prescribed behavior.  
By 1968, the conflict came to be seen by many in America as less of an independence 
movement and more as a series of crimes against children perpetrated by their very own people.  
The militancy of the conflict conveyed overtly by groups like the Daughters of Biafra and 
through more subtle means like the BRSF, cast Biafrans into the category of unworthy aid victim 
when placed against the missed opportunities of peace and controversy around food aid.  Many 
in the United States understood Ojukwu’s refusal to allow in donated food as proof of his moral 
dubiousness.
113
 In responding to the crisis, international aid agencies attempted to transport food 
through Nigeria held territory in order to avert mass starvation.  News reports described the 
Biafran response: “Biafrans have rejected aid by way of Nigeria, partly out of a fear that the food 
would be poisoned, partly to avoid any act that would show a dependence on the Nigerian 
government.”
114
 Speculation about the true motivation of Biafran leaders explained that they 
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“were more interested in getting arms than food and medical supplies.”
115
 Public doubts about 
Ojukwu’s motivations also informed perceptions by observers in the U.S. of pro-Biafra groups’ 
humanitarian motivations.  One paper stated that there was “a growing concern about the way the 
American public has been exploited on the Biafra relief situation.”
116
  Increased scrutiny of 
BRSF’s activities, for example, revealed that more than half the money it raised in 1968 went to 
“salaries, transportation, advertising and other operational expenses” further indicting the group 
in some observers’ eyes.
117
 
As the conflict dragged on with questions dogging homegrown relief efforts, it became 
increasingly clear that many donors doubted the worthiness of the nation they were saving.  In 
1970, The New Yorker wrote that even “pictures and statistics” taken and written about starving 
Biafrans were “no longer automatic in their meaning or credibility.”
118
 More and more it 
appeared that Biafran leaders willingly sacrificed their youngest community members despite 
their rhetoric claiming they would end the conflict if Nigeria stopped her hostilities.  The 
Committee for Concern most succinctly captured the slippages in a letter to the Biafran Special 
Representative.  Nwonye Otue, who lived in New York, received a letter expanding on the 
concerns of the committee.  The letter offered a basic understanding of the social contract 
between governments and people that “if the Government of Biafra is indeed a government of 
the people in its region, if follows that the Government is responsible for the welfare of its 
citizens.” The letter asserted that the legitimacy of the government was based on its adherence to 
the social contract, and the committee warned that Biafra’s actions in continuing the conflict 
were slowly eroding that legitimacy: “Biafra’s claims to self-determination will be strongly 
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influenced in world opinion by the Government’s actions in meeting that responsibility.  We 
believe that claim was weakened in the eyes of nations as they became increasingly aware of 
Biafra’s refusal to permit daytime relief flights….and ultimately, a failure to reach a settlement 
to the war.”  In closing, the committee wrote, “We say to you that the children dying in the 
thousands are all our children – all the world’s – but particularly, we need hardly say it, they are 
your own.”
119
 Such a closing sent a strong reminder that the visibility of children in the conflict 
acted as crucial litmus test for the legitimacy of the struggling nation.
120
 To ensure the Biafran 
government understood the increasing agitation of the American people towards the conflict, the 
committee sent a large picture post card  of a starving child with an empty dish to Biafra’s 
special representative.   An attached message stated that in order to save the starving children, 
Biafran leaders had to come to the negotiating table “without preconditions for a negotiated 
settlement of the war.” The Biafrans could not afford to ignore this plea because, according to 
the committee, “The whole world is watching” and “its patience is growing thin.”  
Both Ojukwu and BRSF’s message and understanding of childhood contributed to the 
perceptions of the conflict as morally ambiguous.  In presenting an image of children as present 
citizens, BRSF seemed to corroborate Ojukwu’s willingness to engage children as perpetrators 
and causalities of war.  In both campaigns, children served as an important symbol for the 
survival of the political state, but acted in a way that challenged traditional U.S. understandings 
of childhood.  The Foundation remarked, “The situation in Biafra is about a great many things: 
why doesn’t the media tell us about those things?...Hungry people can never make ‘sense,’ but at 
least they can be seen in a context that the world may know how they came to be hungry.”
121
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The insertion of this specific quote underscores two important details about how the BRSF 
approached their campaign: first, they understood media coverage as distorted and self-selecting 
revealing only certain aspects of the conflict, and two, because of the omissions it was easier for 
many in the public to focus on the humanitarian aspects of starvation without considering the 
political aspects.  BRSF set out to rectify these omissions by discussing the role of the child in 
new and challenging ways.  
Ojukwu, like the BRSF, discussed children in a way that changed their role and 
experience of childhood and linked them in a much more active way to the outcome of the 
conflict.   One story, for example, showed the life of a widowed mother of five living in a 
refugee camp.  Without money or food, they had to move into a camp that only had half walls 
exposing them to the threats of the rainy season.  They children were very often “sick but there is 
not enough drug [sic] to cure them.” In the same article, another widowed refugee mother of 
three told the camp Warden, “Please, sir, write and tell the ordinary people of Europe that 
thousands of us are dying of hunger and exposure because Britain and Nigeria wish us so.” In 
response, the Warden, merging the fate of the nation to the fate of the three children and mother, 
replies, “I shall do what you have requested, and in spite of Britain and Nigeria, Biafra will 
survive it all.” To reinforce the image of a coherent, unified Biafra, the government concludes 
that the woman’s sentiment speaks for all the people of Biafran and that “This is what every 
Biafran says.”
122
 That is, the mother is willing to sacrifice her child for the sake of independence, 
a stance reminiscent of suffering and militancy.  It was also a stance that counteracted sympathy 
in the United States. 
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The airlift of children out of Biafra by the humanitarian aid group Church World Service 
and Caritas International represented one of the most dramatic solutions to rectify a transgressed 
childhood by Biafran nationals.   Though development experts and child welfare specialists 
recommended children remain “in the environment in which they will have to live and grow up” 
aid groups determined that in the case of Biafra removal was in the children’s “best interest 
medically, psychologically and socially, and when his right to return is assured.”
123
 Removal did 
prove contentious at first.  A USAID report noted that in Biafra, “the regime consistently 
maintained that child care programs should be operated within Biafra and the children should not 
be taken out of the country under anyone else’s juridical control.”
124
 Although Biafran officials 
expressed dismay at the removal of Biafra’s children, they eventually allowed “small numbers of 
properly identified children to be transported to nearby countries which had recognized Biafra, 
such as Gabon and Ivory Coast, for care until the end of the hostilities.”
125
 By May 1969, Caritas 
and CWS had airlifted over two thousand children out of Biafra.   
The fate of Biafra’s children also spurred individuals to embark on humanitarian aid 
campaigns.  Susan Garth, an English woman decamped in New York City, began her own 
campaign entitled the “Susan Garth Biafran Babies Appeal.” She raised money in the United 
States with the intent of evacuating children out of Biafra.   Inclined towards the theatrical, her 
campaign consisted of frightening statistics and doomsday scenarios for the children.  At one 
point, Garth even sent a casket filled with the ashes of a recently deceased Biafran child to 
Queen Elizabeth.  Garth attached a cable to the casket informing the queen mother that the child 
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had been murdered by British policies.  The Queen’s representative sent the ashes back with the 
statement, “Your own courage and perseverance in seeking to help the hapless children who 
have fallen victims to the present conflict is deeply impressive.” The representative’s words 
underscore that children are understood only as victims.  Furthermore, the letter highlights that 
even when opinions differ in interpreting the crisis, the one area that invites agreement is that 
children need to receive aid.  As the letter revealed, Western conceptions of children as wholly 
innocent and childhood as a time of innocence bridged polarizing foreign policy positions around 
Biafra.
126
 She proposed that evacuation was the last remaining solution for the children of Biafra 
because “ordinary food can no longer save them – in fact, it can kill them.”  
Garth intended her airlifts to take children to facilities that could provide special medical 
feeding and treatment only available outside of Biafra.
127
 Her plan included the removal of up to 
five thousand children a day for as long as there were children to evacuate.  In explaining her 
plan of removal to Biafran authorities, she too expressed ambivalence about the capacity of 
Biafran leaders to self-govern.  She wrote of leader reluctance to approve the airlift program “but 
still the Biafran leaders would not let their children go.  African parents will not part with their 
children” and that she continually  had to “secure Biafra’s cooperation in this plan.”
128
 Garth 
suggested that African parents fundamentally misunderstood the relationship between parent and 
child and acted contrary to their best interests.
129
 Garth understood parent refusal as a 
manifestation of extending their own adult rights over the child, a position contrary to protecting 
the child.
130
 Her descriptions of the negotiations process depicted officials as intransigent and 
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unable to understand how to best care for their own children again revealing anxiety about their 
ability to navigate their own future.  Her removal plans for an entire population of children 
reflected the nexus of politics and humanitarianism that many emergency consumers were 
reluctant to parse out. 
Susan Garth’s Biafran Babies Appeal also acted as a testament to the limits of sympathy 
and revealed the ambivalence that even the most dedicated humanitarian campaigns experienced.  
Although she focused her campaign on the need to save children in a humanitarian capacity, she 
did not divorce the conflict from its political dimensions.  In a letter to the Queen, she discussed 
her inability to separate politics and the humanitarian crisis, “Before I entered Biafra I was 
convinced that my job was to save babies and not talk politics, But you can’t cure a symptom – 
and the death of the babies is a symptom of the babies is a symptom of the underlying political 
problems.”
131
  She continued to explore the passion demonstrated by Baifran people claiming 
that “they will never lose, they will never die” because Nigeria could not capture their “hearts 
and souls.”
132
 She reminded the queen that through colonial rule, Britain had trained the country 
in its liberal values.  They had taught Biafrans the “principles of freedom” and with that “people 
will starve, the children will die, but Biafra will live.  They will never be a part of Nigeria.  They 
will fight forever.”
133
 Yet, even as she lauded the perseverance of the Biafrans, she 
simultaneously raised doubts about their efficacy as a nation when she suggested that the only 
way to give their children a future was to remove those children from their guardianship.
134
  
  Public officials also suggested that humanitarianism had its limits.  In closing his letter 
to Susan Garth, the British representative wrote, “I am returning to you the casket which you say 
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contains the remains of an Ibo girl which you brought with you from Nigeria, as you will no 
doubt wish to arrange for proper burial.”
135
 The sarcasm behind the representative’s statements 
made clear that although children held a special place and all could agree that they should not be 
harmed, there were limits even to this understanding as a constraint on humanitarian decisions.  
In the United States, an observer speaking after the conclusion of the Biafran war made a similar 
comment.  When asked to make sense of the outpouring of American sympathy for Vietnamese 
children during that war, she simply stated, “Biafra was a problem last year but I never heard 
anyone expressing concern about the starving kids they saw there.”
136
 Such an observation 
exposed the limits of American aid and suggested that in some cases even the trope of 
victimized, innocent children could not overcome characteristics of conflict that American 
emergency consumers found unpalatable.    
Conclusion 
 Several scholars have noted that Biafra marks the beginning of a new era of 
humanitarianism, what Michael Barnett calls “neo-humanitarianism” in which aid organizations 
began practicing a politics of impartiality helping all those in need and not just victims “like 
them.”
137
 Kevin O’Sullivan both echoes and undermines this sentiment when he writes that with 
Biafra developed “the vision of an inclusive ‘common community’” that “was in practice rooted 
in a very western understanding of humanitarian responsibilities and a very western image of the 
Third World.”
138
 This chapter reveals that the beginning of modern humanitarianism was much 
more in line with O’Sullivan’s recognition of the limitations of this “common community.” 
Furthermore, looking at the evolution of humanitarianism in the United States through the lens of 
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the childhood experience in Biafra reveals that limits of liberal humanitarian governance were 
much more pronounced than has previously been suggested in scholarship.  The ideas 
undergirding American willingness to provide aid were subject to intense scrutiny and challenge 
and transgression of them, particularly when done by the aid recipients, had far reaching 
consequences.  American donors, while initially compelled to support the cause, soon grew 
weary and restive of the effort in large part because of a perception of the victims’ failed ability 
to transform and participate appropriately in the larger imagined community.
139
 This 
condemnation directly stemmed from the role of children’s images in the conflict and proved 
Biafra leadership intransigence as they refused  a seeming “out” from aid groups in the form of 
an ultimatum of stopping hostilities or stopping aid.   The nationalism of the war effort combined 
with what appeared as a willing sacrifice of a sacred resource transformed Biafran participants 
from victims to offenders.   
Biafran led aid groups in the United States, groups like the Biafra Relief Services 
Foundation that emerged from diaspora networks, also focused intently on the role of children in 
their appeals to the American public.  In contrast to their American and Western led counterparts 
that focused on Western understandings of childhood, Biafran aid groups imbued children with 
an active political agency that transgressed emerging Cold War norms of childhood activity in 
war time.  The assumed active political agency of Biafran children by these groups rendered 
them as worthy of sacrifice in the same ways that adults were in the fight for national 
sovereignty -- an understanding of childhood that was anathema to many in the U.S. public.  The 
images of children as politically active, involved, and present in the creation of an independent 
state, unsettled U.S. understandings of childhood.  Groups like BRSF transgressed important 
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beliefs about the childhood experience, namely that children inhabited a circumscribed political 
realm that was undergirded by ideals of innocence.   
No aid group proved able to overcome such a perception of children being sacrificed in 
the Nigeria-Biafra war.  Just as importantly, it became clear throughout the conflict that aid 
groups did not hold all the power in aid formulations.  Humanitarian groups and leaders could 
not ignore the demands and perceptions of the American public.  Emergency consumers made 
clear that they were an important part of shaping aid and if NGOs failed to account for their 
understandings, little progress would be made in whatever emergency was unfolding at the 
moment.  The crisis reminded NGOs that the slowly evolving ideology of humanitarianism 
already had certain pillars that were inviolable, including that of transformation, and that those 
pillars were intimately linked to understandings and experiences of childhood.  Ultimately, 
Biafra proved an important test case for NGOs in how to navigate public perceptions of a 
conflict.  Most notably, the importance of the victim, their worthiness, and their inherent ability 
to transform into citizens of the world were a crucial means of generating support.  The conflict 
helped advance forward a pervasive humanitarian ideology by underscoring the perception that 
the American public was in control of the parameters of aid, and if Americans could maintain 
control they were increasingly willing to incorporate it as part of their calculations of 
responsibility to lead and transform the world.  This became an invaluable lesson just a few short 
years later as NGOs worked to generate interest in a different evacuation that took place in the 
denouement of Vietnam. 
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Chapter Four: Elephant Souvenirs: 1975 Operation Babylift and the commodification of 
humanitarianism 
 
Introduction 
Only a few short years after Biafra, distress over the fate of children in another far-off location 
resurfaced in public debates. In April of 1975, media reports of deteriorating conditions in 
Vietnam and allusions to its imminent collapse sparked an outcry of concern over the fate of its 
youngest and most vulnerable inhabitants – South Vietnamese children residing in orphanages 
throughout the country. Reports proliferated that these children would bear the brunt of North 
Vietnamese retribution because they represented a visible reminder of American intrusion into a 
sovereign nation’s affairs.
1
 Collaborating with American voluntary agencies, the Ford 
administration quickly patched together an evacuation plan to remove over two thousand young 
Vietnamese children from orphanages in Saigon. With the exception of a tragic first crash, 
proponents of the rescue mission, dubbed Operation Babylift, heralded it a successful mercy 
mission.
2
 Photos of President Ford swaddling and cooing newborns on a California tarmac 
underscored the dramatic recovery of life that proponents emphasized as the motivating factor 
behind Babylift. Meanwhile, stories of adoptive parents waiting with bated breath and open arms 
for their new charges heightened the urgency of rescue. The combined public relations spectacle 
of Ford and adoptive parents elevated a narrative that focused on removal from Vietnam as the 
only possible outcome for the war children. However, the operation was not without its critics. 
From the beginning, doubts about the operation swirled as concerned voices questioned, first, the 
motivation of the U.S. government in instigating such an operation, and, second, the kind of life 
that many of the orphans, many of whom were the result of liaisons between U.S. GIs and 
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Vietnamese women, faced in the United States. While much of the research on Babylift focuses 
on the role of the Ford administration or social workers as the creator of the rescue narrative, this 
chapter explores the pivotal and understudied influence that voluntary organizations and 
adoption agencies had in publicly shaping the narrative of rescue as the only alternative available 
to the children of this humanitarian crisis.
3
  
One of the most visible groups of the crisis, The Friends of All Children of Vietnam 
(FCVN), played on concepts of transformation and citizen responsibility that arose with the 
Biafran crisis in order to counter criticism of the operation. They built upon these elements by 
expanding citizen responsibility in emergencies to include consumption practices as a primary 
means of saving children. In short, FCVN’s explanation of Babylift emphasized the mission as a 
consumption project and commodified children in emergencies in that process. Commodification 
undertones were not new in humanitarian efforts. Julia Irwin, for example, discusses the ways in 
which American Red Cross linked donations with mother and child campaigns in their efforts to 
generate American interest in humanitarian efforts.
4
 Babylift changed the dynamics of 
conversations about the role of consumerism, however, by using it as a central focus point. This 
chapter shows that NGOs helped cement a perception of the American public’s control over 
humanitarian parameters by the blatant commodification tactics deployed in Operation Babylift 
that turned children into commodities.  In turn, this magnified a growing humanitarian impulse 
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by inviting Americans to map onto foreign children long held assumptions of race and 
consumption practices.  Injecting deliberate references to commodification represented a new 
shift in how people discussed aid. The public now had to grapple with how they used their 
purchasing power to change lives as they made decisions about emergencies abroad. For many, 
this softened the critiques of the mission, contributed to the lionization of the mission, and 
imbued NGOs with a moral authority that the Ford government could not easily claim.    
Although commodification plays a pivotal role in many humanitarian emergencies, 
historians have limited their analyses of it.
5
 Arrisa Oh recognizes the links between consumerism 
and humanitarianism and examines the connections through a brief look at Operation Babylift, 
but situates her conclusions primarily within the arena of international adoption.
6
  Sara Fieldston 
also acknowledges the role of commodification, but ultimately contends that “the 
commodification of humanitarian action had its limits.”
7
 In contrast, this chapter argues that 
commodification is central to understanding the modern American response to emergencies.  If 
historians are to make sense fully of how groups like the FCVN use a discourse of consumerism 
to change the public’s response to emergencies, the key variable of commodification needs 
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greater exploration. Such an analysis can show how commoditization informed the actions of 
these volunteer groups dedicated to offering aid and how they presented those understandings to 
the American people.  
Igor Kopytoff’s theory on the cultural biography of material things provides a useful tool 
to explore just how humanitarian groups like FCVN turned humanitarian efforts into a 
commodity and forms the theoretical heart of this chapter. In his chapter, Kopytoff writes that 
although things, or physical objects and rights to them, and people represent opposite poles of 
how we think about commodities, this is a recent conceptualization and that people “can be and 
have been commoditized again and again.”
8
  As he expands his argument he states that people, 
like things, move in and out of the process of being marked as a commodity; in one moment and 
phase something is seen as a commodity while at another time and by another person it is not.
9
 
Though Kopytoff argues that though there is a “perennial moral concern” about the 
“commoditization of human attributes” in the United States due to the legacy of slavery, the 
work of FCVN suggests that the process of commoditization continues in modern US history and 
blurs the line between sacred and common spheres of life. Kopytoff defines the sacred sphere as 
containing things that are unique and individuated often marked as sacred and separate from any 
kind of sphere of exchange. The common, on the other hand, is anything that falls outside of this 
sacred world and is marked as specifically destined for the sphere of exchange.
10
 FCVN’s work 
with orphanages suggests that this separation during Babylift was, at best, tenuous and the 
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blurring provided a compelling reason for increasing numbers of ordinary citizens to offer aid to 
the war children of Vietnam. 
This chapter uses Kopytoff’s theorization of commodification to argue that FCVN’s 
presentation of Operation Babylift solidified American perceptions of humanitarianism as a 
process of financial and emotional exchange in pursuit of transformation. The public struggles 
that played out in media outlets over how to understand the operation marked humanitarianism 
as a commodity in which emergency consumers entered into the exchange with a set of 
expectations about what they would receive in return for their investment. Babylift legitimized 
the prevalence of market overtones in humanitarian operations, which presented an accessible 
entryway for increasing numbers of average Americans to enter into the humanitarian orbit.  To 
flesh out this argument, the first section looks at how the mounting pressure of critiques of the 
mission forced FCVN to justify their role and the purpose of the mission. Furthermore, it argues 
that FCVN turned to a discourse of commodification in order to help explain the need for the 
mission and prove the moral worth of the program. The second section analyzes the origin of 
these public discourses by looking at the many ways in which FCVN had historically relied on 
consumption discourses in their private fundraising efforts for their Vietnamese orphanages 
during the war. The final section looks at the ways in which FCVN took a consumption 
discourse intended for private use and reformulated it to appeal to the broader audience that was 
listening to the debates about Babylift.  
Babylift: Critics vs. Supporters 
April 1975 saw the rapid deterioration of U.S. military efforts in South Vietnam. In January of 
1975, the North Vietnamese army began a series of large-scale offenses. Their easy military 
victories emboldened the North Vietnamese to speed up their campaign and they put into effect 
110 
 
contingency plans for the conquest of all of South Vietnam. By March, South Vietnam had been 
cut in half as armies surrendered and hundreds of thousands of civilians fled.
11
 Interviews in U.S. 
newspapers of frightened South Vietnamese underscored the chaos of the imminent collapse as 
maps highlighted the massive amount of ground covered in the North Vietnamese offensive in 
only a few short days.
12
 Stories of South Vietnamese flight from the countryside to the cities 
exposed to Americans the complete disarray these internal migrants faced as they hurriedly 
packed belongings and fled towards areas of hoped-for safety.
13
 Photos showed masses of South 
Vietnamese people crossing rivers to anticipated aid destinations as mothers carried survival 
packages and fathers carried the smallest children.
14
 Once they reached their destination on the 
coastal regions, large groups of the displaced sat waiting as makeshift, temporary communities 
formed seeking help. Amidst these temporary communities, readers witnessed the ravages of 
conflict. The ultimate devastation of war was palpable.
15
 Exhaustion was written on the faces of 
the displaced as small groups huddled together sitting on what few belongings they could carry. 
Amidst the loss of shelter and material comforts, death served as the definitive reminder of the 
costs of the war.
16
 Photos showcased the most private moments of loss -- shrouds protecting the 
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bodies of those who had died in flight and a mother silently carrying her dead child.
17
 Children, 
and the violence perpetrated upon their bodies, elicited an emotional response from many in the 
American public. One paper ran a report on the first meeting between a Babylift child and his 
new parents under the title “S. Vietnamese Child Arrives from ‘Hell’ to New Home in MD.”
18
  
Due to the symbolic associations connected to children, their loss and vulnerability represented a 
particularly horrific portrayal of war in a way that the loss of adult life did not.
19
 In consequence, 
the need to save children took on greater import as it became a way to salvage something 
honorable from the wreckage of the Vietnam war.  
As if to assure worried observers of the fate of the Vietnamese, President Ford issued a 
press conference on April 3, 1975 to discuss American aid to those in flight as “we are seeing a 
great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught” and 
that “the United States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist these people.”
20
 
In his discussion of the flight, he carved out a special place for the children of Vietnam as he 
revealed that he had “directed two million dollar special foreign aid children’s fund be made 
available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United States as soon as possible.”
21
 The 
speed with which the Operation moved in its planning and execution appeared to confirm the 
U.S. commitment to aiding the South Vietnamese population. Indeed, the ease of appropriating 
two million dollars and the push to increase the number of children removed from Vietnam 
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beyond the two thousand mark suggested a profound sense of responsibility.
22
  The response 
from U.S. citizens echoed the national leadership’s seeming concern as hundreds of callers 
reached out to information lines established by USAID about the possibility of adoption. 
Anticipation of the orphans spread and press secretary Ron Nessen reported that “the Pentagon 
and State department have been flooded with calls from people all over the country wanting to 
adopt orphans.”
23
 The sheer number of calls eventually overloaded the phone lines.
24
  Though 
the number of people willing to open their homes and lives to unknown babies was astounding, 
vocal critiques of the mission arose exposing a lack of national consensus over the mission.  
Media raised some of the first doubts about U.S. motivation in rescuing children from 
Vietnam as one reporter attested to “the exaggerated importance assigned by President Ford to 
the orphans’ airlift” and that “the sentimental preoccupations with a few planeloads of orphans 
are hardly adequate to the demands of the moment
25
 Reports claimed that the sudden interest in 
the fate of orphans was no less than a publicity stunt by the Ford administration hoping to 
encourage one last groundswell of public support for the war. In a war weary country, Ford was 
not the only one who realized that permission for funds would be difficult to obtain. Recognizing 
the reluctance of Congress and the American people to give any more money to a war that 
seemed unending, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, found the perfect 
opportunity in Operation Babylift to shift public opinion. In a letter to the Prime Minister of 
SouthVietnam, Tran Thien Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Phan Quang Dan wrote of 
Martin’s understanding of the Operation. The children chosen for evacuation remained in a state 
of limbo as South Vietnamese adoption regulations prevented the emigration of the children. Dan 
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encouraged the Prime Minister to expedite the adoption process because in doing so the image of 
“ a million refugees and war victims fleeing the areas taken over by the communists would help 
to turn American public opinion regarding Vietnam, particularly the orphans arriving in the 
United States, given extensive TV and press coverage with narrated reports from witnesses of the 
situation, would have considerable influence.”
26
  It was clear that images of vulnerable children 
fleeing an imminent Communist threat would remind the public that America had a duty to 
supply every possible form of assistance to the South, including military and economic aid.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Behind the scenes conversations appeared to support such a claim of manufactured 
humanitarianism. On-going conversations about whether and how to remain in Vietnam had 
taken place in the White House before early April. Signs of South Vietnam’s collapse spurred the 
White House to consider additional means of sending more economic and military aid to 
president Thieu. On March 12 the area of Ban Me Thuot fell. In the United States on this same 
day, Congress rejected Ford’s plea for 300 million dollars in military aid for South Vietnam.
27
 
Discussions took place between White House officials about how and if a collapse could be 
stalled.  In a telling conversation, Ford and Kissinger discuss the options open to the United 
States in the face of collapse. Kissinger tells Ford that “it would be popular to say we have done 
enough, give only humanitarian aid, negotiate with Vietnam to take out those who want to 
go….you could couple it with a statement saying it was a bad defeat.”
28
 Ford replied that such an 
option “goes against my grain.”
29
 Nothing could be done without more aid, both military and 
economic, from the United States.
30
  Realizing this, Ford continued to ask Congress for 
additional funds.  Facing a bitter struggle with Congress, Ford said of Congress’ truculence, “If 
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the Congress want to vote this way, then the efforts of five Presidents, 55,000 dead, and five 
Congressional efforts are in vain.”
31
  
The grand reception of the first flight of babies to arrive safely in the United States at 
Presidio Air Force Base in California appeared to bolster claims of the mission as a publicity 
stunt to sway public opinion. News reporters turned out en masse to capture the President 
greeting the PAA 747 flight of 323 children, which earned the reputation as the “President’s 
plane.”
32
 Flashing camera lights dominated the scene as news reporters captured images of a 
worried President cradling a young infant.  The sense of spectacle continued as Hollywood 
celebrities joined in the cause of Operation Babylift. Yul Brenner’s wife spoke of her anxiety and 
anticipation as she waited for their new child to arrive safely.
33
 Hugh Hefner charted his own 
“Bunny Plane” to fly Vietnamese children out of Saigon. On April 9, 1975 they landed at La 
Guardia airport in New York. Photographers captured Hefner’s Playboy Bunnies carrying tiny 
swaddled bundles off his private plane.
34
 The high profile role of public figures like Hugh Hefner 
in Operation Babylift reinforced the link between the emergency and the sense of wonder and 
awe that drew in the public throughout this time of evacuation. A former orphanage worker, 
Susan McDonald, states that this was exactly the point of Operation Babylift: the Ford 
administration needed to do something drastic to reanimate the public’s loyalty to the failing war 
and Operation Babylift proved the perfect vehicle.   
Beyond the Hollywood spectacle of the Operation, other troubling aspects surfaced that 
called into question the altruistic nature of the mission. The adoptive status of the orphans 
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emerged as one of the most controversial subjects of the investigation. Throughout Operation 
Babylift, reports emphasized that the children on the flights were either “in the process of 
adoption by American families living in various parts of the United States” and that “those few 
who do not have families arranged will be placed with families now on waiting lists of the 
agencies.”
35
Speaking in Vietnamese to Jane Barton, four Babylift children told her that until a 
week prior to the flight, they had been living with their grandparents.
36
 By May, reports of the 
unverified status of Vietnamese children had increased. Leaders of the International Children’s 
Fund, Thomas R. Miller and his wife Tran Tuong Nhu, told of stories circulating in the 
Vietnamese communities of children who wanted to go back to their parents.
37
 Children who 
were not orphans and yet found themselves a part of the operation landed on American soil for a 
variety of reasons. Some children, for example, told members of the Vietnamese community in 
California of being separated from their families as a result of the disruption of war. As they 
wandered in search of familiar faces, they were picked up by adults who placed them in 
orphanages. Only a few days later orphanage workers placed them on planes bound for the 
United States.
38
 Other causes of children’s presence in Vietnamese orphanages stemmed from 
misaligned cultural interpretations of orphanages. In the United States, orphanages served as a 
place for children who had no legal guardians willing or able to care for them.
39
 Orphanage 
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administrators hoped that the children under their care would find permanent homes with loving 
and responsible parents.
40
  
In contrast, U.S. observers of the babylift noted that “American adoption efforts have 
never taken into account the fact that many of the children in South Vietnamese orphanages are 
not orphans. Many Vietnamese mothers put their children into orphanages because even the 
meagre rations available there were better than what they could get at home.”
41
 Vietnamese 
mothers also corroborated the different meanings of orphan. One mother used the analogy of a 
burning house when she discussed the decision to put her child in an orphanage, “think you are 
caught upstairs in a burning house. To save your babies’ lives you drop them to people on the 
ground to catch. It’s good people that would catch them, but then you find a way to get out of the 
fire too, and thank the people for catching your babies, and you try to take your babies with you. 
But the people say, “oh, no, these are our babies now, you can’t have them back.’ I don’t 
understand. Vietnamese don’t do like that with children. We love them too much to do that.”
42
 
For this particular mother, adoption and orphanages represented a temporary solution until the 
crisis resolved.   
For many, the egregious mistakes made in determining orphan status indicated a U.S. 
arrogance to use any means available to obtain its political objectives. Despite photos of Ford 
cradling newborns, many understood that the administration possessed little sincerity in the 
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welfare of its newest charges.  The racial background of Babylift children served as an important 
example for critics who wanted to portray an American government intent on shifting a rescue 
narrative to fit its political mission.  According to proponents, Babylift children, many of which 
were the result of liaisons between American GIs and Vietnamese women, faced a particularly 
difficult life in a country that prized “racial purity.”
43
 Reporter Gloria Emerson reported that 
Cherie Clark of the adoption and relief agency Friends of Children of Vietnam stated that “We 
have been flooded with mixed-blood children because of all the reports of killings.”
44
 The 
reasoning for such racial intolerance, whether imagined or real, held little import for those 
waiting to adopt children in the United States – for these prospective parents, what mattered was 
the perceived threat of racial injustice and the knowledge that U.S. citizens had both the power 
and the responsibility to prevent any race related injury from occurring.
45
 Other statements were 
equally dismissive of the complicated role race played as one volunteer stated, “they are here. 
They’re children – with those beautiful, beautiful eyes. That’s enough.”
46
  
Upholding racial justice as an important reason for rescue did not convince everyone, and 
concerns over who controlled, managed, and took care of the bodies of the Babylift children 
played a central role in the critiques against the mission. African-Americans found claims of 
racial rescue particularly suspect. In discussions over the need and extent of Babylift some critics 
pointed out the glaring contradictions of saving biracial children from the racism of Vietnam and 
placing them in a society that still wrangled with the violence of racism. In a meeting called to 
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pressure Ford into increasing the number of Babylift children, one audience member pointedly 
asked, “Do you think half-black, half-Vietnamese children would be better off in the United 
States? Do you think they’ll be allowed in South Boston schools?”
47
 
Though many Babylift children were part African-American, adoption agencies 
consistently placed these children with white families rather than African-American families.
48
 
Adoption agencies refuted the allegations of racial discrimination against prospective adoptive 
families and stated that race played no role in the adoption process.
49
 New adoptive parents, who 
were overwhelmingly white, also rejected charges of racism claiming that love transcended all 
boundaries, including those of race. For example, one adoptive parent noted, “All this worry 
about acculturation is nonsense….Maybe it’s a problem for when they are 16, but not when they 
are babies.”
50
  Others insisted that the children’s vulnerability and need for protection 
outweighed racial considerations.  By focusing on aspects of youth and innocence and what such 
youth conveyed with comments like nothing mattered but “their beautiful, beautiful eyes” aid 
workers and parents eschewed difficult conversations about why some so adoption agencies 
rejected so many African-American applications.   
 The lack of concern by aid groups, the government, and adoption agencies over where to 
properly place the children also acted as a highly visible example of the American imperialist 
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aggression that underwrote the Vietnam War.
51
 If racial tensions reminded observers that many 
within the United States, the physical removal of the war children underscored the power of the 
U.S. government to also dictate and shape the lives of those outside of its political boundaries. 
For many, humanitarian agency and government manipulation and control of the physical 
location of the children reflected much of the country’s unequal relationships of the past, both 
within and outside of the United States.
52
 Thus, imperialist associations of Babylift constituted 
the third major critique of the operation. 
Media members presented some of the most vocal analysis of Babylift as an act of 
imperialism. One reporter in Colorado described the Babylift “an appalling contribution of the 
overwhelming American arrogance that has made Vietnam a tragedy for our country from the 
day we arrived there.”
53
 One of the most vocal critics of the operation, Gloria Emerson, a 
reporter for the Village Voice and the New Republic wrote a searing piece detailing how Babylift 
represented the adoptions as one last attempt at U.S. domination in the wake of its failed military 
objectives. She reminded her readers that the adoptive relationship was merely a microcosm of 
the larger, unequal relationship unfolding between the nation states of the United States and 
Vietnam. She wrote that while the parents desperately wanted children, “it is more than clear that 
the children are filling their needs, as the Vietnamese have been obliged to do for Americans for 
so very long” and that those same adoptive parents do not understand “that Vietnam needs her 
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children and cannot spare any of them except for those who need prolonged medical 
treatment.”
54
  
Though Emerson’s views revealed the racist undertones of the United States as an 
imperialist power, she also drew out the consumptive qualities of the mission, which represented 
a departure from most of the other interpretations of Babylift. She pointed to Babylift as the 
culmination of a pattern in which key officials and the American public viewed ideological 
actions though a transaction-oriented lens.   In this case, the idea of saving children from a 
perceived life of tyranny was done with the understanding that both the financial and ideological 
investment would be returned tenfold and it was deemed necessary if the crises were to be 
molded into a powerful moment of transformation. It seemed that the South Vietnamese were 
also aware of the transaction-based relationship with the United States. Emerson quoted one 
soldier, who stated of the operation, “It is nice to see you Americans taking home souvenirs of 
our country as you leave – china elephants and orphans…too bad some of them broke today, but 
we have plenty more.”
55
 
 As critiques mounted against the mission, the discrepancies between the rhetoric of the 
mission as a mercy mission of rescue and its actual execution suggested that more than altruism 
and concern for children had birthed Operation Babylift.
56
  Charges of warmongering, racism, 
and imperialism plagued the collaborative effort between the adoption agencies and the 
executive branch. Initially, many public observers considered both parties as co-architects of the 
evacuation, but by the time the controversy over Babylift had receded the executive branch 
appeared as the primary villain of the narrative. The adoption and aid agencies symbolized by 
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FCVN as the most visible representative of the groups took on the more palatable role of rescuer 
and claimed a moral authority not found in the actions of the Ford administration. As observers 
sorted out roles of responsibility as a means to make sense of the evacuation, they understood 
that adoption agencies worked as the unwitting partners in a clearly unequal partnership largely 
scripted by the USAID. As one volunteer remembered, “There was nothing we could do about it. 
USAID just came in and started counting babies, which ones were black and which ones were 
white.”
57
  
FCVN and other groups, represented by either the prospective parents or volunteers who 
had been living in orphanages in Vietnam, actively defended their role and position throughout 
the saga of Babylift stating that through their operations, “though death is just around the corner 
for those living here, they have been given treasures by Phu My (one of the care and adoption 
centers sponsored by FCVN); the song of a bird, the laughter of a child, the sight of a spectacular 
sunset, and the warm knowledge that someone does care.”
58
  Their representation to the public of 
their role in the controversy rested on two important elements. First, they claimed their 
established presence in South Vietnam prior to the evacuation spoke to a true and sincere 
motivation to help aid the poor and vulnerable of Vietnam in a way that contrasted with the Ford 
administration. Second, they deployed evocative and specific tropes, images, examples, and 
explanations that were embedded in familiar consumptive practices to present their role as 
rescuer in a way that made sense to many in the American public. Grounding their humanitarian 
efforts in consumption practices made the operation palatable to many in the public even when 
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charges of egregious mistakes, racism, and imperialism cast doubt on the motivation and 
execution of the operation.   
These tropes and images appeared on the surface to refute the charges of racism and 
imperialism laid at their feet. However, these tropes subtly echoed entrenched assumptions 
concerning race, money, and power within and beyond the United States. Perhaps most 
significantly, as the adoption agencies defended their role, their actions and rhetoric helped 
legitimize an understanding of concern rooted in commodification all under the guise of altruism. 
The next section explores how these understandings of humanitarianism functioned in a private 
sphere and laid an important foundation for how the FCVN would describe their work to the 
public. FCVN’s public rearticulation of private assumptions cast the group and other non-profits 
like them as the moral heavyweight. This moral legitimacy generated an understanding of 
humanitarian response that made caring for people across borders more compelling than it had 
been in the past because of the way it intertwined altruism and consumption practices.  
American orphanages in South Vietnam and private commodification  
  Nine adoption agencies collaborated with the federal government and USAID to 
implement Babylift. The number of children brought over by each adoption agency varied.  The 
Friends for All Children of Vietnam (FCVN) and their sister organization, Friends For All 
Children, together brought over by far the largest number of the participating agencies with 1043 
children. In contrast, the Pearl S. Buck foundation brought over 68 children.
59
 The FCVN was 
also the most visible adoption agency throughout the coverage of Babylift. Newspapers often 
quoted their adoption volunteers and the prospective parents going through the adoption process 
via FCVN. Given their exposure in media outlets and the large numbers of children they dealt 
with, FCVN became the defacto representatives of Operation Babylift, and their experiences and 
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testimony proved vital in how many in the public received the rescue narrative. Congress, for 
example, relied heavily on FCVN testimony during the April 1975 congressional investigation of 
evacuation problems of Indochina.
60
  
Although debates over Babylift revealed the contentiousness of the operation, the 
memory of the operation and those who participated in it has remained remarkably unsullied.
61
 
Indeed, the mission has developed a hagiography around it and is often characterized as benign 
and altruistic. Adoption agencies and the volunteers remain central to this portrayal. For 
example, the 2002 commemoration of a plaque for a Colorado hospital that housed Babylift 
children upon their arrival in the United States in 1975 described the operation as preordained 
and the only viable action for saving the lives of South Vietnamese children.  Notes about the 
ceremony stated that “FCVN played a key role in initiating the Babylift evacuation” and that 
bringing the presence of the Babylift children in the hospital was “a visible act of destiny” for the 
Friends of the Children of Vietnam.
62
 The intermittent anniversary celebrations of Babylift often 
sustain the narrative of Babylift as the only alternative option available to Vietnamese children. 
For example, a 2002 Good Housekeeping article about a young women searching for her birth 
mother wrote that the now adult orphan “says she grew up comfortable with the fact of her 
adoption” and that it “was kind of like a Cinderella story.” The young woman went on to state 
that “as far as looking different from the rest of the family…it was never an issue. ‘I was brought 
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up believing it didn’t matter what I looked like.’”
63
 Such stories make clear that Babylift children 
could only have achieved such a foundation of love in the United States and that such 
opportunities were available because of the volunteer agencies like FCVN that participated in the 
evacuation. 
The perception of FCVN as a defender of childhood innocence emerged in reaction to the 
public debates teasing out charges of racism and imperialism. To counter public doubts about 
their role in the operation and distance their actions from the Ford administration, FCVN pointed 
to their long-standing presence in South Vietnamese orphanages. Friends of the Children of 
Vietnam started in 1968 in Denver, Colorado. Dr. Theodore Gleichman began the organization 
after visiting the South Vietnamese orphanage in My Tho as a USAID sponsored internist.
64
 
Concerned about the dire life circumstances facing the children in South Vietnam’s orphanages, 
Gliechman pulled together a motley crew of supporters in the United States to address the needs 
of the children. The group included religious leaders and concerned community citizens. At its 
inception, the FCVN focused its efforts on sponsorship programs of orphanages developing 
extensive relationships with certain orphanages providing both technical and material assistance.     
FCVN’s work with orphanages echoed many of the same principles and beliefs of other 
volunteer, humanitarian, and philanthropic aid groups established during the Cold War. Sara 
Fieldston, for example, details the emphasis on modernity and development that guided the 
missions of many of these development and humanitarian groups.
65
 They also concentrated on 
the benefits of love and proper manifestations of that love including activities like play.
66
  FCVN 
referenced many of these same principles in answer to public inquiries made by Congress. 
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However, in defending their role and the overall mission by incorporating traditional 
justifications of humanitarian effort, they also revealed a new dimension to the debate. FCVN 
gave a privileged place to consumption practices in the ongoing conversation about Babylift 
alongside messages of altruism and modernization.   
FCVN first commodified the humanitarian efforts towards South Vietnamese orphanages 
by creating an orphanage sponsorship campaign. They assigned interested sponsors to one of 
several orphanages in South Vietnam. Sponsors pledged ten dollars per month “to a particular 
orphanage to care for its children.”
67
 FCVN assured sponsors that their dollars provided a secure 
present and the hope of a better future for the children. The expectation of a secure and hopeful 
return stamped the exchange with what Kopytoff calls use value, in which those involved in 
FCVN exchanged dollars for something of equivalent use and value.
68
  In giving dollars to buy 
war children food and medical supplies, children not only survived, but grew into a specific kind 
of “Americanized” adult. As one worker stated of the children when they arrived on American 
soil, “These are the most Americanized kids you have even seen.” As the ultimate, and idealized, 
outcome of the Americanized orphan child showed, FCVN commodified humanitarian efforts by 
establishing monetary benchmarks that provided an ideological return when met. It was a clear 
blurring of the sacred and common worlds. 
In deciding to steer away from the individual sponsorship model, the FCVN foster 
orphanage plan accentuated the commodification process.
69
 In individual sponsorship programs, 
volunteer groups asked for individuals to assist only particular children.
70
 Children of individual 
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sponsorships received letters and care packages from their U.S. sponsors. The letters and 
personal exchange helped build, at least nominally, a relationship in which “foster parents” and 
“foster children” learned of the other’s personal histories and present day stresses and 
struggles.
71
  Individual sponsorship programs veiled the commodity aspect of the humanitarian 
effort through the personal relationships they entailed.
72
  
FCVN, on the other hand, inverted this practice by making a former personal and 
individual relationship, anonymous and collective. FCVN Orphanage Coordinators solicited 
families, groups, and individuals to collectively aid one single orphanage rather than the 
individuals within that institution. The FCVN decided that group sponsorship represented a more 
productive humanitarian effort because “of the severity of the problems in Vietnam, and, also, 
because of the needs of ALL the children are so great we could not single out only a few 
individual children to receive aid. We felt that the best way to reach all of the children in 
Vietnam who need help is to support the orphanages and centers in which they are cared for. We 
just returned from Vietnam and we saw it working.”
73
 Establishing group sponsorship programs 
over personal sponsorship blurred the lines between the worlds of sacred and common by 
creating a generalized model of the orphanage and war child experience in Vietnam.  
The orphanage program collapsed the individual child’s experience into a tidy framework 
of war chaos by categorizing war trauma. FCVN categorized orphanages based on the kinds of 
children they sheltered. For example, in a newsletter describing the many orphanages associated 
with FCVN, a prominent place stood out for the Hy Vong orphanage, which translated as “House 
of Hope.” This particular orphanage had a reputation for housing the most severely ill children. 
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FCVN described the orphanage as a place in which the children of HY VONG “progress 
remarkably well” and “gain their strength and good health,” but that “many die at HY VONG.”
74
 
If children survived treatment, they were sent to Newhaven orphanage “to await the trip ‘home’ 
(adoption).” 
75
 The general good health of the children in this center gave hope to many sponsors 
and reminded everyone that death lurked everywhere and “thus when illness and death come 
here it is a double shock.”
76
 Another orphanage, To Am, housed “emotionally disturbed” 
children “who are not doing well in the orphanages but who will, hopefully, improve with 
evaluation and stimulation from the remarkable staff at this house whose name means WARM 
NEST.”
77
 Although such categorization made reporting to sponsors easier for FCVN, it also 
worked to dismantle the singularity of each child. As a consequence, children embodied specific 
imaginings of generalized categories of the war experience and rested somewhere on a 
continuum of trauma that ranged from unsalvageable to miraculously healed.
78
  
While FCVN’s approach generally eroded the individual experience of each child, they 
did offer moments in which children were differentiated from the larger war child category and 
reinstated as individuals. The progress newsletters proved an important space in which the 
children moved in and out of the commoditization process by a “dialectic of categorization and 
differentiation.”
79
 After discussing the general needs of the orphanage, the newsletter highlighted 
individual children like Phung. Readers learned much about her: she was nine and “found in one 
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of the poorest of the Saigon orphanages,” lost her eyesight as “the result of an untreated eye 
disease,” had a “sweet nature” and liked “to keep herself immaculately clean.”
80
 Learning 
personal details and even cursory biographical data momentarily moved the child out of the more 
generalized war child category and rewrote the humanitarian effort as a relationship of care and 
concern.   
After highlighting individual children, FCVN’s appeal process reoriented the children 
towards an exchange sphere by discussing the general material needs required to save all 
Vietnamese children from disease and death. After describing how HY VONG had attempted to 
prevent more deaths through the establishment of a medical laboratory, they described how much 
more they needed if they were to continue to save lives: “We are continuing to make 
improvements, but we need so much more—a centrifuge, many more isolettes.” Although death 
stands as a sacred moment of life, FCVN descriptions of the material objects used to prevent 
such tragedy from occurring shifted the discussion of death from the sphere of the sacred to a 
common material sphere linked by monetary exchange. The entreaties by FCVN to sponsors 
that, “Your assistance is needed for the survival, the growth and development of these children” 
helped sponsors bridge the link between the worlds of the sacred and the common, “moving 
between spheres that are supposed to be insulated from each other.” 
81
  
In privileging the campaign as a way to provide emotional growth and development, 
FCVN attempted to eschew the obvious market undertones of their programs. In appeals for the 
foster orphanage plan, a 1973 newsletter wrote, “ The volunteer staff at the FCVN center sees it, 
not so much as a place, but a spirit, an effort of hundreds of people coming together to offer 
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assistance, security, love, and a future to thousands of children.”
82
 The director, Cherrie Clark, 
further stated, “It isn’t the address of the building that counts; it’s the concern and reality that 
will make the difference in the lives of the children as they face tomorrow.” 
83
 Only after 
highlighting the emotional character of FCVN’s mission did they remind readers of the intricate 
nexus between the sacred and the common spheres; hope, firmly embedded in the sacred sphere, 
needed material support if it were to remain within that realm. They wrote, “Much is being done 
– but much, very much remains to be done. All of this work requires money, time, and love. The 
children are waiting – waiting for someone to care.” According to this appeal, care implied two 
co-dependent meanings: first, an understanding of universal suffering and desire to relieve that 
suffering and, second, the ability to create a better future for them through monetary provision.
84
  
 FCVN’s understandings and descriptions of orphans’ caregivers represented another way 
that the group blurred the sacred and the common, transforming humanitarian aid into a 
commodity.
85
 In private, FCVN mapped onto orphanage caregivers the expectations attached to 
donated money. They were, in the words of Walter Johnson, “expected to enact carefully 
scripted roles.”
86
  One of the primary expectations of FCVN was that nuns would in charge of 
orphanage care write a general letter to the collective donating body assuring readers of the 
progress made from contributions write general letters of progress to their sponsors.  Nuns, 
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alongside volunteers, played a primary role in the daily maintenance of caring for children. One 
nun, for example, remembers during her time in South Vietnam that the babies needed constant 
attention to keep them from deplorable conditions, “that they would be soaked in the urine and 
feces.”
87
 Thus, most reports about daily life in Vietnam came from the nuns living and working 
with the orphans.  
According to FCVN letter writing remained crucial to soliciting more donations. Letters 
served as evidence that donor money made a difference in creating a “secure, loving” home for 
the war children of Vietnam. However, in balancing the demands of taking care of children, 
some nuns chose not to engage in letter writing. Cheryl Marksen, the executive director of 
FCVN, made letter-averse nuns a particular mission of reform as she pointed out to FCVN 
coordinators, “Nuns who don’t write! I think you all realize that we do have a few nuns who 
seem to have an aversion to writing.”
88
 Because the letters from nuns acted as the lynchpin for 
the orphanage program, Marksen stressed the continued to need to pressure on nuns to write. She 
admonished coordinators to engage in their own letter writing campaign to the nuns. Marksen 
encouraged, “write and keep writing to her, explain and reexplain the program in the hope that 
one of your letters will get through (either through the mail or through to the nun!).”
89
  
She also encouraged personal visits to the nuns. She noted that the FCVN supply contact 
in Vietnam “should be of great assistance” because “he’ll be able to make personal contact for 
you.” If the supply contact was unavailable, she suggested, “keep your ears open for someone 
who know [s] an American who may be in the area of your orphanage – if you find one plead 
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your case and ask that they personally visit the nun for you.”
90
 If this failed, she also offered the 
use of her USAID contacts, “I’ll also write to a contact I have in USAID and ask for names of 
advisors in each area that we have orphanages.”
91
 Resorting to contacts within USAID implied a 
willingness by FCVN to exhaust all means to compel letter writing from the errant nuns, 
including official measures.  
 As the letter writing advice reveals, the nuns’ performance played a key role in how 
FCVN coordinators viewed relationships with the orphanages at any given moment.
92
 
Expectations of nuns’ behavior and the fulfillment of that behavior triggered which sphere, either 
the sacred or the common, the coordinators used to inform their responses to the relationship. 
When nuns failed to meet expectations like letter writing, FCVN coordinators used monetary 
terms and benchmarks to express their concerns and leverage it as a form of discipline for the 
nuns. Some sponsors, for example, who traveled to Viet Nam would make their way to 
orphanages and report back their unsolicited orphanage observations to FCVN remarking on 
whether or not the nuns and orphanages enacted the carefully scripted roles provided by FCVN.  
Laya Engelker, the president of the aid group Friends of Children, Inc., visited the Diem 
Phuc Orphanage in Saigon. She wrote the FCVN noting that the orphanage “is being supported 
by you, with substantial monthly amounts. I don’t know what this money is used for, but it 
certainly is not spent for the children.” Engelker listed several examples in which the money had 
not been appropriately utilized: “the baby room has no bathing facility, and the toddler room has 
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one sink, only recently put in….Also, recently constructed is a play floor for the toddlers, but it 
does not look like it is being used much.”
93
 Engelker’s list highlighted her perceived violation of 
the intended exchange in the sponsorship program: when orphanages failed to use donated 
money in an appropriate manner, they actively eroded any hope for the children’s better future. 
 In addition to the poor care facilities, Egnelker was particularly rankled at the way the 
orphanage rejected her offer to adopt one of the Vietnamese boys at Diem Phuc. After describing 
the boys as “in very bad shape, and only through a miracle may he still be alive today,” she 
wrote that “my offer of medical help and adoption was rejected.”
94
  Her ire at a rejected adoption 
revealed the fluid aid structure in which the common and sacred spheres moved in and out at 
specific moments and “converts what is formally unconvertible.”
95
 She closed her letter stating, 
“I strongly urge you to suspend all funds to Diem Phuc orphanage, until improvements are made 
there for the children… and the orphanage starts releasing babies for adoption.”
96
 Her anger 
rested on the premise that sponsorship funds allowed donors to place certain claims on aid 
recipients and mandate how aid recipients met those claims.
97
 If the response left donors 
unsatisfied, Engelke suggested that donors terminate that relationship. Engelke’s appeal to end 
the relationship unless the orphanage agreed to adoption of some of its babies highlights how 
exchange value underwrote a relationship ostensibly rooted in love, hope, and concern.   
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Even when the orphanages agreed to donor expectations, they encountered ongoing 
scrutiny regarding how they met those claims.
98
 Diem Phuc Orphanage, for example, agreed to 
participate in the orphanage program as a way to benefit the children under their care. They 
decided to use sponsorship funds to build an extra wing onto their existing orphanage structure. 
For some FCVN board members, this proved a gross misuse of funds. Ross Meador, for 
example, wrote that even though “Sister Tai is prepared to present a breakdown of how the 
money is spent” he argued that  “if it was my orphanage, I would place other priorities ahead of 
building a new wing.”
99
 These other priorities included addressing the children’s skin and chest 
infections and the children’s diet.   
Meador’s reaction to the nun’s decision to use the money in a way that did not accord 
with his vision underscored the sense of ownership sponsors felt towards the orphanages. He 
wrote directly to the sponsor that Sister Tai did not share the same vision as FCVN, as 
exemplified by her use of sponsor money. He juxtaposed the contrasting missions when he 
wrote, “it’s simply a matter of priorities. One doesn’t buy a color TV if his children are 
starving.” Spending decisions enacted by the nuns reflected a basic difference in philosophy 
according to the memo and offered proof that “the sisters are apparently interested in something 
other than the best conditions of the children.” This letter also suggested that “Diem Phuc be cut 
off from FCVN supplies.”
100
  
Sister Tai’s independence in how Diem Phuc utilized sponsorship funds categorized her, 
and Diem Phuc, as unmanageable and ultimately unworthy of aid.
101
 Though FCVN placed 
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severe expectations on the orphanages in regards to disposal of money, programs they 
implemented, and the methods they chose to raise the orphans, many nuns like Sister Tai 
disrupted the perceived roles of the aid relationship.
102
 Though commoditization marked 
FCVN’s communal sponsorship program, the actions of the recipients disrupted and challenged 
these lines. Their reception and management of funds acted as an important disturbance in what 
had been perceived as an easy transaction oriented process developed by FCVN. Aid donors like 
Ross Meador expected malleability and a fulfillment of the claims he made on the people 
receiving FCVN money, and felt comfortable blurring the line between commodity and the 
sacred. Ultimately, however, actions like those of Sister Tai complicated these prescribed roles 
and served as a powerful reminder that though donors expected the fulfillment of certain 
obligations with their sponsorship dollars, there was no guarantee that this would transpire.  
Those orphanages that complied with FCVN wishes in a more predictable way managed 
to secure a fairly steady stream of sponsorship funds.  FCVN reports of these orphanages praised 
them as sustainers of community life and emphasized the ways in which the common sphere of 
material aid supported the sacred sphere of life. St. Paul’s orphanage in Qui Nhon stood out as an 
important example of this link. One observation of St. Paul’s declared, “survival of the 
orphanage is survival of hope for a chance the children of the people of the Qui Nhon 
deserve.”
103
 At least in some instances, determining whether or not a particular orphanage 
deserved the hope afforded by FCVN dollars lay in how completely they participated in FCVN’s 
adoption program. Unlike Diem Phuc, St. Paul’s orphanage director, Sister Marie, “makes no 
effort to hide her genuine concern for the children. About every set of parents to whom she turns 
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over one of her children for adoption she will ask, ‘But are you sure they’ll really love him?’”
104
 
The cooperation and collaboration of orphanages to work with the FCVN adoption process 
marked them as capable of transforming lives in a way that aligned with FCVN visions.   
Although FCVN volunteers felt that sponsor dollars had the greatest elasticity through a 
communal foster orphanage program, reports of the program reveal that adoptions of Vietnamese 
children remained an important point of focus for the group.
105
  With the success of the 
orphanage sponsorship program, several members of the group felt the FCVN could provide 
even more to individual children and thus redirected the mission of FCVN towards adoption. To 
better facilitate the adoptions process, on October 27, 1973 they encouraged a “legal and 
administrative separation between the Adoption Agency and the other FCVN activities.”
106
 The 
new group focusing on adoption took the name Friends For All Children (FFAC).  The 
transaction oriented relationship of the foster orphanage plan also informed how FFAC 
conducted the much more intimate adoption process. Similar to the orphanage program, private 
adoptions moved children in and out of sphere of commodity, blurred the common and the 
sacred and veiled the transaction-oriented process as an emotional, ethical responsibility, all in 
hopes of transforming the child.  
In 1965 South Vietnam allowed intercountry adoptions to take place, but allowed only 
one adoption agency, the International Social Service agency, to place children and had instituted 
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rigorous controls on the process.
107
  By the mid-1970s, South Vietnam relaxed those controls 
allowing seven adoption agencies to operate in the country. Even with these relaxed controls, 
foreign nationals wishing to adopt in South Vietnam faced significant hurdles such as finding a 
child available for adoption and navigating paperwork. Between 1971 and 1976 only 141 
children were adopted.
108
 Some adoption agencies explicitly spoke of the limited ability to adopt 
in Vietnam. One agency, the International Social Service, wrote in their adoption program 
notices that “it is true that there are many Vietnamese children in orphanages. However, only a 
few are free for adoption. Many youngsters are placed temporarily in these institutions for safety 
or until conditions are such that it is possible for them to be reunited with their families. For only 
a small number would adoption to the United States be feasible.”
109
 FFAC’s adoption process 
managed to overcome these hurdles in a remarkable way.  
 FFAC relied on a young Australian woman, Rosemary Taylor, as their main contact for 
initiating the adoption process in Vietnam because of her previous successes in completing 
adoptions.
110
 She originally worked for a French group and eventually helped the FFAC enact 
adoptions.  Taylor relied on unorthodox methods that stood in sharp contrast to other groups 
working in Vietnam. Taylor first hints at her unorthodox adoption methods when she tells a 
family searching to adopt a Vietnamese child, the Buchanan family, that “it will be no problem 
to find you a baby boy of the age you suggested” at a time when other adoption agencies 
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suggested looking elsewhere for children to adopt.
111
 In describing herself to the Buchannans, 
Taylor states, “As for “what I am” ? according to your American idea it all depends on the 
diploma you have.” She goes on to state that though she was generally categorized as a school 
teacher, in Vietnam “despite my lack of a diploma in “social work,” it would be hard to call me 
anything else just now.”
112
 
  In her self-description, Taylor was adamant that the American reliance on degrees and 
licenses prevented necessary social action such as getting children adopted from taking place.
113
 
Taylor’s descriptions of her particular methods emphasized getting the children into good homes 
in order to meet their best interests in contrast to licensed social workers who simply “quote 
phrases and paragraphs from some social work manual…leaving the problem untouched and 
babies dying…and he comfortable and smug in his air-conditioned office.”
114
  In separating 
herself from accepted social practice standards she cast herself as a morally concerned global 
citizen in contrast to the bureaucracy of other social service networks in Vietnam.
115
  
She also boldly confessed in her correspondence to Buchanan that the Catholic Relief 
Services described her efficient methods as suspicious and that they disavowed her services, “not 
allowing her access to the largest and most pitiable orphanage in Saigon.”
116
 Taylor was clearly 
aware of how Catholic Relief Services viewed her methods when she wrote, “I have no support 
from Catholic Relief Services, which could give me more access into one of the biggest 
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orphanages in Saigon. They distrust my methods, having no idea of what I am doing, as I am 
working independently. One poor brainwashed staff-member revealed that I was supposed to be 
shipping orphans wholesale, and illegally out of the country, without even seeing them...and 
engaged in other malpractices. White slavery, etc!”
117
 However strong the Catholic Relief 
Service’s criticism, Taylor deflected their concerns by consistently pointing to the urgency of the 
orphans’ situation -- a situation Taylor described as impending death.  
Like FCVN’s group sponsorship program, Taylor’s clandestine adoptions moved children 
in and out of the commoditization process. Taylor’s secretive methods erased the personal 
history of each child and allowed prospective parents to create a narrative for them. Making each 
child’s history invisible was an important part of the process of breaking the child down into 
discrete parts. The history of the child remained a separate part of their identity that parents did 
not have to acknowledge or grapple with in the adoption process. When the child reached the 
airport, parents resocialized them with new identities, new names, and a fresh start.  
Taylor also shared FCVN’s preoccupation with death and like FCVN, she used 
transaction-oriented language to frame her correspondence with parents about the role of death in 
the adoption process.. When discussing the common occurrence of death and orphanage 
children, she advised the Buchanans that in choosing a child for adoption, “it is best to wait till 
the last moment to actually choose the child because I like to be quite sure that the child is 
developing normally…sometimes too the baby dies before the adoption is complete…so I find it 
most prudent to get a birth certificate about the desired age, and if the first child dies, then 
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substitute another child on the same certificate…As you will realise, many of these children have 
no certificates, nor names at first, so one can substitute certificates with a clear conscience.”
118
  
Taylor, acting as the first arbitrator of the parent-child relationship, set the parameters for 
understanding that particular relationship. Her market oriented and supply and demand language 
and her comfort with replacing other children for those who had died suggested a less intimate, 
or sacred, relationship than adoption implies and helped bound the children as commodities.
119
 In 
distancing the adoptive parents from the mourning processes and suggesting that a ready supply 
of children could be counted on to fill those newly vacant spots, she strips the children of their 
humanity and removes them from the sacred sphere.
120
  
In conceptualizing humanitarian aid efforts for South Vietnam’s war children, FCVN’s 
orphanage sponsorship program and Taylor’s adoption methods blurred the lines between sacred 
and common spheres and in the process commodified the effort. This blurring acted as a central 
axis in how FCVN presented their mission and their role in the evacuation to the public. Indeed, 
Babylift forced private understandings of humanitarianism and its embedded commoditization as 
enacted through adoption and sponsorship into a public forum. The next section analyzes more 
closely the ways in which FCVN transformed private understandings into public justifications 
for Babylift, in particular, and argued for a more general continued humanitarian presence by the 
United States throughout the world. 
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“Nicholas David:” The private goes public 
In its endeavor to justify its humanitarian mission to the public, the FCVN exposed a tradition of 
commodification in relief efforts.  As media outlets pursued the story of Babylift, FCVN 
received an important public platform to amplify commodification and forced FCVN into close 
contact with the media. Facing public scrutiny, FCVN again dismantled the children into discrete 
parts by, first, focusing on disconnected aspects of the Operation such as health and transport. 
After moving the children back into the realm of commodity, the media focus on FCVN 
reintroduced the idea of personalization, reinforcing the sacredness of life, and marked their 
exchange value by placing intensive ideological claims on the aid recipients. The process of 
claim-making in the public realm continued to blur the line between the sacred and common 
worlds and transformed the humanitarian project into a consumption project. Most importantly, 
the re-articulation of Babylift as a consumption project made the Operation palatable to more 
Americans who increased both ideological and financial investment in the operation.
121
  
The media took a keen interest in Babylift from the start. Reporters described living 
conditions in South Vietnam, followed the orphans’ journey to the United States, and followed 
the first meetings of the children with their parents.
122
 Readers learned, for example, that 
adoptive parents Barbara Fischlowitz had blond hair, Margaret and Michael Kirby lived in 
Chevy Chase, and Lorna and Edward Stevens of Long Island brought their daughters Elizabeth 
and Sheila, both previously adopted from Vietnam, to greet the Babylift orphans. Reflecting the 
language and approach of the parents and volunteer adoption agencies that they interviewed, 
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much of the news coverage echoed FCVN’s tension of blurring sacred life and commodity in 
these stories. The tension surfaced as FCVN adoptive parents publicly discussed the intimate 
details of the adoption process. Though families used emotional language to discuss their 
feelings of the adoption process, this discourse competed with the necessary logistical and 
financial details of how to ensure the arrival of Babylift children.   
For example, media stories that followed parents and Babylift children put on display the 
private mundane details Rosemary Taylor guided prospective parents through in the adoption 
process. Money costs associated with adoption played a critical role in how private adoptions 
transpired. According to official FCVN adoption procedures, the prospective parents needed 
enough money to cover adoption fees, visas requirements, and airline costs of transporting 
children, and homestudy fees if the family opted for private agencies to conduct the 
evaluation.
123
  In addition, FCVN adoption instructions also suggested that the parents “must be 
prepared for medical expenses” related to caring for orphans from a war-torn country. FCVN 
urged parents that if their medical insurance “will not cover the child, they should have another 
plan in mind.”
124
 In an interview with a Babylift parent, reporter Ron Shaffer explicitly 
addressed the issue of cost. Though the parent skirted the answer, Shaffer informed his readers 
that the normal cost of the adoption process for the children “is about $1500.” 
125
 Shaffer’s dollar 
reference gave his readers a way to make sense of the Operation in a way that spoke to daily life 
and everyday practices. Many needed such an explicit exchange value because, for many, 
Vietnamese refugees evoked little sympathy.
126
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In navigating the logistical aspects of the adoption process, the specter of a potential 
monetary loss always hovered at the fringes of the adoption process. For fear of having her 
clients cheated out of  money, Rosemary Taylor admonished parents to work with only certain 
lawyers in Vietnam that she had personally vetted. She reasoned that others might take 
advantage of a presumed wealthy American couple. She wrote in one letter of a particular 
lawyer. “I don’t want him to overcharge you…Pay him $150 only, and if he wants to charge 
more, change lawyers.”
127
  Although the focus in adoption lay on accessing love, hope, and 
security, it rested in tension with the hidden exercise of balancing gain and loss in monetary 
terms.  This constant tension between sacred and common coded the adoption as, at least partly, 
an investment.
128
  
The media exposed this undercurrent of adoption as investment through its unification 
stories. The desperation for money and the subsequent framing of children as having a specific 
dollar value, filtered through to the public once the evacuation began in earnest. Transport costs 
of relocating the children, for example, highlighted this conflation of money and children in 
need. The Colorado based non-profit Friends For All Children took out a dramatic full page ad in 
the New York Times in the aftermath of the Galaxy C-5A stating that although the two-hundred 
and fifty-one thousand dollar “jet charter bill has been paid” there was still a critical need to raise 
more money and that “the more money we raise, the more children we can rescue, and ferry to 
freedom.”
129
 They ended their appeal with the admonishment that “your dollars can literally buy 
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these kids a ticket to a new life.”
130
 The ad reinforced the idea of maximizing value through 
donation dollars.  
Even government officials known for devotion to humanitarian campaigns deployed 
language that emblematized children in South Vietnam as potential monetary loss and gain. 
Senator Edward Kennedy’s line of question during the Judiciary Committee’s investigation into 
the Operation highlights the competing tendencies to understand children as human and a larger, 
depersonalized entity that cost a specific amount of money to save.
131
 Mr. Daniel Parker, the 
Administrator for USAID and the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster 
Assistance, was the first witness called during this investigation and faced a string of intense 
questioning from Kennedy. Kennedy was particularly interested in the physical and mental state 
of the children as seen in media images once they landed in Presidio, California. Asking just why 
these children were in such poor condition upon their arrival in the United States, Parker’s initial 
response claimed that the long overseas flight took its toll on many of the children. Kennedy, 
reluctant to let this line of questioning go offered in response that he did not know “how in the 
world you can explain the poor condition of children that are in orphanages today under the 
control of the South Vietnamese government, which AID has said it is supporting.”
132
 Kennedy 
further noted that of the ten million dollars that had been appropriated by Congress for 
orphanages in Vietnam this year, USAID had only spent 3.9 of that total.
133
 Kennedy’s anger at 
the misuse of funds helped frame the mission as one of financial investment; the broken and 
diseased bodies of the children represented a poor return on a ten million dollar investment. 
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If basic logistical details of Babylift and the adoption process worked to break children 
down into discrete parts, so too did the intensive scrutiny the children’s bodies received. In the 
private adoption process and, later, in the media coverage of the evacuation, private and public 
concerns fixated on the health of the South Vietnamese children coming into the United States. 
Parents looking to adopt a child from FCVN received a stock letter openly acknowledging the 
deteriorated physical conditions of many South Vietnamese children that made their way into the 
orphanages. The letter wrote, “Dear Friends……The children often arrive in poor physical 
condition with undiagnosed problems. Some have arrived with severe diarrhea, ear infections, 
worms, lice, intestinal parasites, pneumonia, bronchitis, hepatitis, typhoid, anemia, 
conjunctivitis, boils, fungus skin infections, scabies, thrush, vaginal infections, and T.B.”
134
  
Media scrutiny amplified private concerns over the children’s bodies. Their intense 
interests highlight the second way in which Operation Babylift children were broken down into 
discrete parts: public discussions over the health screenings and evaluations of the children. 
Throughout the evacuation process, health professionals intensely scrutinized the bodies of the 
new arrivals.
135
 As each flight of war children landed, a medical team of triage pediatricians 
inspected each individual child. Media reports described the triage process, often quoting doctors 
shocked at the ill-health of the children. One doctor examining children in San Francisco 
declared that “It was the most incredible scene of deprivation and illness I’ve ever seen” as many 
of the children experienced “severe cases of dehydration, pneumonia, diarrhea, chicken pox and 
other viral diseases.” It was also declared that a number of the children were “unquestionably 
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near death.”
136
  Reports of health screenings that emphasized the diseased bodies of the children 
served to remind readers that no matter how much the media personalized their stories, the 
children of Vietnam could still be reduced to simplistic, one-dimensional descriptions. In this 
case, the children were seen as little more than as either diseased or healthy bodies. Such 
reductionism reflected the same body concerns of the private adoption process.  
The health of Babylift children that preoccupied media attention also dominated the 
congressional investigation into the problems of the refugee evacuation during the last days of 
the U.S. presence in Vietnam. Congress, in their deliberations, used evidence from Yale 
professor Edward Zigler’s report on his expert opinion concerning the airlift. Zigler, professor of 
psychology and head of the psychology section of the Child Study Center at Yale, provided 
important insights into the effects of the evacuation on the children. He wrote that one of the 
major problems of the airlift “was the inadequate health screening of the Vietnamese children in 
Saigon and the impromptu and inadequate health services delivered to the children while in 
transit or when they arrived in the United States.”
137
 Although Zigler’s final analysis aligned 
with the diagnosis of other medical experts who examined the children, that they exhibited only 
“garden variety illnesses” and “posed no current danger to the public,” he alerts readers that the 
health problems of the children predated the airlift and the United States “should have been 
making an effort to improve the health of Vietnamese children while they were still in 
Vietnam.”
138
 
Other, more graphic reports of orphanage reports in South Vietnam reinforced Zigler’s 
assessment of the children’s health concerns. Judith Coburn, a reporter for the Village Voice, 
reported on living conditions within South Vietnamese orphanages. She visited one of the Saigon 
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orphanages reporting that 278 children lived in a four room orphanage that was so crowded “the 
children near the walls could not get out without crawling over the other children.” Even more 
distressing descriptions told of how “in such overcrowded facilities many babies lay in their 
urine and feces for hours while the overworked caretakers rushed from crib to crib attempting to 
change them.”
139
 Susan McDonald, a nun volunteering in one of the orphanages run with 
Rosemary Taylor, remembers the same situation, “We just did what we could to save them.”
140
 
Zigler summarized this report in his own work with the added warning that “in such quarters a 
single child’s illness could quickly generate an epidemic.”
141
 
Zigler’s and Coburn’s emphasis on the physical state of Babylift children suggested that 
other issues could also manifest as Babylift children developed. Zigler pointed to the fragile 
psychological state of many of the orphans. He wrote that the evacuation procedures, which 
moved South Vietnamese children already sick, “not only imposes further physical danger but 
can also induce psychological harm.” Children who survived the first evacuation flight that 
ended in a tragic crash “were not given time to recover either physically or psychologically from 
the experience of the crash…Imagine the fear that these children felt when placed aboard a plane 
so soon after their horrendous experience.”
142
 Coburn’s article also touched on the delicate 
interplay between health and emotional well-being. A nun she interviewed reported that the 
greatest hurdle faced in the orphanages was “the expiration of young babies in their cribs. This 
nun felt that many of these dying infants had no visible disease and may have died from simple 
lack of love or stimulation.”
143
  
                                                             
139
 Hearing: Operation Babylift: 87. 
140
 Author interview, fall 2013. 
141
 Hearing: Operation Babylift: 87. 
142
 Ibid.,88. 
143
 Ibid. 
147 
 
Zigler and Coburn’s reports cautioned for an honest brokering of the difficulties that the 
Babylift children might face in their development. In private, adoption agencies like FCVN also 
warned parents about the emotional state of many of the children in the orphanages’ care: “Many 
of the older children have formed no close attachments to adults and can more readily accept 
other children.” They also note that the “older child may be very quiet and reserved.
144
 These 
concerns received a remarkable whitewashing. FCVN adoption information suggested that 
emotional difficulties exhibited by the children were easily resolved. “It takes much time 
sometimes before the confidence in the adult can form. As a mutual love between the parent and 
child develops, he blossoms.”
145
 Sentiments that love could overcome all deficits flourished 
throughout the unification stories presented by the media.
146
 In consequence, FCVN’s often 
repeated mantra of love overcoming all obstacles rendered Zigler’s worries unwarranted. Unlike 
the physical conditions of polio damage, napalm burns, missing limbs, partial blindness and 
other permanent health challenges, emotions did not pathologize children in the same way that 
physical disabilities did because love and support could eventually overcome any emotional 
challenges.  
This would prove an important point in how many observers of Operation Babylift came 
to place ideological claims on the Babylift children. The clean emotional state of Babylift 
children or at the very least the ability of parents to ameliorate any emotional difficulties with 
love, marked these children as the perfect recipient of aid and allowed parents and observers to 
place specific expectations on the children of how precisely, and easily, they would integrate into 
the United States. This clean emotional state portrayed the children as malleable ideological 
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vessels that benign forces like appropriate parents could mold into appropriate U.S. citizens. In 
consequence, the war children received new identities, suitable American qualities, and had their 
histories reframed if not completely erased. After stressing the ability of the Vietnamese children 
to integrate and that, as a Holt adoption official, expressed, Babylift children “are the most 
Americanized foreign children you have ever seen….In Saigon, they were eating scrambled eggs 
and singing jingle bells” the media engaged in intense personalization of the children to reinforce 
their Americanness. 
147
 
As the children traveled over in military transports, photos were taken of the Operation 
that showed row after row of tiny boxes pressed together strapped to the floor of an airplane 
whose seats had been removed. Inside the boxes lay infant and baby South Vietnamese 
children.
148
 This was one of the few photos that captured the children as an anonymous mass. 
More prevalent were the photos that showed individual or small groups of children. For example, 
a widely circulated photo of Betty Ford greeting the orphans showed a close-up of her with one 
tiny swaddled bundle. Other photos spotlighted only small groups of children or children with 
their new parents.
149
 In one case, a small number of children playing are caught on film laughing 
and playing games as they await their air transport.
150
 In another case, a photo shows two small 
boys, new brothers, playing as the older American child takes his new younger, Vietnamese 
brother under his protection.
151
  
  Naming proved one crucial way in which parents and Babylift observers set the tone for 
their expectations and the kinds of claims they made on the lives of the new arrivals. Gisli 
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Palsson argues that naming is an important site of exclusion and belonging.
152
 For Babylift 
parents, this was certainly the case as many either removed the children’s Vietnamese names or 
attached Americanized names to them. Several reports discussed the Vietnamese birth name of 
the child and its replacement, chosen by the parents, of an Americanized name. A news photos, 
for example, depicts a close-up of a woman holding in her arms a small Vietnamese toddler. The 
caption reads, “The 3-year-old boy will be renamed Nicholas David.”
153
 Receiving a new name 
suggested that the children could start over with a completely new life in the United States under 
the proper tutelage of white, middle-class families. As reports detailed the unification stories 
they often referenced the idea of a “new life” for these children or a “life of hope.”  A memoir of 
Ed Daly’s rogue flight of children stated that, “The once frightened orphans were now bright-
eyed children, eager to land in the United States of America.” As children submitted to this life 
of hope, it was expected that they would shed the most obvious cultural elements of Vietnam, 
including their names. 
Personalization that occurred through the naming campaign also spurred intense 
ideological claims on the children, claims which stemmed from a perceived financial investment. 
The adoption stories proved particularly relevant for claims that centered on race. Descriptions of 
the adoptive parents and their first meeting with the Babylift children often included seemingly 
mundane details of physical descriptions and hometowns of the parents. The emphasis of the 
stories on the physical descriptions of the parents and families confronted looming racial 
anxieties and worries about the absorption of Vietnamese children into a nation that had long 
privileged white skin.
154
 The perception of white families welcoming racially different 
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Vietnamese children into family and hearth was especially relevant in an era when varied 
cultural and political groups strove to advance colorblindness as a competing consensus against a 
color obsessed history.
155
 At its core, these physical descriptions maintained to readers that the 
adoption of Operation Babylift babies, so young of life and experience, transcended racial 
matters. Remarks from the adoptive parents further eschewed the racialization of adoption. For 
example, one adoptive parent noted, “All this worry about acculturation is nonsense….Maybe 
it’s a problem for when they are 16, but not when they are babies.”
156
 The archetype of the 
innocent child embodied by the war orphans transformed them into an important ideological 
symbol of a color-blind society.  
In addition to saving the country from divisive debates around race, the children took on 
use as a second ideological symbol. In this case, saving Vietnamese babies through Baby lift 
meant saving them from South Vietnam’s failed war, failed future, and failed mothers.
157
 
Vietnamese mothers bore the brunt of this interpretation of the mission. At its core, U.S. 
conceptions of motherhood revolved around building, growing, and strengthening the nation 
through relationships with children.
158
 Mothers birthed future citizens and instilled appropriate 
republican behaviors and values as they raised their children. One of the most important 
behaviors mothers could cultivate in their children was loyalty to the nation-state and its mission 
to transform the world in its own image.
159
 However, for many, the image of the “good” 
Vietnamese mother remained elusive as doubts and stereotypes about the political maturity of the 
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South Vietnamese and their loyalty to a larger vision of a free-world surfaced. For many in the 
United States, patriotic mothering served as the corollary to military performance on the 
battlefield.
160
 Thus, the fates of military men, patriotic mothers, and the future nation intertwined 
in the Vietnam war.
161
  
Observers continued to monitor the connection between war progress and motherhood. 
One report highlighted how war chaos informed the decision of a mother to relinquish her 
children. 28 year-old-mother Nguyen Thi Liem encapsulated this corollary when she sobbed 
“Maybe the Viet Cong be here. Maybe they rocket. Maybe they bomb. I don’t want my babies to 
die.” She made these comments as “she signed a waiver permitting the adoption of her three 
children.”  
162
 The catastrophe of lost opportunity for Vietnamese mothers to raise appropriate 
children accompanied the military disaster to capture the political and physical state.   
  Due to the mutually reinforcing nature of expected gender performances in war, doubts 
about the South Vietnamese military prowess informed perceptions of how Vietnamese women 
performed their expected role as protectors of the state’s future. During the last years of the war, 
Nixon’s Vietnamization policy entrenched dependency perceptions as the South Vietnamese 
struggled to combat the North’s effective guerilla tactics.
163
 Writing for Newsweek, one author 
explicitly described the relationship between Vietnamization and dependency as the “grand 
illusion’ that “failed to take into account the extent to which a client can become dependent on 
its patron – not only materially but psychologically as well.”
164
 He continued stating that 
although U.S. training and support were intended for only a limited time, “it was only natural 
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that its leaders would become overly attached to the security blanket that American support and 
technology provided.”
165
 Such characterizations implied that South Vietnam was simply not 
ready for the challenges and responsibilities of a global citizenship (Klein 11-13).
166
 
Political and military questions soon reframed Vietnamese mothers as incompetent and 
devoid of the appropriate skills to raise a generation loyal to free-market driven society.  
Mothering failures often came to light through descriptions of Babylift children arriving in the 
United States. Though the children ostensibly came from orphanages, comments on their 
individual histories implied that well before entry into such an institution, their Vietnamese 
guardians failed in their parenting duties. For example, adoption expert Susan Kilbanoff, stated 
that many of the children faced a difficult adjustment to life in America and would do things like 
stealing “because that is the only way they have learned to survive.”
167
 Images of thieving 
children arriving on the shores of the United States reiterated to audiences that the adoptive 
parents would need to deliver intensive instruction in proper liberal-democratic behaviors that 
the children failed to receive during their time in Vietnam. Other descriptions emphasized the 
sickness and lack of cleanliness in the children. Dr. Alex Stalcup, physician to Babylift, noted in 
the Congressional Hearings that these sick and dirty children “were the cream of Vietnam’s 
crop.”
168
 The children’s unkempt and sickly appearance reminded readers that the Vietnamese 
mothers failed in their duty to raise the proper kinds of citizens needed for the free world. 
Reports that cast Vietnamese mothers as failures in the nation-building process 
reaffirmed U.S. ambivalence towards Vietnamese mothers as “good” mothers. Reporter Gloria 
Emerson captured this ambivalence when she wrote of a widespread belief in the United States 
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“that even the nicest Vietnamese do not really love or know how to take care of their 
offspring.”
169
 To be both a good and patriotic mother required sacrifice which entailed “a choice 
that must be made to give up something of value in order to get or keep something of greater 
value, and the loss must be viewed as regrettable.”
170
  The sickly state and questionable behavior 
of Babylift children acted as evidence that South Vietnamese mothers did not fully understand 
the value of the children in their care, which in turn lessened the act of sacrifice for Vietnamese 
mothers.
171
  One adoptive mother explicitly questioned Vietnamese mothers’ capacity for love. 
In an open “letter to a unknown mother” in a FCVN newsletter, Diane Nason wrote, “I don’t 
think of you very often, In fact, more of the time I make an effort to keep you out of my 
thoughts….I feel so sad for you…because it is so sad to create something so lovely and then to 
be forced to turn your back on it…You must have felt some love too…if not for the baby, 
perhaps for her father.”
172
 Significantly, depicting South Vietnamese mothers as unworthy of 
their charges helped many observers make sense of their own claims on the Babylift children.  If 
Vietnamese mothers could not save their own children, and by extension their own nation, then 
American benefactors would have to shoulder that responsibility.  
The claims placed on Babylift children spoke to a future return on an ideological 
investment. Babylift children, once instilled with proper American values, would move the 
nation past its racist history and stand in opposition to its international reputation of imperial 
influence. Supporters of Babylift could easily reimagine the children as the transformative agent 
of the future of both the United States and the United States in the world. Making such intense 
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claims on the children allowed groups like FCVN to counter charges made by South Vietnamese 
officials that claimed the United States was ‘taking elephant souvenirs.”  
Conclusion 
Ironically, though the insights about elephants and souvenirs offered by the official’s words were 
intended as a means to scrutinize the inequality of the relationship between the United States and 
South Vietnam, his message of consumerism resonated with many in the United States as an 
affirmation of that relationship. As stories and reports revealed links between consumption and 
humanitarian efforts, these links became an important foundation for the outpouring of concern 
for the children’s welfare. While the government may have spearheaded the operation, their 
partners, the voluntary organizations and adoption agencies, played a much more critical role in 
the legacy that Babylift left for understanding and participating in emergencies by the average 
citizen. By rearticulating the private consumption understandings and assumptions of 
humanitarian work in a public context, Friends for All Children of Vietnam established a 
blueprint for understanding humanitarian emergencies and their transformative potential as 
transaction based. Such a transaction oriented view of the people and conditions involved in the 
emergency opened a space for the average citizen to feel emotionally, ideologically, and 
financially invested in new ways in the crisis. These new ways of understanding the crisis gave 
greater moral authority to the very groups that created them, lending greater weight to the 
opinions, values, and actions of humanitarian groups.   
Once again, perceptions of children in emergencies were critical in shaping these new 
modes of humanitarian thinking. The Vietnamese “orphans” became symbols of all that had gone 
wrong with the war, with much of the blame for the fallout being p laced on the parents of the 
Vietnamese children. According to this new logic, incompetent mothers, the domestic 
155 
 
counterpart to incompetent soldiers, were unaware or even incapable of understanding the 
sacrifice they made when they placed their children in orphanages. This was just one more 
example of inappropriate behavior that reflected a vital shortcoming in transformative ability. 
FCVN made clear that though the parents could not be transformed, the children certainly could 
and the easiest way to insure this happened was through American purchasing power. Just as 
importantly, American participation in the emergency had the additional salve of ameliorating 
America’s own responsibility in the war. The following chapter explores the ways in which the 
next large scale emergency that focused on children, the Ethiopian famine, shifted from a 
suggestion that Americans helps transform the world through humanitarianism to an expectation 
that they would do so . Ethiopia served as the clearest warning that certain groups of parents and 
potential global citizens could not be trusted in their transformative journey.  As a result, aid 
groups heralded the American public as the last saving grace for the children of the Ethiopian 
famine. If Americans could not save the dying children and prevent future famines by reshaping 
parental behavior in emergency situations, then nothing could. 
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Chapter Five: “The Next Time the World Goes Downhill”: the 1984 Ethiopian famine and 
citizen responsibility 
 
Introduction 
 On January 28, 1985, in a fit of pique, Cyndi Lauper declared, “That’s right! Ain’t what 
we’re doing trying to unite the world?”
1
 Lauper’s comment was a direct response to a creative 
dispute taking place in a Los Angeles music studio where such prominent and diverse musicians 
as Willie Nelson, Michael Jackson, Lionel Ritchie, and Bob Dylan had gathered to record the 
song “We are the world.” Lionel Ritchie and Michael Jackson wrote the song and recruited 
fellow musicians to sing it in an attempt to provide aid relief to the victims of the Ethiopian 
famine.  Although the famine began in 1983 with counter-insurgency strategies instituted by 
Ethiopian leader Chairman Mengistu in the Northern regions of the country, two years passed 
before attention in the United States focused on the great humanitarian emergency taking place 
within Ethiopia.
2
 The increased attention culminated in the great LiveAid and Band Aid concerts 
and “We are the world” recording which garnered over sixty million dollars intended for African 
famine relief
3
.  
The songs, resulting concerts, and the outcry about famine conditions proved much more 
than a straightforward relief effort.  Cyndi Lauper’s comment revealed that the concert, songs, 
and public outpouring were as much about articulating a specific vision of a future world in 
which American citizens bore a heavy burden to shape as it was about providing immediate 
relief to broken and vulnerable bodies so far away.  Lauper’s spontaneous comment left open the 
question of what precisely aid efforts wanted a united world to do and look like post-crisis.  This 
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open-ended question was critical in the evolution of humanitarian ideology in the United States 
because it forced aid groups, the American people, and the U.S. government to grapple with and 
push forward the boundaries of humanitarianism.  Within the context of the Ethiopian famine, all 
three of these groups relied on ideas of consumption, transformation, and responsibility to 
advocate for humanitarianism as a better, more appropriate way to engage with the world.   
Previous scholarship of the Ethiopian famine has focused extensively on the consumptive 
spectacle of the famine that manifested most visibly through the LiveAid concert while other 
studies have looked at the ways in which the American people jumpstarted the Reagan 
administration into action.
4
 
In contrast, this chapter focuses on how aid groups promoted American participation in 
the emergency by presenting the American people as the only means of transformative salvation 
for Ethiopian children.  NGO messages of salvation included much more than simply food relief;  
salvation in this case also rested on changing behavior.  This chapter argues that the vision of a 
future world articulated by media, government, and aid groups solidified the role of the 
American citizen in shaping U.S. humanitarian efforts by coalescing around the transformation 
of Ethiopian famine victims, both parents and children, from “unenlightened” peoples into world 
citizens that would act as torchbearers of liberal values, attitudes, and behaviors.
5
 Children were 
the future lynchpin of this vision and the key to a productive childhood lay in shaping their 
attitudes and behaviors alongside those of the parents.  As a result, in Ethiopia, children 
represented the future of the world and the role America would play in setting the agenda for that 
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new order through their humanitarian encounters.  The outcome of post-famine Ethiopia rested 
on transforming famine victims in such a way that would ensure their actions and ideologies 
post-crisis conformed to a neoliberal understanding of the world.  Because the promised new 
world rested on specific neoliberal understandings of individual behaviors and characteristics, a 
space opened that allowed even greater claim making through purchasing power on Ethiopian 
famine victims than what had been seen in Babylift.  If participants in the humanitarian crisis 
transformed Babylift children into new Americans through claim-making, claim-making in the 
Ethiopian case attempted to transform famine victims into new neoliberal citizens of the world. 
In the moment of humanitarian crisis that was the Ethiopian famine, the three varied 
forces of media, private non-profits, and government commingled to entrench a specific 
neoliberal understanding of the future world order that recognized individual choice, goal-
tending, and personal accountability as the necessary ingredients to promote global progress and 
placed Americans at the center of that calculation.
6
   As the new humanitarianism found in 
Babylift expanded ten-fold in the 1984-1985 famine crisis -- media images and documentaries 
depicted the glaring reality of child death in the refugee camps, relief efforts invited the public to 
participate in the emergency through purchasing power by donations to save children, and the 
humanitarian response generated specific claims of expected behavior from children receiving 
aid – Americans used the famine as an opportunity to remake and redefine visions of progress 
abroad.  As a result, humanitarianism received an unprecedented stamp of moral authority and 
entrenched the ideology as a legitimate alternative to traditional U.S. foreign policy.  
Finally, this chapter relies heavily on the moral theorization of Didier Fassin.  Didier 
Fassin explains that in an emergency a strong sense of urgency compels people to act quickly to 
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meet the most basic needs of victims.
7
 In both Babylift and the famine, those outside of the 
emergency rushed to meet the basic shelter and food needs of victims.  He further explains that 
as people rush to meet the basic needs of victims, the state of emergency provides an allusion of 
equality in which the basic humanity of all individuals is regarded as equal.  Within this context, 
emergency circumstances briefly disrupt the boundaries of race, class, nation, and ethnicity and 
in privileging a sense of equality the reality of power relations are obscured.
8
 This chapter seeks 
to uncover the allusion of equality in order to discover how the needs of the Reagan 
administration, the private humanitarian groups, and the public merged together as a means to 
advance essential neoliberal ingredients of a specific vision of the future.  I look at calls to action 
and emergency relief projects to better understand how the drive and motivation to alleviate pain 
and suffering was steeped in a hierarchical politics of race, ownership, and commodification.  
Each section of the chapter explores the dynamics of power relations as they played out in 
messages about and programming of saving the children of Ethiopia and ultimately coded U.S. 
participation as the only means of transformation.  Section one analyzes how traditional tropes 
reinforced the perceived backwardness of Ethiopian citizens and were renewed during the famine 
as a call for intervention from humanitarian aid groups.   Section two looks at the ways in which 
Americans voiced concerns about the negative consequences of aid as a force that would foster 
dependency and sloth – both of which made up neoliberal nightmares.  Such doubts again raised 
questions about the transformative potential of the victims.  Section three then looks at how aid 
groups addressed these concerns through camp and population management of the famine 
victims.  
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Africa Redux: Media images and the need for aid 
Media coverage of the famine surged in the fall of 1984 after American news stations picked up 
footage shot by the BBC of a refugee camp in Korem, Ethiopia.  English reporter Michael Buerk 
first broke the story of the famine when he found his way into the camp in October and began 
reporting on the huge numbers of people traveling to the area in search of food.  As he described 
the scene as one of a “biblical famine…now in the twentieth century,” cameras panned out to 
show thousands of bodies covered in blankets huddled next to each other.  At other moments, the 
camera panned in to show close-ups of children crying, fear written across their faces.  In other 
scenes, viewers saw mothers holding tiny babies in an attempt to breast-feed even though no 
milk remained in mothers’ malnourished bodies.  The cameras highlighted the acute frustration 
of the babies as they cried out at the lack of milk.  Within the same scene, fathers walked through 
the crowds carrying the shrouded, tiny bodies of babies that had died, seemingly from lack of 
food.
9
 Graphic images stunned audiences by showing starving Ethiopians literally dying in front 
of the camera.
10
  
Like Operation Babylift that happened ten years earlier, two key themes emerged in the 
policies and portrayal of the Ethiopian famine.  First, children occupied a predominate role in 
media images.  Second, the intense focus on children played a central part in how Americans 
understood the crisis.  US Senator Paula Hawkins made explicit the need to focus on children in 
the famine, equating it to a moral obligation when she wrote to the USAID about a provision in a 
bill she was sponsoring, “I would like to urge the AID to pay special attention to the plight of 
children caught in this desperate situation…I urge the agency to make use of this program to the 
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extent possible in order to protect humanity’s most precious resource, its children.”
11
 Many 
consumers of the disaster similarly adhered to Hawkin’s conception of children as an innocent 
and precious resource.  Placing children at the center of the famine allowed many viewers to map 
onto the crisis conceptions of childhood rooted in innocence and infantilism that translated into 
an inability of Ethiopian adult men and women to rectify the famine crisis.
12
 As a result, the 
child victims of the famine came to represent all of Ethiopia, an image which suggested that 
Americans needed to stand in as appropriate guardians to implement action to save their bodies, 
lives, and future.
13
 For many viewers of the tragedy, Ethiopia acted as a modern day rescue 
narrative.
14
  
 In consuming photos, news stories, and text about the babies of Operation Babylift, 
Americans learned the babies’ personal details and took an active interest in how these particular 
Asian victims would each fit individually into the national vision.
15
 In contrast, media often 
treated the Ethiopian famine victims ambivalently and vacillated between personalizing the 
stories of loss and highlighting the famine as an avoidable tragedy, which entailed 
depersonalizing the victims and homogenizing them as a large nameless, faceless group.  Playing 
on this ambivalence, cover stories thrust images of starving children languishing in make-shift 
camps in front of the eyes of magazine readers, but provided minimal background or personal 
information.  Little is told of those that are photographed other than a brief sentence or two on 
how they arrived at the camp and, often, their stage of death or their nearest family member’s 
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stage of death.  Images of starving children suggest some kind of relationship with the viewers, 
but the lack of details discouraged more than the superficial evolution of that relationship.
16
 
A 1985 article in Life Magazine exemplifies first, the centrality of childhood conceptions 
to perceptions of the famine and, second, the ambivalent characterization of the famine victims.  
Photos litter the story, most typically showing bodies that have recently died.  The captions that 
accompany them give only a brief explanation of the photograph.  In one photo that covers one 
and a half pages, viewers see the naked back of a 28-year-old recently deceased woman being 
cleaned for burial by her mother and aunt.
17
 In shooting this very intimate moment between 
family members, the magazine emphasized the caretaker relationship between mother and 
daughter, capturing the moment not as the tragic loss of an adult woman, but rather as a moment 
when a mother mourned the loss of her child.  In reporting on the crisis, media images of the 
famine privileged the vulnerability of losing the children of Ethiopia, the nation’s “most precious 
resource,” and managed to portray even adult victims as perpetual children, 
Readers also learn nothing about who this woman is or her family.  Witnessing one of the 
most intimate moments of human life without anchoring it to any context simultaneously 
engages and disengages the reader.
18
 Fassin argues that the preponderance of visceral media 
images found in emergencies creates “a form of generalized closeness to suffering that allows 
empathy to be expressed almost identically whether one is face to face with the person or 
thousands of miles away.”
19
 Sifting through images of death and disease, the observer, or 
consumer of emergencies, comes face to face with his own perceptions and understandings of 
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life events like birth and death and the disruption of those events.  As a result he engages with 
the victims’ pain and suffering.
20
 
But although, as Fassin suggests in his theorization of humanitarianism, observers of the 
famine engaged with suffering at a distance, they did so only in highly qualified ways within 
well-defined and rigid boundaries.   Media renderings of Ethiopians as a monolithic bloc of 
suffering allowed the reader to create their own narrative about the event and attach their own 
assumptions about the photos and images they saw, including the understanding of Ethiopia as a 
nation of innocent, dependent, and helpless children.
21
 A smaller photo inserted next to the burial 
preparation photo in the Life article, reinforced this theme as it showed a man gently placing his 
recently deceased four year-old daughter on a blanket.
22
 Like the burial photo of the woman 
discussed above, the central point of concern is the death of the child and the inability of the 
parent to prevent such an end.  Readers only learn very briefly the age and name of the daughter, 
but no more which facilitated a connection to the images based on the imagining of a shared 
pain.   
The limited textual context given about the victims allowed observers to rely on their 
own understandings of the world to make sense of the images.
23
 In this way, they disengaged 
with the full context of the victims’ lives, ignoring the complexity and historicity of the political 
situation facing the victims, by relying on their own understandings of the pain the victims 
faced.
24
 With little or no individualization of the people photographed, the consumption of media 
images about the famine invested the reader with a significant amount of assumptive power over 
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what constituted an appropriate famine victim.  These assumptions would eventually inform the 
kind of purchasing decisions consumers made in the emergency, by inviting them to anchor these 
images with their own narratives of the famine.   
One of the most visible and cogent narratives used to make sense of the famine centered 
on the Cold War.  The Life article highlighted the distinct Cold War discourse Americans 
incorporated in their reports of the famine.  Speculation over how and why the Ethiopian 
government pursued certain food and emergency policies throughout the crisis served as an 
acknowledgement of deeper ideological forces at work and exposed how many Americans 
engaged with the political elements of the crisis.   Images of innocent famine victims suffering at 
the hands of an evil Marxist-Lenninist regime deployed a simplified political schema to interpret 
the crisis: the Ethiopian people, often viewed as childlike and innocent, suffered at the hands of 
the communists and American responsibility mandated that efforts be made to save them
25
.  
References to this simplified understanding abounded.  One article, for example, argued that 
before any progress could be made in the crisis, American leaders needed to recognize the root 
cause of the famine issue as a political consequence of a communist regime.  The author 
admonished that before the United States rush headlong into a relief effort they must recognize 
that “adverse weather conditions set the stage for Ethiopia’s disaster, but it is the political 
priorities of Ethiopia’s dictator, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, that have crippled 
Ethiopian agriculture and reduced its ability to cope with the drought.”
26
  
Tanja Muller claims that anti-political representations of the famine continued to 
dominate the crises throughout its coverage into 1985 and currently remain in use as an 
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important practice of non-profits seeking aid donations for Africa.
27
 When looked at closely, 
however, this analysis unravels.  The innocence of victims did remain an important theme in 
media coverage, but the perception of the famine as apolitical never took root.  The larger 
political dynamic between the United States and Ethiopia evolved into a central point of concern 
for many Americans.  Working in concert, the media and the public advanced a narrative that 
rested on deeply political, if overly simplistic, explanations of the world.  In this new story, 
famine victims persisted as suffering at the hands of a malevolent communist government led by 
Haile Mengistu.  One relief worker affirmed this sentiment when he was quoted as saying, “the 
moral position” is “to save lives if we can.  The moral position is not to punish the people for the 
sins of their rulers.”
28
 As the media reiterated the equation of Megnistu as an evil government, 
they turned their attention to children to reinforce this claim.   The wretched physical condition 
of Ethiopian children came to symbolize the ultimate consequence of having a communist 
regime in place.  It also presented an image whereby American leaders and the public had to 
stand in as guardians for incapable Ethiopian parents.   
Although the Cold War narrative was readily available for use, many of the images and 
representations seen in the 1984 Ethiopian famine also rested on long-standing paternalistic and 
racialized renderings of  poorer, dark-skinned peoples.
29
 The case of American management of 
the Ethiopian crisis and the “moral and subjective framework” it rested on had a long heritage.
30
 
Reginald Horseman traces the racial underpinnings of American interaction with native 
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Americans in his exploration of Manifest Destiny during the 1840s.
31
 He concludes that the 
civilizing mission some Americans used to justify expansion rested on racialized understandings.  
Matthew Frye Jacobson looked at cultural works to reveal the way writers deployed fiction to 
advance an image of America as savior through progress.  Edgar Rice Burrough’s 1914 Tarzan 
of the Apes, for example, managed to capture the American imagination through particularly 
simplistic and racist representations.
32
 Through the pages of Tarzan readers learned to associate 
progress with American industry and civilization and backwards, primitiveness with Africa.  
They also learned about the relationships between the two characterizations; American progress 
would tame and advance undeveloped cultures.
33
  With the onset of the Cold War, the refrain of 
American progress only gained strength as a justification for interference in the activities of other 
nations.
34
  
The constant heralding of American progress contained distinct paternalistic threads and 
acted as at least one guide marker in America’s relationships and interactions with the world.
35
 
Paternalism shaped ideas of what did and did not constituted progress, infused media reports of 
the crisis, and acted as a litmus test of how Ethiopians responded to the emergency.  News 
reports about daily life in the refugee camps gave readers a glimpse into Ethiopian lives and 
created comparisons between the “progress” of an American way of life and other more 
“primitive” cultures.  Such comparisons tended to reveal the outcomes of “primitive” cultures as 
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tragic and backward.  In the Life article, for example, a graphic photograph shows a famine 
victim lying on her side on a bare floor covered by a blanket.  Next to her legs is a newborn baby 
still attached by the umbilical cord.   A MSF midwife tells the reporter that although there is an 
obstetrics table available to the Ethiopian women, most “prefer to squat on a swatch of black 
plastic on the floor.” Embedded within this comment is the suggestion that Ethiopian women 
chose to remain outside any of the obstetrics technology that facilitates “positive outcomes.”   
Such a decision privileged Ethiopian women’s own understanding of the birthing process 
and the body’s ability to perform in that process over Western constructs of childbirth.  The aid 
worker does goes on to say, “I knew this method of having babies was possible but I never saw it 
before…Now I think: Why not? It’s more natural.”
36
 However, this particular photo of a natural 
childbirth is placed next to photos of women delousing each other upon entrance to the camps 
and amidst other photos of starving bodies.  Implied is the subtle suggestion that the preferred 
natural mode of childbirth, and the attending natural lifestyle, incurs substantial risks because it 
eschews the authoritative knowledge of medicine and technology that manages saving lives that 
is presented in popular culture references like movies and television shows.
37
 Here, “natural” 
stands in for “primitive.” In this particular scenario it becomes natural for aid workers, mostly 
Western, to step in and guide Ethiopian women in this emergency towards a more perfect 
understanding of how progress in areas like medicine can ease areas of their lives like childbirth. 
Utilizing a paternalistic discourse generated images and descriptions of Ethiopian famine 
victims as unable to meet their most basic needs and valorized the Western aid workers who 
acted on their behalf.  According to the article, in many ways the aid workers of MSF, or 
Medicine San Frontiers, became the only conduit to survival.  One photo underscores this with 
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the image of a white, female aid worker from MSF walking steadily ahead of a gaggle of 
children in her charge.  She is quoted as saying after meeting with the RRC that, “I was really 
fed up after the meeting with the RRC…I wanted to leave.  But if I can still help a few people, 
there is a reason to stay.” Rooted within this statement is hierarchy of power overlaid on a sense 
of need; the famine victims need her to stay because only she, or other aid workers like her, have 
the capacity to defend the victims from the Mengistu’s Marxist government.  Another paragraph 
references Benedict Clement, a physician in the children’s ward, who is “lovingly called Mother 
by her patients.”
38
  In this case, Clemente is providing information, expertise, and care for her 
charges in a way that other Ethiopians cannot– not even their own mothers.   Clement fulfills a 
filial role by acting as a mother defending her children, who happen to be Ethiopians of all ages.  
In still another description, readers are told that in the face of huge numbers of refugees coming 
into the camp, “six doctors, ten nurses and a midwife face the wall-to-wall crush with a kind of 
determined cheerfulness.”
39
 Readers, working from a strong heritage of stereotypes about Africa, 
are given the sense that the huge numbers of poor, pitiful victims are incapable of fending off the 
effects of Mengistu’s government on their own.
40
 Like children, they needed stronger, wiser 
adults to protect and defend them.   
Cold War and paternalistic discourse shaped the reception of the famine by American 
audiences and interjected a specific formulation of the outcome of the relief effort that surged 
forward.  However, turning to traditional ideological explanations allowed followers of the 
emergency to work around the ambivalence surrounding the famine and occluded the racial 
underpinnings of famine representations.  Ethiopians and their nation had to be saved, but in 
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emerging from the crisis they had to be a different kind of Ethiopian.  Not only did their bodies 
require nourishment and sustenance, but they also needed to learn the behavioral principles of 
independence and choice-making.  Just as American children had to be instilled with core tenets 
of liberalism that focused on independence and choice-making in order to forge a life of 
prosperity, so, too did the figurative children of Ethiopia.  As the ideological vision of Ethiopia 
as a stronger, more liberal people and nation took shape, Americans began placing greater claims 
on the relief effort and recipients of aid as a means to ensure that vision came to fruition.   
Seen in this light, viewers understood in the famine a dire need for outsiders to step in 
and act as defenders and providers  of aid.  In this story, the aid workers and volunteers take 
center stage as their actions are described as “heroic” and elevated to an almost celebrity-like 
status.   The plight of the famine victims becomes secondary to the bravery of the volunteers 
working on their behalf and suggests that without the vision of the aid workers miserable 
conditions will remain the status-quo.  One grant submitted to the USAID explicitly speaks to the 
dire state of affairs in Africa that could potentially hamper even the efficiency of American aid 
workers if not carefully addressed.   The group AfriCare, a development organization that had 
been working in Africa since the 1970s, developed a grant project to place U.S.  medical teams 
in the camp sites as a means to provide emergency medical assistance.  Writing in line-item 
justifications for a grant proposal submitted to USAID, the author noted that for those 
individuals volunteering to serve on the aid mission team, “the living conditions in the areas of 
Ethiopia in which they will be working…will involve major hardships for these individuals.”
41
 
The grant went on to conclude that, “One has to actually visit the areas in question to have an 
idea of the emotional drain on the individuals faced with trying to maintain health services for 
the thousands of people facing starvation and living in conditions of absolute miser.  In order to 
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alleviate the strain on the volunteer personnel, Africare believes it is necessary to include some 
time during the period for the volunteers to get away from their depressing environment.”
42
 
Ultimately, the author of the grant expects the cost of doing aid work in Africa to exact a high 
toll, but it is the expectation of a fruitful return that pushes the aid effort forward.   
Making Cents: the problem of aid and the future of Ethiopia 
The first visual images and text of the famine stunned many Americans into action and 
relied on a well-known narrative to do so; the images created a story which cast the famine 
victims as tragic pawns of a communist government that would undertake any lengths to strip 
people of freedom.  Here, the association between children, innocence, and lack of political 
acumen played a central role in justifying the need for American donors to invest in the crisis 
with aid dollars, technology, and time.  Colleen Williams, a concerned citizen, underscored this 
connection when she wrote to Vice President Bush that “my personal opinion on all this is I feel 
it was the Ethiopian government’s fault …. and I feel the Ethiopian people shouldn’t have to 
suffer for this.”
43
  
Dramatically increasing media attention on the crisis, highlighting victims’ innocence, 
and emphasizing them as apolitical pawns in a communist game had two consequences.  First, 
increased media attention triggered an emotional response from American viewers and prompted 
huge numbers of individuals to contribute to the Ethiopian aid effort.
44
 This effort coalesced into 
a world-wide care community in which amounts of money flowed from both large and small aid 
and relief groups into the aid effort in numbers never before seen.
45
  Second, as this compassion 
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collective grew, a loosely structured community developed and placed greater claims on the 
recipients of aid.  They demanded Ethiopians transform their values and behaviors into usable, 
workable traits that would prevent such a tragedy from happening again.  In this way, aid 
providers circumscribed the images of adult Africans as innocent children and informed the 
means through which individual and group donors approached aid efforts.  Donations and relief 
efforts became as much about providing dollars as about grooming the “children” of Africa into 
responsible adults.   
The care community consisted of disparate segments that ranged from children, to 
businesses, to schools.  Though the donations and offers of aid began as isolated, individual 
occasions to end suffering, eventually a loosely formed community formed around famine relief.  
Simplifying the political and historical context of the situation, media images of the disaster 
fostered a sense of urgency, and for a brief moment opened a window of imagined equality based 
on the vulnerability of broken and weakened bodies.
46
 Pulled by emotion and working under the 
vision of equality, people rallied to the aid effort.   Many thousands of ordinary Americans called 
into relief centers asking how they could help and offering to donate money.
47
 No formal 
requirements existed for entrance into this community other than a desire to end the famine and a 
willingness to act on that desire.
48
Donations amounts ranged from five dollars pledged from the 
allowance of two little girls to ten-thousand dollars given by a publisher.
49
 News reports 
detailing the kinds of people who offered money, like the baker from the East Bronx who wanted 
to drop off five hundred dollars his employees had gathered at UNICEF’s office, created an 
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image of Americans from all walks of life working together to mitigate the urgency of this 
disaster. 
This sense of collaboration that bonded large numbers of aid givers together reverberated 
throughout media reports.  In Life Magazine, for example, the story of how diverse musicians 
came together to record “We are the world” in January 1985 interwove the theme of building 
consensus throughout the article.  Great pains were taken to emphasize the diversity of musicians 
working collaboratively, putting aside differences, and unifying in a vision to save famine 
victims.  Photos of Michael Jackson and Willie Nelson, high profile artists from two distinct 
musical genres, illustrated the diversity to audiences.  One caption placed beside the photos, 
reads simply, “Michael: ‘My mom listens to you all the time.’ Willie: ‘My girls love you.’ And, 
to emphasize the point of collaboration, a full page photo of all the musicians stand together with 
the texts of the song lyrics splayed at the top of the picture, “There comes a time when we heed a 
certain call.”
50
Similar to these musicians, people around the country set aside differences to heed 
a certain call and change the future of the world. 
It wasn’t just adults that thought they could make a difference.  In May of 1985, the Los 
Angeles Unified School District spent two weeks pitting schools against each other to see which 
one would wind up on top as the number one fundraiser for money for Ethiopian famine victims.  
They aimed to raise $250,000 for needed supplies in the country.  The ultimate goal of the 
campaign was to “help stop the dying and instill in students a sense of caring for the plight of 
others.”
51
 The strategies various schools employed to raise money were wide-ranging.  Some 
presided over auctions, others held dances, and others had foreign-food sales, a riff on the usual 
bake sales common to school functions.  Students did manage to reach their fundraising goal.  
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One school alone, Birmingham High School, presented a check to the school board for 
$8,018.18.
52
 One school council member said of the reason for so much student involvement, “I 
think maybe kids are coming out of their apathy…..People are becoming aware of the world 
again.  But it seems like it’s the ‘in’ thing to be concerned about.”  
One of the most remarkable charity events of all time played on the trend of concern and 
represented the most visible and largest manifestation of the care community.  Looking to do 
more for the hunger in Africa, Irish singer-songwriter Bob Geldof soon started planning 
LiveAid.  The result was spectacular.  In perhaps one of the greatest charity events ever, Geldof 
managed to arrange live concerts in two different cities, London and Philadelphia.  For those 
who could not attend in person, television networks like ABC and the BBC broadcast both 
events simultaneously.  In addition to television coverage of the events, additional footage from 
seven other countries was included.  Planning for the event was staggering due to the size and 
scope of the project.  The Philadelphia stage was as wide as a football stadium and had twenty-
seven cameras crowded around it.  Two hundred police officers were used to patrol it in addition 
to nine-hundred private security guards.
53
 Audiences in 150 countries around the world either 
saw the performances on television or heard them on the radio.  It was truly a world-wide event.  
The concerts lasted sixteen hours throughout which phone lines were open to take donations 
from viewers.   The total cost of the show was four million dollars and was covered by corporate 
sponsorship and ticket sales.  The charity concerts raised about 70 million dollars with the vast 
majority of donations coming from the United States.  Other large contributing nations were 
Britain, Australia, and Ireland.
54
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Throughout the country, people started looking for ways they could influence the 
outcome of the famine.  With a growing community involved in the famine and as more people 
entered into this community, expectations grew around the outcome of donation relief.   
Coalescing around a set identity and experience of caring for others, media recognition of this 
group effort imbued large and small donors with a sense of power over where their money went 
and how it was spent.  Alluding to a disagreement between Ethiopia and the United States over 
the extent of aid in relation to the proportion of famine, media headlines cited relief officials 
declaring that Ethiopia was “biting the hand the feeds it.”
55
 Such sentiments were embedded 
within a hierarchy of power relations between nation-states and jarred with the rhetoric of 
Americans giving aid freely to any in need.
56
  Individual donors, for example, clamored for a 
visible return on the money they donated and still felt disappointment years later when Ethiopia 
faced the prospect of another devastating famine in 2004.  During the relief effort of 2004, one 
radio caller “expressed irritation and outrage that Ethiopia was still in crisis fifteen years later 
after she had donated money to the Band-Aid appeal in the mid-1980s.  What had happened to 
all the money, she demanded.  And why couldn’t Ethiopia look after itself? The programmer 
presenter asked whether she would be donating money to the relief effort this time.  ‘Certainly 
not,’ she replied.”
57
 The sense of monetary accountability pervaded reports of the relief effort so 
thoroughly that one report cautioned against too much expectation.  He discussed the difficulty 
of administering aid in famine-stricken areas and wrote that donors “must deal with one of the 
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world’s least attractive governments.  But this can be done without illusion and with an honest 
reckoning to Americans who contributed so much to Ethiopian relief.”
58
 
  Public understanding of the famine soon coupled monetary accountability with 
ideological accountability.  Heeding a certain call meant that many in the United States, and 
other countries, understood this humanitarian disaster as an opportunity for ordinary Americans 
to collectively remake conditions in the world which precipitated suffering and deprivation.  
Popular culture magazines provided a simple answer to frustrations with conditions like those in 
Ethiopia that allowed famines to take place.  One reader summed up this sentiment when they 
wrote in to the editor that, “The next time someone tells me the world is going downhill, I’ll just 
remember what 43 of the biggest names in in music did to make it better.  It took USA for Africa 
to make me realize that I, too, can help!”
59
  
An important part of remaking the world through the famine relief included excorticating 
Mengistu’s rule, using it as the foil to the freedoms, progress, and protections guaranteed by 
liberal nations.
60
 For example, in 1985 as reports of death and starvation in the camps near Wollo 
made their way to the front of Western newspapers, other reports began circulating about the 
celebration planned by the Ethiopian government to commemorate the ten-year anniversary of 
Marxist rule.  Leaders of the aid effort expressed outrage when they learned of a 500,000 bottle 
shipment of Scotch whisky ordered by Mengistu when relief camps were overflowing.  They 
stated, “I Fail to see how any country can do this while their people are starving.”
61
  Such anger 
showed little patience for the current governance of Ethiopia.  A New Republic report shared the 
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same skepticism of current conditions in Ethiopia when the author stated, “It is difficult to 
predict the direction and success of future rehabilitation and development efforts in Ethiopia.  
Much depends on whether Mengistu continues to his current agrarian and economic policies.”
62
  
For donors, the new world that they invested in had no place for socialist rule of Mengistu. 
As important as the role of the Marxist government was in shaping donor visions of how 
to re-make the world, other facets of the emergency soon emerged that contributed to donor 
expectations, including anxieties about race.  As the aid campaign took form through direct relief 
programming and development activities, deeply political assumptions about dependency, aid, 
and race in the domestic context informed the creation of those initiatives taking place at the 
international level.  Domestically, race framed an on-going debate concerning the abuse of 
government sponsored programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
63
 
Although by the time of the Ethiopian famine “racial science had long been discredited among 
scientists and physical anthropologists,” many Americans still continued to use racial 
categorization as a way to explain contemporary political contexts.
64
 Images and a discourse of 
African-American mothers on welfare and abusing the program flourished.
65
 As a result, 
stereotypes of African-Americans as lazy and dependent took root, and the role of welfare 
remained heatedly debated in the creation of a productive citizenry.
66
 
The Ethiopian famine magnified the discourse around dependency and aid, and placing 
the conversation in the international arena heightened an awareness of what was at stake with 
aid.   With current domestic aid debates acting as the backdrop, many donors feared that aid 
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could sap the industriousness and vitality of Ethiopia’s future.  Instead, what would emerge was 
a nation dependent on other nations – a macrocosm of what was happening with aid in the 
United States.   To avoid this fate, many American donors made greater ideological claims on the 
recipients of aid during the famine based on fears that a proliferation of unmanaged aid would 
create a world that discouraged the full manifestation of a thriving, liberal atmosphere and the 
attending freedoms, privileges, and rights.   
As discussions around aid need and delivery progressed, issues over dependent behavior 
emerged as the core site for individual and national transformation and created fertile ground for 
donors to make claims on aid recipients.   A post-famine Ethiopia had to include people who 
were diligent, hard-working, and able to fully contribute to the success of the nation through 
labor.  In June 1985, a month before the largest fundraising event of the famine campaign took 
place with the dual concerts, Gerry Salole voiced concerns that the massive amount of aid 
destined for Ethiopia opened the possibility of sabotaging that nation’s future by engraining a 
sense of entitlement in famine victims’ perception of their circumstances.  Salole, the field 
director for Save the Children, implied that receiving such a large amount of aid in such a short 
time period would cultivate a sense of dependency
67
.  He elaborated on these fears when he 
stated, “We need to try to understand what happens to people who are getting something for 
nothing… This has to be creating bizarre ideas about those who are providing the relief and 
generally what the world is like.” In articulating uneasiness with the relationship between aid and 
its recipients, Salole raised questions about the management and end-result of aid.  He suggested 
that if aid continued unabated without some kind of investment or repayment from the victim, 
the victim would first, develop a misconception about how the world functioned and the place of 
progressive, advanced nations within that structure, and second, be stripped of any desire to 
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develop skills needed to participate in that world.  In this case, unless carefully supervised, aid 
efforts would produce the opposite of productive citizens.    
 As Salole raised concerns among the public through news reports, other private aid 
groups took their concerns directly to USAID officials.  Some pushed for a solution to the 
famine that would span a greater timeline beyond  money earmarked for only a short period of 
time within the 1985 fiscal year.  Interaction, the large umbrella organization of over 100 private 
volunteer agencies, did just that.  In a letter to the chairman of the committee that introduced HR 
100 and HR 606, the President of the organization, Peter J. Davies, wrote that the group 
commended the legislation that “would provide both higher levels of funding and a broader 
range of assistance, including assistance for recovery and rehabilitation.  It is our strongly held 
view that assistance for recovery and rehabilitation is just as important as emergency aid.  
Indeed, unless we make the extra efforts now to assist African countries in such undertakings as 
redevelopment of water resources and rehabilitation and improvement of agricultural production, 
we risk increasing their dependence on food aid handouts instead of encouraging greater self-
reliance.”
68
 
 If the public and private agencies concerns overlapped about the destructive tendency of 
food aid to foster dependence and entitlement thereby displacing the values of responsibility, 
self-reliance, and hard-work, government workers within the USAID also remained sensitive to 
these anxieties.  Indeed, documents circulating in the department since April 1984 revealed that 
USAID continued to struggle with the same questions that the public and private aid groups held 
over the future of aid and relief.   A speech entitled  “Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?”, 
delivered to the World Affairs Council of Northern California on April 5, 1984 made its way to 
the desks of USAID officials.  The speech resonated with workers and made clear arguments that 
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answered many questions about the meaning of aid assistance.  A hand written note at the top of 
the speech claimed, “Excellent speech, should be read by everyone in our business.”
69
 The 
initials JM followed the comment.
70
   
 The speech opens with a vignette about a disastrous earthquake that struck Lisbon in 
1755.  After discussing the reaction to the disaster by the public, to the author asks audience 
members to whether “natural disasters – floods, droughts, famines, hurricanes, tsunamis and the 
like as well as earthquakes – are Acts of God or acts of man.”
71
 In a few simple sentences he 
forces his audience to consider that “when disasters happen in the Third World, and droughts and 
famines seem to be on the increase in Latin America, Asia and Africa, do we react properly? Is 
disaster relief part of the solution – or part of the problem?”
72
 After surveying a range of 
disasters, including the contemporaneous famine in Ethiopia, for his audience, the speaker begins 
an analysis of the responses to these emergencies.  He concludes that “one of the myths about 
disasters is that after an earthquake or a flood, or during a famine, people sit around in numbed 
helplessness waiting for helicopters to fly in with blankets and food.  The truth is almost exactly 
the opposite: it is the delivery of food and blankets which causes this dependence and 
inactivity.”
73
 The sentiments voiced in this speech which circulated through USAID offices, 
echoed the same concerns about the consequences of aid that started surfacing in the media.  For 
many, aid represented a fine line: too little and America would be shirking its duty to help heal 
the world and change its course, too much and America contributed to the further degeneration 
of individual potential.  Misdirected aid risked dangerous consequences.   
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Without properly managing aid, famine victims risked becoming dependent on others for 
survival and in that process faced regressing into acts of dishonesty and idleness.  Taking 
seriously the consequences on Ethiopia’s future, aid donors, workers, and officials set out to 
ensure that a future of idle, dependent Ethiopians did not occur.  They did this by building new 
cultural expectations around work habits in carefully managed aid distribution centers.
74
 Salole 
proposed an unofficial solution to the dilemma of dependence by encouraging food recipients to 
actively participate in the relief effort by contributing their labor.  He noted that a form of this 
plan was currently in place in certain areas near food camps where volunteers built and repaired 
the dirt roads that Save the Children’s trucks used.  Meanwhile, other aid recipients used their 
donkeys to transport food to remote villages.  Salole summed up the effort by saying “They’re 
not being paid in money or food, they’re doing it as volunteers.  That way they become 
participants in, rather than objects of the relief effort.” Most importantly, Salole concluded that 
“people who work for what they receive are less likely to come away with the impression that 
free food is something to which they have permanently become entitled.”
75
 For Salole, current 
aid operations represented a danger to the larger world structure by enabling dependency.  He 
stated, that in its current form, “Relief means you can come in and say, ‘Here’s the food, take 
it.’” For Salole and other donors like him, relief operations needed a major readjustment in order 
to create a new, world that tamped down on dependent behaviors that exacerbated, or even 
caused, emergency situations.   
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Even as reporters and NGO leaders raised concerns about dependency they 
simultaneously applauded the resiliency of the aid recipients.  When reports placed images of 
resiliency alongside descriptions of victims as innocent pawns in a communist game, such 
characterizations helped reinforced Ethiopian men, women, and children as “worthy victims” in 
media outlets.    In his account of the crisis, the UN Director of Ethiopian Operations, 
underscored the survivors’ courage when he told of the great lengths many Ethiopians went to in 
order to remain in their home villages and that “the peasants did not leave their homes until they 
had used up all their food reserves and had sold their belongings to buy food.”
76
 Taking nothing 
these families walked in a “never-ending stream of people” towards the relief center in Mekelle, 
the main town of Tigray Province.
77
 Furthermore, even when the camps were full and could 
accommodate no new arrivals, the newcomers stayed close to the camps, “dug a hole in the 
ground or piled up stones as protection against the wind.  They had no belongings, their clothing 
was in rage.  They had no blankets or anything to cover themselves.  This was a shocking sight 
of human misery.  How these people survived until help arrived was a mystery.  But perhaps I 
did not quite understand the staying power of the Ethiopian peasant families, very likely the most 
enduring in the world.” If such a statement expressed awe at the survival instincts of people 
living during a disaster, it also echoed the romanticization of peoples considered “savages” and 
“barbarians.”
78
  
Although applauding the resiliency of Ethiopian men, women, and children, it was clear 
that aid experts felt they needed to properly manage and channel inner resources like resiliency 
as a means to guard against dependency.  Without direct supervision and management of aid, 
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officials like Salole wondered  “whether aid provided over a long period may not stifle the 
initiative of the recipient” and render them incompetent for a future that required productivity 
and industry for survival.
79
  In part, such a view stemmed from the juxtaposition of camps, 
described as a location of progress, technology, and comfort, and Ethiopian terrain, described as 
a Biblical backwater.
80
 Survivors spent time in camps that were outfitted with “large water-proof 
tents, street lights, generators, a hospital, free, hot food and guards at the gate” and which were 
seen as “a functioning town with far more amenities than its inhabitants have ever known before 
or are likely to know again.” Observers noted that leaving “such an environment can be 
traumatic.” Such a line of reasoning reinforced concerns about dependency  and expressed 
wonder at the apparent willingness of survivors to remain in a place of comfort that they did not 
contribute to making.
81
  Even as aid workers on the ground and in the urgency of the operation 
developed make-shift and ad-hoc aid revisions like Salole’s labor contribution program, the 
USAID also worked to re-make conditions in the camps that would alter and modify certain 
behaviors.   The kind of aid projects chosen for US funding, hinged on the kinds of goals and 
aims they articulated in their grant applications.  Many of those chosen targeted the very 
anxieties over aid-dependency and the production of liberal citizens that concerned government 
employees like Julius Marks.   
Remaking the World: Grant-making, claim-making, and Ethiopia’s Future 
In light of Reagan’s staunch reputation as a Cold War warrior, during this period his 
public stance towards the larger Cold War conflict edged towards an appearance of 
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rapprochement as he sought to balance the demands of anti-Soviet fervor and peace brokers 
within his administration.
82
 With more public emphasis on returning to warmer relations and 
promises to avoid military conflicts, White House officials also focused on alternatives to further 
their vision of a free-market world order while appearing as the broker of a rapprochement with 
the Soviets.
83
 Publicly, in the spirit of the olive branch, they took care to rebuild cultural 
relations and work together on science matters like space initiatives.
84
  Behind the scenes, 
however, less conspicuous means offered a way for Reagan to assuage the concerns of staunch 
Cold War warriors who feared that Soviet strength would outpace the capabilities of the United 
States. 
85
  Officials found one such conduit in the form of emergency aid grants and immediate 
relief projects that worked to rebuild Ethiopia in the image of a liberal state.  The 1984-1985 
famine functioned as an important space to implement such projects.  Acting on the impulses of 
public concern, spurred in large part by media images of the famine, the US government 
officially sanctioned and funded private, non-profit programs whose project aims tied neatly with 
a neoliberal vision of the future.  In order for the world Reagan and his officials envisioned to 
survive, reformers needed to do more than simply forestall dependency.  Famine victims had to 
learn new skills and attitudes, such as increasing productivity, shoring up self-reliance, and goal 
tending, to equip them for the coming liberal oriented world.  Thus, the White House had a 
special interest in partnering with groups that encouraged and helped bring about these behaviors 
in famine victims.  If aid workers on the ground improvised with the behavior transforming 
programs they implemented, like Salole’s volunteer contribution program, the White House 
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agencies like the USAID  directed a more methodical and sustainable campaign to achieve 
similar results.  Three USAID funded  projects in particular highlight White House interest in 
transformative aid: the CRS health-nutrition surveillance program, the tent cities of Nathan 
Abbie, and the well-drilling campaign of AfriCare. 
The grant process played a key role in this long-term campaign.   The grants written by 
individuals and agencies provide detailed insight into the ways in which American and other 
Western aid agencies understood and made sense of the famine and the people and government 
of Ethiopia.  In general, grants are designed to force those requesting aid to articulate and justify 
their aims, goals, identities, and relationships to the world around them. As a result, because 
grants provide such a clear window into the inner workings of groups pivotal to the outcome of 
the famine, they are an important source of evidence for unpacking the assumptions that 
underlay this emergency as well as the kinds of claims donors felt justified in placing on victims 
through a transaction-based relationship.  Grants also provide important insight into the ways in 
which the USG understood the famine.  The grants in OFDA and USAID files went through a 
lengthy review process and faced three outcomes: approval, revision, or rejection.  During the 
review process, many of the grant reviewers wrote notes in the margins expressing a number of 
viewpoints about particular grant aspects.  Some reviewers underlined, starred, asterisked, and 
wrote in question marks.  Other reviewers wrote lengthy comments in the sidebar while others 
limited their notes to one or two words.  Taken together, these notes reveal what was important 
to reviewers and how programs did or did not align with U.S. policy goals.   
Although the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance is housed within the United States 
Agency for International Development, it carries out a separate mandate: OFDA focuses on relief 
activities and the USAID implements development activities.  Often, as emergencies moved 
185 
 
from the emergency phase to the relief phase, humanitarian activities implemented by the OFDA 
transition into development activities handled by USAID offices.  While officials attempted to 
maintain this strict division in previous emergencies, in the Ethiopian famine of 1984 the line 
blurred as development and relief activities merged.  While many NGO groups and individuals 
wrote grants in hopes of providing immediate relief to emergency famine victims, several others 
remained unconvinced that emergency aid alone would alter conditions enough to prevent a 
future disaster.  With media and important NGO leaders continuously pointing to the famine as a 
direct result of underdevelopment, many saw the most logical solution as embedding 
development activities within emergency relief.  The increased collaboration between the OFDA 
and the USAID, and their subsequent approval of relief grants that emphasized development, 
reveal the merger of relief and development.  Much of this merger stemmed from the need to 
address the increasingly vocal call to resolve the root problems of the famine.  This call came 
from a variety of areas.  In the media, Geldorf, the organizer for LiveAid/BandAid took great 
pains to explain the suffering as a direct result of long-term poverty.  In witnessing children 
slowly dying on television screens, the viewing public demanded the government implement 
longer-term solutions to the prevalent poverty in Africa as a means to end the suffering of 
starving children.
1
 
Consequently, many of the relief efforts funded by the OFDA had significant 
development qualities to them which changed the nature of relief and humanitarian aid.  
Emergency aid, generally discussed in the short-term, was framed within a specific development 
context whereby longer-term goals were identified and targeted.  The merger of development and 
relief opened an even greater area for claim-making on the bodies and lives of Ethiopian famine 
victims by exposing the urgency of the famine as a direct result of long-term development 
186 
 
deficiencies.  Greater claims were made because the stakes were higher.  This was no longer 
simply a short-term crisis; this was a crisis of biblical proportions as Buerke reminded viewers in 
his documentary news footage.   
Because of the vast amount of work that would need to go into the transformation of 
Ethiopia as a result of its underdevelopment, how recipients used the aid they received developed 
into a source of contention between donors and victims.  In particular, the use and abuse of food-
rations became an important site for transformation.  Many donors and media viewers who 
contributed to the campaign understood the relief camps and feeding centers as a microcosm of 
the progress of the Western world.
86
 In detailing camp life, reporters focused on the victims’ 
desire to remain in the camps in order to take advantage of technology and progress.  Some of 
these stories emphasized the lengths that aid recipients went to in order to remain in the camp 
and be spared the “trauma” of returning to a life without Western amenities.  In particular, 
reporters seized on Ethiopian mothers that “nutritionally sabotaged” their children – a condition 
in which reportedly mothers kept at least one of their children in a malnourished state so that her 
family would not be turned away from the camps.
87
 While Ethiopian mothers may have 
understood this particular use of food as a survival mechanism for her entire family, aid workers 
equated it to thievery and manipulation of the aid system.
88
 The message sent by news reporters 
and aid workers throughout the famine concluded that a future Ethiopia which included 
technology and amenities, entailed cultivating behaviors of honesty, responsibility, and 
accountability in famine victims.  Like aid disputes taking place in America, there was no room 
in Ethiopia’s future for mothers who used their children to take advantage of the system.   
                                                             
86
 Hyndman, 130-133. 
87
 Clifford May, “Field Notes on the Psychology of Famine,” New York Times, June 9, 1985. 
88
 Walter Johnson, Soul By Soul; Life Inside The Antebellum Slave Market, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999), is useful here with his ideas of survival and agency in the context of American slavery.  
187 
 
 A USAID funded Catholic Relief Services project, the Nutritional Surveillance program, 
also worked to transform behaviors deemed deceptive by closely managing and shaping 
individual norms.  This program focused on mothers and children.  As children and mothers 
received their food rations, program managers also gave them nutrition training.  The program 
closely tracked and monitored participants through weigh-ins.  It was expected that participants 
would apply their nutritional training towards the rations they received and thus experience a 
weight-gain in malnourished children.  An important component of this program centered on the 
ideas of community sharing in Ethiopian culture.  According to the grant authors, many of the 
destitute adults receiving food aid intended for children took the ration and shared it amongst 
other family and possibly community members.  To ensure that the ration intended for the 
children went undivided, the program monitored the weight of each child enrolled in the program 
and provided extra rations to other adults.
89
   
Dividing the use of rations, thus preventing the sense of communal sharing, spoke to the 
differences in how aid providers and famine victims understood tragedy or celebration. 
Preventing sharing of rations emphasized the individual experience of suffering and foreclosed 
the communal experience of tragedy. Accordingly, as NGOs elevated the individual experience 
of suffering, they also foregrounded and privileged the individual basis for overcoming adversity 
and challenge.  Seen in this light, the feeding program helped condition participants for the rigors 
of the modern, neoliberal world.  Success in this new world required that individuals understand 
the importance of self-reliance and individualism.  Participating in the nutrition program allowed 
Ethiopian mothers and children the means to gain this crucial experience.   
The second proposed project, the drilling of wells, managed to elevate efficiency and 
goal-orientation as the key aspect of survival in the post-famine Ethiopia.  In December 1984 
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USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance commissioned a report on the state of water 
accessibility and cleanliness near the displacement camps.  As the numbers of displaced persons 
swelled the relief centers, camp resources failed to grow accordingly.  Water access proved a 
growing concern as only a limited number of water wells throughout the camps had to sustain 
thousands of campers.  In the Bhati Camp, because water access was insufficient people soon 
began using nearby river water even though it was contaminated.  Camp authorities deployed 
fifty-three external “sanitation guards” to keep people away from the river bed.   
Unable to utilize the river and only having access to a few water pumps meant that 300 to 
400 people had to wait for water on a daily basis.  In their investigation of the camps, the project 
managers noted the response of the camp doctor towards these conditions, “The doctor did not 
seem concerned about the 300 to 400 people waiting for water.  He agreed that it would be better 
if they had more water but thought the waiting was beneficial to the people as it gave them a 
goal, something to do, in the very act of waiting they thought they were working for their 
water.”
90
 For the report preparers, the use of time played an important role in how they 
interpreted camp life.  The doctor understood waiting as an action that gave hope, or a moment 
of meaning, in a life overshadowed by death.  The report preparers on the other hand, understood 
waiting in a much different light.
91
 Waiting for water represented a passive use of time when the 
urgency of the situation required much more active measures.  Time was a crucial ingredient in 
saving lives and the idea of hundreds of people using time to wait, rather than act, violated 
western norms of efficiency and goal orientation – if the goal of camp life was survival, then 
campers needed to be doing more than simply waiting passively to receive water.  Building 
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multiple and permanent well sites served as a way to save lives by providing access to clean 
water.  But it also served to reify aid donors’ understanding of how to use time.   Establishing 
multiple well sites subverted the camp doctor’s understanding of what marked a productive goal.  
Rather than simply waiting in line, displaced persons in the camp could actively shape their own 
destiny by more efficiently using time.
92
   
 In addition to developing specific liberal behaviors such as individual accountability 
(through the nutrition program) and teaching habits that were crucial to a liberal work-ethic like 
managing time more efficiently (through the well-project), USAID funded projects also worked 
to foster the importance of choice-making in everyday life circumstances, a habit that many felt 
was missing under Marxist rule.  Although many Western viewers internalized the victims as 
child-like in their lack of political acumen, an expectation arose that such an apolitical state was 
only temporary.  With appropriate training and opportunities, victims could take control of their 
future through the kinds of choices that they made.  In this way famine victims would grow into 
responsible beings and political adults.  In ascribing choice-making, or a lack there-of, as an 
important feature of the crises, Western media and relief projects pointed to the role of 
Mengistu’s government in the creation and sustainment of the famine through the ways in which 
they stripped Ethiopians of their right to make choices about where and how they lived.   
Doubts loomed over Mengistu’s intentions to end the famine.  Reports suggested that his 
aid program and the use of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Committee served as a rouse 
for squelching the rebels who lived primarily in famine-stricken areas.   Megnistu’s resettlement 
program served as an important focal point for these doubts.  Resettlement efforts began in 
earnest in October 1984 by Ethiopian officials as an attempt to stem the death toll by moving 
people from drought stricken Northern provinces in Tigrea and Eritrea to more fertile lands in 
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the South near the Kishe province.
93
 Mengistu officials described the program as completely 
voluntary and one administrator stated that he was “surprised by the large outpouring of 
volunteers” and claiming that there was “no problem” getting people to relocate”.
94
   Mengistu 
initiated resettlement in order to actively solve the hunger problem.
95
 When describing the plan 
to Western donors, he insisted that those that resettled did so voluntarily.  Many in the Reagan 
administration refused to believe the resettlement program was anything other than an attempt to 
institute forcible collectivization on the peasant population.  Some international aid groups fed 
this suspicion when they questioned the tactics used to recruit volunteers to the resettlement 
areas in Southern Ethiopia.
96
 One Red Cross official stated that “we don’t know the degree to 
which they are being forced and we don’t know the risks to which they’ll be exposed.”
97
 
Statements from those who had been resettled appeared to corroborate these doubts as one 
peasant “complained that they would need bulldozers to clear rocks and trees and tractors to turn 
the hard virgin soil.”
98
 Such comments drew readers’ attention towards the possibility that not all 
of the resettlers moved of their own accord.  Newspaper and television characterizations of the 
government painted a picture of Ethiopian officials working to strip individuals of essential 
liberties such as freedom of movement.   
Public questions over Megnistu’s motivations came as a boon to U.S. officials who knew 
of the famine conditions in Ethiopia long before the breaking coverage of Buerke’s news 
documentary, but were reluctant to do anything to ameliorate the situation.
99
  At least two years 
prior to the sweeping news stories of famine in Africa, Reagan officials opted not to provide aid 
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to a communist government.
100
 They reasoned that providing funds to Mengistu’s leadership 
would only help the burgeoning leftist country realize national socialistic goals.
101
 The increased 
numbers of letters sent into USAID reminding those officials that “something must be done, 
current efforts were to be commended, but they were not enough,” made it clear that a reckoning 
was about to take place.
102
 A press release from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, co-sponsor of 
the African Famine, Relief, and Recovery Act of 1985, summed up this response when he wrote 
that, “The continuing drought that has afflicted eight African nations in the past decade has put at 
risk an estimated 10 million human beings.  Since October 1, 1984 the United States has shipped 
an estimated 700,000 metric tons of emergency food to famine-stricken regions of Africa.  This 
is a good start, but it is not enough.”
103
 Official U.S. policy could no longer ignore circumstances 
in Ethiopia hoping that widespread disease and death would topple Mengistu.  Acting against the 
backdrop of the public’s outcry USAID reworked official policy to their benefit.  If they were to 
help a communist nation, it would be on their ideological terms.  Luckily for them, it appeared as 
though the public was on board, and even set the pace, for those terms.  In this way, as the 
United States became a leader in providing aid to Ethiopia, they were also able to fulfill policy 
goals through their collaboration with non-profit aid groups.
104
  
Reagan officials did this by placing non-negotiable conditions on emergency aid 
delivered by the United States.
105
 One of these non-negotiable conditions was the location and 
placement of aid.  Throughout the famine, the White House insisted USAID only provide aid to 
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non-resettlement areas.
106
 One important example of this policy manifested in the creation of 
tent-cities.  Israeli activist-philanthropist Abie Nathan, working through the American Jewish 
Committee, submitted a grant to build an emergency tent city.  His intended plan was to build a 
safe, sanitary city to act as a relief center for famine victims.  Victims arriving in the cities would 
find tents to live in and relief to help end hunger.  Wary at first, USAID  soon described the tent-
city as an acceptable plan and if funded it would “be money well spent.”
107
  They supported the 
grant under condition of strict controls to where Abbie built the cities.  Any site had to receive 
U.S. approval before any construction could take place.  Approved areas meant any land that was 
not part of Mengistu’s resettlement schemes that had caused such consternation in Western 
media reports.  Many of these landed in famine stricken areas that also happened to be controlled 
by Ethiopian groups rebelling against Mengistu’s leadership.   
Funding tent cities in rebel controlled areas helped politicize the emergency and 
reinforced questions about Mengistu’s resettlement scheme and the nature of a communist 
government in its relationship to citizens’ rights.  Although the tent cities served as a means of 
relief, they also served as an important contrast to the assumed forced resettlement scheme of 
Mengistu and became emblematic of the importance of choice-making in individual life.  In U.S. 
funded tent-cities famine victims had the choice of where, when, and how to seek aid.  They 
could go as far or as near their homes as they liked.  This served as an important foil to reports 
about the lack of choice-making in resettled areas.  Newspapers reported the resettled areas as 
places where victims were told when and where they had to report.  In addition, journalists 
portrayed resettled areas as also affecting the daily lives of every other Ethiopian who did not 
face starvation; taking away choice from one group entailed denying choice for other groups.  
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Journalist Clifford May reported on compulsory activity when he wrote of the “thousands of 
Ethiopian college students and teachers” who were “ordered to spend the summer working with 
famine victims” who had been resettled in the south and west of the country.  One student stated 
of his assignment, “I don’t know anything about plowing or building tukuls (traditional thatched 
huts used by Ethiopian peasants).”
108
  
Also reported in the article were concerns about what resettlement meant for the future of 
Ethiopian famine victims.  One aid official stated that the resettlement scheme had been poorly 
designed and that “those being resettled have little chance to become self-sufficient soon.”
109
 The 
victims’ passage into adulthood and beyond the famine crisis depended, in part, on their ability 
to make decisions free from government interference, and the tent cities represented an oasis in a 
land dominated by government interference.  In this way, tent cities allowed the U.S. government 
to emphasize the importance of giving individuals the freedom to make choices that could and 
would lead to health and happiness in life.  In keeping famine victims out of resettlement areas, 
the United States worked to undermine Mengistu’s policies and served as a way to keep the act 
of choice-making a relevant point of concern in the eyes of American donors. 
Although all three projects intended to create a new, more prosperous Ethiopia at the 
conclusion on the famine, the grants also underscored the constant concern with cost associated 
with aid throughout the emergency.  Concerns over cost went beyond anxiety over financial loss, 
suggesting ideological doubts about the complete transformation of Ethiopia into a proper-
functioning liberal state in a competitive world market.  Anxieties about the costs of the aid 
effort surfaced in various ways.  After extensive planning concerning the kind of equipment to 
facilitate the well-drilling and the location of the drills, Ethiopian authorities abruptly cancelled 
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the project.  The US embassy was given no clear-cut answer as to why the cancellation took 
place, but they suspected it had something to do with the proposed locations of the drills.
110
 U.S. 
authorities expressed dismay at the sudden collapse of the well project.  Uncertain where to turn 
or how to rectify the situation, the well project was seen as a major loss in mediating Ethiopia’s 
future.
111
 The well-project cost the United States an opportunity to directly shape the outcome of 
the famine.  So, too, did the collapse of the tent-city plan.  When it was discovered that Abbie 
Nathan was making plans for tent-cities in unapproved, resettled areas, USAID pulled funding 
from the project.  The opportunity cost of failed projects was not lost on AID administrators.  
Angered over Nathan’s management of the project, and his explicit action to work around 
USAID conditions, an embassy cable wrote that not only would the grant end immediately, but 
also that the U.S. government would never again work with Abbie Nathan.
112
 Remarks like these 
underscored worries about Ethiopia’s future and their ability to chart a new course even under 
the tutelage of American expertise. 
Conclusion 
During the crisis of Ethiopia, media interpretations opened space for Westerners to place 
claims on the victims by re-casting Ethiopians in pejorative, childlike caricatures reminiscent of 
early depictions of Africans and African-Americans.   For viewers in the U.S., images of stick-
thin children acted as proof that African parents were incapable of adequately caring for and 
nurturing their charges.  Such conceptions had profound implications for the Cold War subtext 
that underlay reporting of the famine.  The Cold War background also helped further simplify the 
situation for many Americans as they easily filled the roles of villain and worthy victim.  In 
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stripping the famine of its political complexity and suggesting that Africa needed saving from the 
evils of communist leaders, donors imbued the famine with an ideological use; providing money 
to Ethiopian famine victims, and the children that had best come to represent them, transformed 
them into tools to save the world from Communists and allowed donors to regenerate Ethiopian 
values and behaviors appropriate to a world free from socialism.  However, grants for aid 
programming reveal that many in the relief community in the United States held concerns about 
the ability of Ethiopian nationals to act as appropriate soldiers in the global fight.  As a result, as 
development and relief merged, the kinds of programs chosen as recipients of federal dollars 
reveal how the means to save bodies were also intended to transform those bodies into a new 
neoliberal citizen at the conclusion of the famine.  The desire to save and transform children 
cemented this building commitment to humanitarianism.  Unlike in Biafra, children in Ethiopia 
no longer occupied a liminal space.  If Americans were more willing to turn their sights away 
from the situation that Biafran children occupied as a way to establish blame for the sins of the 
leaders, they were less willing to do so in Ethiopia.  Looking at starving children, watching 
Ethiopian mothers giving birth to children who were to die within hours, and viewing fathers 
wrapping their children in funeral shrouds allowed Americans to reaffirm their desire to end 
human suffering and helped them mark their efforts as something that was fundamentally 
different from the goals that their government pursued.   Yet, the Cold War and neoliberal lenses 
that filtered this single-vision desire to stop pain was enmeshed in hierarchies of purchasing 
power and ideological expectations and entrapped them in a weary cycle of consumption and 
hopes of transformation that was both different from and in synch with government objectives.  
This gave the public a certain amount of moral authority which allowed them a key role in 
pushing the Reagan administration into creating preemptive relief and aid policies.  In the end, 
196 
 
the public played such an important role because aid groups and the media images they utilized 
framed the emergency as one which required the average citizen to take an active part in solving 
by saving and transforming the lives of starving Ethiopian children.  When Americans had 
doubts about the aid effort, their sense of responsibility fed into ideas about transformation and 
consumption in ways that helped galvanize the response.   As a result, the famine shifted the 
balance in the dynamics of the humanitarian movement.  This would become a pivotal 
recalculation in the humanitarian movement during the next crisis that gripped American 
children of children in emergencies 
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Chapter Six: Proving its mettle: the 1987 Palestinian Intifada and the entrenchment of a 
humanitarian ideology 
Introduction 
If Live Aid demonstrated an overwhelming public consensus of NGOs as the primary 
alternative to official U.S. foreign policy in deciding humanitarian action, the 1987 Intifada in 
the Middle East tested that support.   In December 1987, the United States refocused attention on 
the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the emergence of the “Intifada,” or shaking off, 
which prompted individuals and groups to ask, “What could people in the states do?” to help the 
situation.
1
  Previous media depictions of events in the Middle East often portrayed Arabs as 
nefarious, under-handed villains.
2
 In the case of Palestinians, they were often perceived as the 
aggressors, but the advent of the Intifada caused a complicating wrinkle in the long standing 
narrative due to the unique role that children played in the conflict – these rock wielding children 
forced many in the American public to grapple with the boundaries of the expanding 
humanitarian orbit.  By the 1987 Intifada, representations of children had entrenched 
humanitarian aid as one of the most viable and important means of American interaction with the 
world.  In short, the humanitarian ideology was set and this chapter exposes how representations 
of children in humanitarian emergencies forced Americans to engage with emergencies they 
might have otherwise ignored.   While Biafra exposed Americans as unwilling to extend aid to 
victims deemed unworthy even when children’s lives were at stake, by the time Ethiopia took 
place, many Americans were willing to refashion their commitment to victims by placing 
themselves at the center of the emergency as the only conduit available to change the emergency 
victim.   The management of the aid effort through a focus on children, which made harnessing 
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consumption tendencies easier, remained critical to that shift.  Irrespective of parental behavior, 
children could not be abandoned.  That is, unlike Biafra, children could not be a casualty of 
disputed humanitarian goals.  The children of the Intifada proved the beneficiaries of this shift.  
Yet, an unsettling problem still remained for humanitarian minded groups: Dean Sayre’s1959 
World Refugee Year characterization of Palestinian children as a people “that hate us” still 
loomed large in the American imaginary.  If aid were to be extended to a group saturated in 
negative imagery, NGOs had to remake this troublesome population.   
The proliferation and acceptance of the human rights and the burgeoning children’s rights 
movement proved key in this makeover.
3
 Without a discourse of rights associated to individuals 
that transcended the political state, aid groups would have been at a loss for how to reshape 
perceptions towards the children involved in the conflict.  This was particularly true given that 
the increased violence of the Palestinian independence movement did not accord with neoliberal 
values of accountability and responsibility.  Aid groups utilized the increasingly popular notions 
of human rights to complement rather than supplant the neoliberal shape humanitarianism had 
taken.   A human rights discourse was so useful because it solved the apparent dilemma that, 
given perceptions of past Palestinian behavior, they could not be shaped into a useful neoliberal 
subject.  In effect, it highlighted all people as worthy of rights and in the process stripped away 
culture, history, and context.  What remained was a blank canvas that many Americans interested 
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in aid understood as a prime moment in which to remap emergency victims with appropriate 
values and behaviors; human rights had become the handmaiden to neoliberal sensibilities in the 
Palestinian emergency.   
The origins of the conflict appeared as a natural outgrowth of human rights violations, 
giving strength to the idea that aid intervention was necessary on human rights grounds: When 
an Israeli truck collided with a group of Gazans, killing four and wounding seven, a march of 
demonstration by Gazans took place.  Israeli soldiers fired on the demonstrators which triggered 
larger scale protests and the conflict soon erupted into a struggle for control over the territories 
Israel had acquired during the 1967 war.
4
 Increased violence that gave no appearance of simply 
fizzling out soon captured world attention.  In early 1988 the U.S. news program CBS secretly 
filmed the beating of two Palestinians by Israeli soldiers in a round of violence that took place in 
the West Bank town of Nablus.  The two Palestinians were young and both had their hands 
secured behind their backs as the soldiers beat them on the arms and legs with heavy rocks.  
While previous reports of the riots had hinted at the reversed roles of Israelis as aggressors and 
Palestinians as the oppressed, this clip visually confirmed that reversal.
5
 U.S. media coverage 
filmed Israeli tanks rumbling down the streets of Gaza towards their intended target – rock 
wielding Palestinian children.  Scenes that pitted guns against rocks suggested a gross imbalance 
of power and, at least on the surface, played on U.S. understandings of children as innocent and 
vulnerable.
6
 This chapter explores the pivotal role that NGO groups played in harnessing U.S. 
sympathy towards Palestinians through the role of children in the conflict and reconfiguring the 
narrative so that new possibilities of support by the American people emerged.  Although the 
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increase in support remained limited as traditional stereotypes soon resurfaced and counteracted 
the view of Palestinians as victim, the Intifada provided the narrative with a new dimension that 
increasingly larger segments of the U.S. public refused to ignore.  Specifically, this new vision of 
the conflict included a perception of the Palestinians as salvageable victims that could be 
transformed if given the appropriate tools and training.  
The reconfiguration of the Palestinian as salvageable victim occurred only because NGOs 
appropriated and injected the rhetoric of individual human rights alongside neoliberal rhetoric 
into the ongoing discussion of the conflict.  Prior to the start of the Intifada, much of the tension 
around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict centered on the issue of collective rights, most notably the 
right to self-determination.
7
 Unable to validate Palestinian claims to collective rights, many in 
the United States fell back on traditional negative tropes and stereotypes to explain the situation.  
With the start of the Intifada and the emphasis on the violation of individual human rights, 
humanitarian aid groups could make a legitimate and compelling claim for aid to the American 
people on behalf of the Palestinian people.  Better armed with a discourse of righting individual 
wrongs, NGO groups made compelling arguments for why the United States should attend the 
conflict with more care.  In addition, the central role of children forced NGOs to provide a 
specific remedy for the conflict that addressed the violation of individual rights; education 
became the cornerstone for this remedy.  In providing a solution that encapsulated the crisis of 
human rights and fit within the framework of transformation, NGOs demonstrated the strength of 
their newly acquired power status.  These non-state actors had forced a reckoning of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in surprising ways – no longer could the situation in the Middle East simply 
be explained away through stereotypes.    
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Previous studies of the Intifada have focused on the origin of the crisis and the political, 
economic, and social effects of the conflict on Palestinian society as a whole.
8
 Other studies have 
focused on the ways in which the Intifada reshaped Washington policies towards the conflict.  
Less has been said about the way it shaped public perceptions of the Middle East in the United 
States.
9
  This chapter contributes to studies of the Intifada by widening the perspective of its 
effects and highlighting how the American public made sense of the conflict.  In addition, this 
chapter also contributes to the historiography of human rights.  Within much of the human rights 
literature, attention has been paid to those who successfully used human rights as a powerful 
weapon to bring about change and those who either completely disregard it or those who use it in 
superficial ways.
10
  This body of scholarship has set up a framework of pro-vs. anti-human rights 
supporters.  This leaves little room for the ways in which human rights discourses and actions 
evolved within pro-human rights groups and amongst its supporters.
11
 That is to say, that often 
human rights scholarship treats those that believed and participated in the movement as of a 
similar ilk, all part of one happy human rights family.  As this chapter shows, there was a wide 
variety of human rights meaning, understanding, and willingness to use such discourse amongst 
its most vocal adherents.  To explore the three main themes in this chapter (the solidification of a 
humanitarian ideology, the ways in which NGOs harnessed U.S. sympathy by focusing on 
children, and the varied approaches towards human rights), this paper first looks at the ways in 
which the Intifada changed public perceptions.  The second section then looks at how NGOs 
capitalized on this budding sympathy by focusing on children’s right to educational access.  The 
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third section explores how education again served as a compelling vision to hold human rights 
and aid groups together when many American’s started voicing ambivalence towards support for 
the Intifada.   
The Intifada and shifting sympathies 
The 1987 Intifada proved an important turning point in American understanding of the Arab-
Israeli conflict because of the way NGO groups plied a human rights discourse in their 
representations of the conflict.  Prior to 1987, many Americans, when they thought of it all, 
understood the Palestinian cause as a misled struggle for collective rights and a political state.
12
 
White House policy contributed to this understanding by providing the Palestinians with little 
room to negotiate the conflict.
13
 During Kissinger’s diplomatic reign, he vowed that the United 
States would negotiate with the PLO only if they acknowledged UN resolution 242, which 
explicitly admitted Israel’s right to exist.  To do so would allow them access to U.S. diplomatic 
channels at the cost of the very issues they were fighting for – international recognition as a 
distinct group with the accompanying international privileges.
14
 With little room to maneuver 
and unwilling to surrender the goal of self-determination, collective rights remained the rallying 
cry for the PLO, the primary governing body at the time the Intifada erupted.
15
  
U.S. antipathy towards the Palestinian struggle, particularly in the wake of terrorist 
incidents, informed U.S. willingness to consider any position other than a pro-Israel one.
16
 In 
1986, for example, the USG sought an injunction to shut down a Palestinian information office 
in Washington, D.C. Operated by U.S. citizens of Palestinian heritage, the office acted as a 
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conduit to distribute information about the conflict to people in the United States.
17
 The 
government argued that because the offices were associated with the PLO they were considered a 
terrorist threat.   The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) acting in coordination with 
the Arab Anti-discrimination committee, filed a suit against George Schulz and the State 
Department to stop the shut-down.  They argued that because those operating the office were 
U.S. citizens, the closure violated their first amendment rights.  The courts declined such a view 
and ordered that the office remain shut.
18
  
 The rise of the Intifada upended traditional conceptions of the conflict due, in large part, 
to its timing.  The movement took place at a moment when human rights had gained significant 
legitimacy as a conceptual framework to help guide U.S. interaction with the world.
19
 Kathryn 
Sink discusses how individuals within the Reagan administration played important roles in 
pushing the human rights agenda within the administration.
20
 On the private front, non-profit 
groups like Amnesty International had already come into their own through campaigns that 
focused on anti-torture and the end of South African apartheid.
21
 If the 1970s birthed the human 
rights movement as Samuel Moyn contends, the 1980s showcased its spectacular ascent.
22
 Thus, 
the rising momentum of the human rights movement primed many in the United States for a 
human rights interpretation of the conflict in the Middle East.  This newer interpretation 
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foregrounded the rights of individual Palestinians and sought to redress individual grievances the 
Israeli state perpetrated in the state pursuit of security.
23
  
 In particular, media interpretation of actions and events that occurred during the Intifada 
focused on the violation of individual human rights.  For example, reporter Jo Franklin-Trout, 
standing outside a detention camp in the Occupied Territories, asked of a woman, “And they take 
boys, young boys?” These questions and others were asked of Palestinians during the filming of 
Days of Rage: the young Palestinians, a film produced by PBS to seek out the root causes of the 
1987 Intifada from the perspective of Palestinians.  This particular interview segment highlighted 
Israel’s iron fist policy.
24
 In this case, Israel applied the policy to all participants involved in the 
Intifada.  Franklin-Trout stood outside the detention center, waiting with the mothers of young 
boys who had been arrested for aggression towards Israeli soldiers.  In focusing on Palestinian 
women waiting outside detention centers Franklin-Trout foregrounded the women not as a 
Palestinians but as mothers, in the process emphasizing motherhood as a universal condition with 
similar experiences and understandings regardless of time or place.  Such universalization neatly 
aligned with the core understanding of human rights as a universal condition.
25
 Universalizing 
Palestinians showed the complexity of living conditions within the Occupied Territories and in 
doing so sharpened into focus the possibility of Palestinians as individual people with legitimate 
grievances. 
Franklin-Trout’s interview provided viewers with other instances of individual rights 
violations by exposing the continuous state of disruption of private space, family life, and home 
with which Palestinians had to contend.  One of the most jarring examples comes from an 
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interview with a man whose entire house has been bulldozed by the Israeli army in accordance 
with the policy of collective punishment.
26
 The Palestinian man and his brother had been 
interrogated by Israeli forces for suspicion of throwing Molotov cocktails at the army.  As the 
interview progressed, the Palestinian man states that the interrogation took place entailed 
excessive beatings.  According to the Palestinian, his brother confessed to throwing the weapon 
in an attempt to end the beatings.  As punishment the Israeli army bulldozed the entire house.  In 
order to rebuild his house, the Palestinian needed to obtain a permit from the Israeli authorities.  
He claimed he was being denied any such permits and as result was forced to live with his family 
in rubble.   
The Palestinian’s testimony made a remarkable impact because the directors filmed the 
interview amidst the wreckage of the house.  Nothing is left of the home’s walls other than the 
foundation.  Viewers see the large family trying to live as normally as possible in a destroyed 
home.  Dishes are spread amid the large and small chunks of bulldozed concrete left over from 
his house.  Tents provided by the Red Cross are draped where the roof was previously.  The 
result is a dilapidated living space that is now open to the public.  Quite literally private lives are 
on display.
27
 With the tearing down of the home’s walls it became easier for others, and the 
viewers, to peer into the home and see what was happening.  In case it was not apparent to the 
viewer, the man pointedly asks, “How can my family survive like this?”
28
 In contrast to rigid 
conceptions of Palestinians as terror seeking individuals, violent and shrouded in masks, this 
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Palestinian family was framed as concentrating on mere survival and having very limited means 
of achieving that survival.
29
  
  The language used to discuss the Intifada and the images that captured it moved past 
magnified caricatures and brought into relief Arabs as ordinary people.
30
 In providing vivid 
descriptions of the simple daily rituals Palestinians engaged in and the private space of home 
within which they occurred, reporters offered an image of Palestinians as a people that 
Americans could understand.
31
 The description of a community in the West Bank as having “an 
elevated tangle of TV antennas, clotheslines, water tanks” was a description that could fit many 
crowded cities in the United States.
32
 Within this crowded city Palestinian men, women, and 
children participated in the same kinds of activities that U.S. citizens were daily practicing.  This 
sense of ordinary activity constantly resurfaced as reporters focused on community and family 
life.  One article, for instance, noted a young Palestinian child on a dedicated mission to seek out 
a candy bar in the nearest store.   Even the briefest reference to Palestinians enacting ordinary 
daily events moved them a step away from the image of terrorists, shifting the conceptual 
understanding of what and who were Palestinians from ungrateful migrant to a group worthy of 
humanitarian consideration
33
 Palestinians as candy eaters thus came to be portrayed as ordinary 
in a way that much of the political rhetoric and culture of the 1970s and 1980s had rejected. 
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 New images of Palestinians during the Intifada did not completely erase traditional tropes 
of Palestinians as terrorists.  However, the uprising did manage to refresh these images in new 
ways highlighting the attempt to live an ordinary life under Israeli occupation.  The taken-for-
granted sense of danger and uncertainty of Palestinian motives were exposed to American 
observers of the conflict on as one article begins: “A battered white Pugeot pulled up to the 
roadblock the Palestinians had thrown across the main highway through the Gaza Strip and the 
driver opened his trunk to reveal his cargo.”
34
 Given the title of the article “Battleground for 
Gaza” and many of the assumptions and stereotypes about conflict in the Middle East, readers 
could be left with any number of guesses about the kind of violent cargo the trunk contains.  
Previous understandings of the Middle East would suggest a trunk laden with guns, bombs, or 
other sources of violence.  What the reader finds instead is a surprise; the trunk is loaded with 
eggplant, tomatoes, scallions, and potatoes.  The driver had been furtively securing food for 
himself, his family, and his community while Gaza was under curfew.  Rather than weapons of 
violent conflict the food in the trunk represents the daily life ritual of finding, preparing, and 
eating food.  In this article, Palestinians are not seeking violence; they are seeking to fill their 
bellies.   
Violation of basic rights led to an outcry over the way Israeli authorities treated 
Palestinians.  A reporter for The Washington Post said, “If Israel’s occupying forces fear that the 
West Bank schools are teaching junior terrorists remedial rock throwing, why not stop shooting 
old men, women, and children or leveling their homes?”
35
 This reporter’s comments posed a new 
way of thinking about the conflict by transforming Palestinians as worthy victims with legitimate 
grievances.  Israeli Prime Minister Shamir used the familiar analogy of Gulliver to describe the 
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conflict.   “Our situation,” Shamir argued, “is like the picture of the giant Gulliver entering into a 
confrontation with dozens of dwarfs when one hand and two legs are tied, and there are 
declarations all the time that Gulliver is the bully.”
36
 Although Shamir’s reflections intended to 
highlight the unfair treatment of Israeli policy by critics, some U.S. reporters found fault with 
this logic.  One wrote, “Shamir’s metaphor encapsulated the siege mentality that has overtaken 
the government there since the Palestinian riots began in early December.  But to the outside 
world, it was a distorted portrait of how the battlefield actually looked.  As television footage and 
photographs have made clear, Gulliver has the gun.”
37
Public responses to the conflict indicated 
that new sympathies were emerging.  Responses to Days of Rage revealed fissures in traditional 
understandings of the conflict.  Showing real-time coverage of the conflict, cameras followed 
reporters around the camps and Occupied Territories.  In her interviews with the mothers, 
fathers, and youth involved in the conflict, Franklin-Trout provided them a platform to explain 
their motivations and responses to long-time Israeli authority.  Through her interviews she 
created a highly sympathetic portrayal of Palestinians and the conditions in which they had lived 
for so long.  In 1989, the Washington Report on the Middle East wrote that Kenneth Bialkin, 
president of New York’s Jewish Community Relations Council, “had criticized PBS for deciding 
to show what they regarded as ‘anti-Israeli propaganda,’ and had encouraged PBS to cancel the 
production.” Bialkin felt that the PBS production added to the momentum of anti-Israeli rhetoric 
in media coverage of the Intifada.  He argued that, “Whether under the guise of human rights, the 
First Amendment, balance or liberalism, the fact remains that an awful lot gets into the media 
which is very negative toward Israel.”
38
 Although PBS did not pull the documentary, the 
company did agree to add Israeli reactions to the Intifada and a panel discussion of the film.  
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While many in the United States continued to understand the conflict in traditional stereotypes, 
the Intifada did open new spaces that allowed at least some conversation to take place whether or 
not the uprising claimed legitimacy.   
 Bialkin’s reference to human rights in his campaign against Days of Rage reflected an 
important shift in how media and NGO groups discussed the conflict; the urgency of human 
rights violations now predominated debates and conversations about the subject in a way that 
collective rights never did.
39
 Several discussions took place amongst NGO groups about how to 
best present the conflict to the public in such a way that would capture and sustain their 
sympathies.  In May 1988, the AFSC entitled their 1988-1989 peace education program as 
“Breaking Out of the Continuing Stalemate: Building American Support for Middle East 
Peacemaking Initiatives,” writing that “the continuing Palestinian uprising in the Occupied 
Territories and the harsh Israeli response will capture the attention of the U.S. public, the U.S. 
government, Arab and other governments.” 
40
 Other groups also understood the importance of 
shifting winds.  In July 1988, the United Nations hosted the “North American Regional NGO 
Symposium on the Question of Palestine” to discuss ways to unite disparate groups on the 
subject.  Many of these panels focused on rights issues and included workshops on how the 
conflict affected US-Palestinian rights, labor rights of Palestinian workers in the Occupied 
Territories, and ways to organize “students in support of Palestinian rights.”
41
  
By 1989, rights issues had become the central focus for many groups working on the 
Palestine issue.  In January 1989, the Palestine Human Rights Campaign corralled together 
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several NGOs in an attempt to keep the conflict on the American agenda.   This group included 
American Friends Service Committee, the Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of 
Canada, the ADC, and several church groups.   The group actively discussed strategies that 
would best capitalize on public sympathy and concluded that maintaining attention on human 
rights would prove the most valuable strategic method stating that “human rights are far and 
away the best issues to push.  The two state solution is harder to push than the human rights 
issues.”
42
 With the conclusion that human rights remained the crucial issue, the remainder of the 
workshop discussed the pragmatics of building a successful human rights campaign.   
Increasingly, the emphasis on human rights violations and Palestinian people as victims triggered 
a new conversation around what constituted appropriate rights for Palestinians.  Some 
Palestinians noted the change saying, “for the first time, we felt at ease talking to 
Americans…Before everything was closely related to bombing, terrorism and airplanes.  Now, 
this year, there has been the link of Palestinians to the land.”
43
 It was a conversation taking place 
in uncharted territory, and determining the landscape of that new territory proved difficult as 
groups conflicted over the conflation of human rights and humanitarianism, unsure of how 
shifting roles would change the nature of the debate.   
Indeed, the insertion of human rights discourse into the conversation did not occur 
smoothly.
44
 Groups working on peace issue struggled with each other to work out the ends and 
means of human rights, a term that could be frustratingly vague and expansive.  The dynamics of 
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this discursive struggle visibly transpired on subway cars in Boston, Massachusetts in April, 
1988.  A peace coalition group, the Campaign for Peace with Justice in the Middle East, bought 
ad space in the Boston subway and placed a series of posters denouncing the violence in the 
Occupied Territories.  The ad, which showed several armed Israeli soldiers hauling away a lone 
Palestinian, declared that “Your tax dollars pay for the violence in the Israeli Occupied 
Territories….Isn’t it time to speak out? No Aid For the Occupation.” The ad’s sponsors were 
listed beneath the message and included the American Friends Service Committee, the 
Mobilization for Survival, and the Lebanon Emergency Committee.  In another ad, sponsored by 
the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the message read, “Soviet Union, South 
Africa, Israel.  1 Yard Stick for Human Rights.”
45
 
 The ads and their spotlight on human rights abuses ignited controversy within the Boston 
community.  Many Jewish leaders expressed outrage over the ads, calling them “racist” and 
“lodging charges of anti-Semitism.”
46
 One news report quoted a Rabbi calling the ads, “blatantly 
anti-Zionist, blatantly anti-American.”
47
 Other leaders called the ads “a brazen example of 
propaganda and hypocrisy.”
48
 The brewing tension culminated in attacks on the AFSC New 
England Regional Office located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  On April 8, workers in the 
AFSC entered the building and found glass on the floor from where someone had “thrown a 
piece of asphalt through the window and storm door in front of his desk.”
49
This incident added to 
ongoing community tension.  Only a short time before, on Saturday, March 5, a worker exited 
the building to find a man and a woman squatting on the doorstep with bottles of spray paint and 
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jars of glue in hand.  The worker scared them off, but they did leave behind hand-painted posters 
with the slogan, “Victory No!/Expulsion YES!!” The worker felt they were about to poster and 
graffiti the building.  In addition, anger still simmered over a recent mock funeral procession.  
The protest, organized by groups other than AFSC, had cars carrying the names of dead 
Palestinians drive through Jewish neighborhoods in Brookline, a heavily Jewish neighborhood of 
Boston.
50
  
 AFSC supporters also voiced concerns to the media over the ads and sought to distance 
their group from the ads that had their name as supporter.  A 68-year-old Cambridge woman, 
who did not identify herself to reporters, stated that, “I hope every Jew in American tears up their 
check to the American Friends Service Committee in the same way I did.”
51
 AFSC did not just 
voice concerns to the media, however.  An important debate took place within AFSC offices 
concerning the exact nature of the group’s role in presenting information about the conflict to the 
public.  In a letter to the office, one long-time supporter wrote a detailed letter asking for a 
clarification of AFSC’s position on the conflict.  After her Rabbi revealed the ads in his Saturday 
sermon and the role of AFSC in the ads, the letter writer stated, “I am confused and upset.  I 
can’t believe that the American Friends Service Committee as an organization can support what 
you did in its name.  I have always seen AFSC as an organization that brings opposite sides 
together, not one that forces them even farther apart…I have always seen AFSC as a voice of 
sanity, of reconciliation and healing, in a world brimming with ancient and irrational hatreds.  
AFSC was making quiet progress here in Rhode Island.”
52
 The letter writer’s position 
underscores one effect of the reorientation towards individual human rights for human rights 
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sympathizers -- aid and humanitarian groups now started to grapple with the conflict as a zero-
sum game, in which any gain for the Palestinian people resulted in a loss for Israel. 
Although the regional office, headed by Joe Gerson, dealt with the fallout from the ads, 
the controversy escalated to the point where the national office had to clarify policy.  In a letter 
to Gerson, the national office affirmed his “deep and conscientious concern to stand in a place of 
risk with people in the Middle East and believing that you did what you thought right,” but 
ultimately asked Gerson to remove the AFSC endorsement calling it “a mistake
53
.” He stated that 
the poster acted against AFSC’s mission by cultivating a message that “leans toward the building 
of enemy images and, if anything, argues for the taking of sides in the confrontation.” The letter 
further stated that “in a poster like this one can only portray one dimension of the crisis.  So, 
while truthful, the poster tells only one part of a larger, multi-dimensional story.” 
The heart of the debate, and what the Cambridge letter writer bemoaned in her script, 
centered on the imperative to withdraw aid from Israel because of its perceived human rights 
abuses that the media had captured in covering the Intifada.  When community members read the 
proposal to end aid, they read it as an indictment against Israel’s right to secure its borders.  
More than anything, the subway ad highlighted that human rights, in its expansive and vague 
inclusion of so many things, could not be all things to all people.
54
 For aid and humanitarian 
groups, a paradox resulted in which the absorption of human rights actually fractured the aid 
community.  In a letter to the AFSC national office, the Mobilization for Survival, one of the 
groups that originally co- sponsored the ads, wrote that by disassociating with the ads, the AFSC 
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“offer[s] an opening to those who would divide and conquer the peace movement, and you 
deflect the attention from the important issues involved.”
55
 The subway ad controversy exposed 
the tenuous power of aid groups and their reliance on emergency consumers.  If the growing 
humanitarian, development, and aid community were to remain relevant and capitalize on the 
momentum gained from the Ethiopian crisis, they had to find a way to bridge the many different 
understandings of emergency crises and create a message that would resonate with all people, in 
effect, becoming something that could stretch to meets the needs of the emergency consumers 
involved.  Questions abounded about how far to push the human rights envelope and balance 
competing interests.   
 As aid groups struggled to sort out their role in the conflict, events on the ground 
provided a solution for the humanitarian community to flesh out these new questions.  As the 
Intifada unfolded, attention centered on the effects of disrupted education for Palestinian 
children.  The survival of education became a way to address and reunify the splintering human 
rights and aid movement, mollify the very divergent needs of emergency consumers observing 
and participating in the conflict, and shore up the strength of the humanitarian community.  
Education acted as the glue holding everything together; it encompassed the three core tenets of 
a humanitarian ideology and became a powerful incentive to continue faith in the aid 
community.  The next section will look at how this happened. 
Harnessing NGO Power: Unification through education 
 While many of the disruptions Palestinians faced stemmed from an ambiguous legal 
status under Israeli and international law, the expanding human rights movement and coverage of 
the Intifada underscored how disrupted civil rights ultimately bled into a violation of human 
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rights.
56
 However, as the subway controversy explored above highlights, even human rights 
could not advance a consensus in such a hotly debated arena like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
This changed with the introduction and focus on children’s rights-- advocates and humanitarian 
groups were more willing to agree when the conversation narrowed to the violation of children’s 
rights, particularly their rights associated with access to education.
57
 Speaking two years after the 
conflict began, Congressman Doug Berueter told the Chairman of the Congressional Hearing on 
the Developments in the West Bank and Gaza that “while Israel has behaved commendably” in 
allowing freedom of religion in the territories, he did have “a particular concern with the children 
of Palestine,” many of whom he felt, “have been swept up by events that they only vaguely 
understand.”
58
 Evading a complete condemnation of Israel, he did manage to cast suspicion on 
the management of the territories by claiming that he feared that “the security forces, in their 
understandable desire to maintain order, mistake the natural play of children for something more 
malevolent, and this is a tragedy.”
59
 Breteur’s comments show just how much children 
complicated the traditional narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  If established rhetoric of 
the on-going conflict rested on entrenched stereotypes of “evil” and “tricky” Arabs, the 
introduction of children’s participation undid that square.
60
 Media images shored up this support 
as they juxtaposed stone throwing children against rumbling Israeli tanks.  Against this 
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background surged American expectations that childhood remained free from politics and 
violence and, most importantly, that it remained free from human rights violations.
61
   
 Congressional discussions placed much emphasis on how the Intifada disrupted 
childhood, a disruption which debaters framed as a violation of children’s human rights.  For 
example, in the Congressional Hearing that took place in May, 1990 the committee read reports 
submitted by the Palestine Human Rights Campaign that revealed daily conditions for children in 
the refugee camps, which the report described as “typical and endemic.” The first sentence of the 
report set the context for the hearing by declaring that, “All children have the right to childhood.  
All children have the inalienable right to be free from fear, free from physical and mental abuse.  
Children have right to feel secure from threat of bodily harm as they grow up.” According to the 
report, children living in the Occupied Territories faced daily threats that included: children were 
imprisoned without charge and released without trial, usually after 18 days of detention, children 
were tortured into confessing acts they never committed and signing confessions in Hebrew, a 
language most Palestinian children did not speak, children were fined large sums of money that 
their families could not pay.
62
 Another report explained the social and psychological affect these 
events had on the individual child, “the psychological impact on the children can be seen in the 
frustration, nervousness, stress, fear and aggression”
63
 and concluded that, “Before the respectful 
and obedient child was considered superior; now the strong, muscular, and aggressive child is 
more popular.”
64
 
AFSC records from their kindergarten programs in the West Bank also bore out these 
assertions of nervous, anxious, and aggressive children, images that ran counter to the 
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expectations of a childhood of happiness and comfort
65
.  In her notes back to the AFSC, the 
director of the kindergarten program, Mary Khass, opened her letter by writing, “Hello from 
Hell.”
66
 She described how her staff of kindergarten teachers made it to work only twice within a 
six month period and how “the boycott is very strict, the shops are almost empty, merchants are 
not allowed to buy new merchandise, what is finished is not replaced,” and that “many are 
having their fair share of tear gas daily.”
67
 In another letter, Khass describes the physical 
destruction students and staff operated within and how “during the last curfew on Beach Camp, 
the soldiers demolished completely the fence wall of the play-ground.” The destruction of the 
wall worried her because “the rubble is a cause of danger to the children and they have not 
protection from the street.”
68
 Khass noted the ways in which the physical signs of war manifested 
in the classroom behavior of the children.  She described how the children came into the 
classroom nervous and anxious, that “there are children who are having the effect of the 
happenings on them – they just come into the kg. and sit in a corner and don’t want to be 
bothered…the child is aggressive…the child keeps hitting his peers.”
69
 She also described the 
family conditions of these children who, in the absence of fathers in prison or detained, heard 
their mothers constantly reprimand, “Whoosh, don’t shout, don’t raise your voice, don’t play, the 
Israelis will hear you and they’ll come in and beat us all.”
70
 The unique biological and social 
circumstances of children described by Khass and the congressional reports, namely that they 
remained dependent on others and required stability for appropriate emotional, social, and 
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physical development yet still had the capacity to act as independent persons, underscored the 
distinct category of children’s rights in the conflict as something special.
71
  
A focus on children’s rights made sense given the continued international momentum to 
understand children as having special characteristics and needs that required a different approach 
towards their rights, which culminated in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, a 
legacy of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child.  While The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child was signed in 1989, approximately two years before the rise of the Intifada, the 
underpinnings for it had an established pedigree in the Occupied Territories through educational 
development programs like the AFSC’s.  The AFSC educational program MUMS, or Mothers 
Understanding Methods of Schooling, in the Occupied Territories that developed in the 1980s 
exemplified the rights-based approach that had been building.  In this program, workers would 
travel to the homes of preschoolers and work with the mothers on how to facilitate learning and 
thinking in the home.  The AFSC’s MUMS worked diligently to instill in mothers a new way to 
teach children to understand the world around them.  The program emphasized the child as “a 
thinker, concept former, knowledge gatherer,” all of which intended to equip an individual with 
the necessary tools to actively negotiate the world around them without relying completely on 
the adults in their orbit.
72
 To meet these goals, an AFSC review of the program recommended 
revising the curriculum to move away from “the heavily didactic style which pervades most of 
the worksheets” and instead move to an approach that encouraged children “to think.”  The 
report encouraged this by providing explicit opportunities to do so and to “trust them,” the 
children, as they worked through the process.  One explicit opportunity came in the form of 
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including more occasions to free draw in the program.  The report touted the benefits of free 
drawing as something “that offers them another way of representing their world, and playing 
with it imaginatively and creatively.”
73
 Free drawing placed on emphasis on the student as an 
active learner, trying to make sense of his world in order to better navigate it, an ultimate 
confirmation of the rights based approach embedded in the 1989 CRC.  Education was an 
approach that conformed the rights based approach of the CRC because it allowed children an 
opportunity to develop skills for defense of their individual lives as well as the defense of the 
nation’s future.
74
   
Paula Fass explains that the West, in the early twentieth century, focused on removing 
children from hazardous living conditions resulting in approaches towards childhood that rested 
on protection.  The events of World War I, World War II, and the growing tensions of the latter 
half of the twentieth century exposed children’s vulnerability and growing contradiction between 
the power of adults and governments to protect and the reality of war.  Throughout the 1980s, 
conditions made clear that “children could remain the voiceless objects of exploitation” shifting 
approaches to childhood from protection to a rights-based approach.
75
 In this new approach, 
groups “asserted the positive rights of participation” for children.
76
 While recognizing continued 
protection, the CRC focused on ways to acknowledge and provide children with firmer, “rights-
based approaches” that children could call upon in their own defense.  Advocates hoped that a 
rights based approach would equip children with the tools of self-defense when adult protection 
failed.   
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Although the more informal educational MUMS program continued operation under the 
Intifada, curfews presented a difficult challenge.  The AFSC intended participants to complete 
the program within 25 weeks, but the Intifada extended the time frame to 8-9 months.
77
 Formal 
education system also experienced dramatic upheavals during the conflict because of imposed 
curfews.  Together, reports and concerns like those of Mary Khass pointed to the disruption of 
school systems as an important cause of behavioral changes, and just as importantly they 
signaled the curtailment of children’s rights.  A joint statement by the British Refugee Council, 
Christian Aid, Oxfam, Quaker Peace and Service, Save the Children Fund, United Nations 
Association International Service, War on Want, and the World University, Service, wrote that 
the closures of schools had “serious long-term damage to the development of children.”
78
 The 
disruption of schooling, alongside the detention of youth, incited some of the most vocal 
criticism of Israeli force during the Intifada, uniting ambivalent opinions like Bereuter’s with 
pro-Palestinian sympathies like those of the Palestinian Human Rights Commission.  Observers 
found it discomfiting that “in the first four years of the Intifada, one-third to one-half of school 
days were lost” stating that the closings had no purpose “other than an expression of fundamental 
animosity toward the cultural development of the Palestinian people as a whole.”
79
 Equally 
appalling to concerned groups was the confinement of children to their homes when schools 
closed.  A Save the Children report on their kindergarten programming noted “the frequent 
                                                             
77
 “A review of MUMS Conducted with the Team,” File Folder: ID Middle East 9086, Box ID Middle East 1989, 
AFSC.  
78
 “The Denial of Education to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” File Folder: ID Middle East 11524, 
Box ID Middle East, 1989, AFSC. 
79
 N.J. Brown, Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003): 200, 202 and Rosemary Radford Ruether, Board of Directors, Palestine Human Rights 
Campaign, materials submitted to congressional hearing: 332.  
221 
 
curfews have meant that the population have often been confined to their homes for prolonged 
periods.  During curfews the kindergartens have remained necessarily closed.”
80
 
Israeli authorities had managed the Palestinian education system in the camps since the 
1967 war, a position which gave them authority to exercise much control over the schools, 
including the extensive shut-downs of the Intifada.  During the 1967 war, when Israel expanded 
its borders, they gained an additional one million Palestinians in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to 
govern.
81
 During the ensuing years, Jordan and Syria launched another way against Israel.  
Eventually a peace treaty was signed between the parties in 1973, and in 1979 Israel signed a 
peace treaty with Egypt.  Amongst other things, the peace treaties cemented Israeli’s control over 
the West Bank and Gaza.  Israeli governorship of the West Bank included the development of 
the “Office of Education for Judea and Samaria.” The office was to report to the military and 
“was staffed entirely by military personnel in uniform.”
82
 As a result, the Israeli military 
government had full control of school administration and took extreme care with the kinds of 
political curricula teachers delivered to their students, and “teachers whose political views were 
not acceptable were dismissed or transferred to distant locations.”
83
  In addition to teacher 
management, Israeli authorities also kept strict control of materials circulating within school 
walls and engaged in “curricular censorship of textbooks mentioning Palestine.” The authorities 
paid particular attention to history, geography, civics, literature and religion, all of which are 
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predisposed to instilling a collective identity.
84
 The authorities removed any reference to Arab 
nationalism or Zionism in addition to anything connected to Palestinian heritage.   
 Observers watching the drama unfold may not have been able to agree on the extent and 
scope of addressing general human rights issues in the territories, but they could agree that 
efforts to prevent children from attending school marked an egregious affront by Israeli 
authorities.  Against the growing international movement to protect children through a rights-
based approach like that of the CRC, the call to aid Palestinian children coalesced around the 
child’s basic right to education.  Education acted as a base to hold observers together because it 
served as a proactive defense for the child, meeting the needs of pro-rights groups, without 
requiring significant criticism of Israel that might have troubled more hesitant observers like 
Berueter.
 
 Given the precedent of Israeli preoccupation with events taking place in the schools, it 
is no surprise that the authorities viewed school activity with suspicion once the Intifada gained 
momentum.  Soon after the Intifada began Israeli authorities closed down UNRWA-run schools 
in the belief that Palestinian teachers used the classroom to foster student insurrection.
85
 Shutting 
down schools struck a particular nerve for the American public as Nebraska Representative 
Doug Bereuter declared when he said of the school closures, “By their very nature, schools and 
universities encourage students to question authority, and that has happened around the world.  
And it is absolutely no justification for denying the rights of basic education to children.”
86
  
Bereuter’s message of schools and guardians encouraging children to question authority reflected 
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an important dimension of children’s rights: children needed to cultivate their own voice in order 
to challenge the world around them.
87
  
 While the school closures of the Intifada disrupted the development of an appropriate 
revolutionary child imagined by Bereuter, Palestinians used the closures to develop and 
encourage a particular form of challenge to authorities that ran counter to Bereuter’s carefully 
circumscribed rebel.  During this time period, the complex forces of the Intifada fostered a 
different kind of self-advocacy, a vision of the insurrectionary child and adult that competed with 
Bereuter’s conception.  Mary Khass, like other Palestinians, lamented the school closures and the 
effects of violence on children, but she also expressed pride in the way the Intifada forced adults 
and youth to reshape traditional behaviors.  In the classroom this translated into a different kind 
of teacher-student dynamic.  In Khass’s letters to the AFSC, she wrote how children entered the 
classroom aggressive and anxious and the teachers, sensing this heightened state of emotion and 
that “the children can’t concentrate on any method of learning,” opted to help the children “relax 
after what they are doing curfews.”
88
 Teachers also paid attention to the pacing of the 
insurrection when interacting with their students.  When “things started happening” in camps, the 
teachers “just loosen up and starting helping the children emotionally and individually.”
89
 She 
wrote that the more informal methods of the teachers allowed the children to relax and “most 
time, by 9:00, they all want to be out, and the play the Intifada game, they play the martyrs game, 
they play burning tires, they play covering their faces.  They play all these games.  They let them 
free.  They let them play.”
90
 For Khass, the children’s martyrs game and the relaxed classroom 
atmosphere created by the adults was indicative of teachers and students making larger changes 
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in the way they understood and responded to the occupation.  Rather than acting in what Khass 
described as the role of “beggar” an entirely new mentality emerged in which Palestinian 
children and youth could reorient their self-identity.
91
  
 Not all observers of the Intifada understood school disruption as having benefits, 
however minimal.  The Palestinian children of the Intifada playing martyrs and burning tires in 
Mary Khass’s kindergarten classes did not fit the image of representative Bereuter’s school child 
insurrectionist carefully and rationally evaluating problems and solutions learned in a school 
setting.  Instead, problem-solving developed in the context of war – a context that sparked 
ambivalence amongst American observers – and resulted in irrational revolutionaries.  In line 
with this perspective, some outside observers found Palestinian guardians particularly culpable 
for creating nascent revolutionaries.  California representative categorized the Intifada as a 
situation in which “the perpetrators of the various terrorist acts and arson and Molotov cocktail 
throwing deliberately use children as their shock troops.”
92
 These observers, acting on the belief 
that children remained innocent vessels that could be callously manipulated, did not believe that 
children and youth had the suitable decision making capabilities to enact appropriate behavior in 
the conflict.
93
 These were the very children that Bereuter wanted to keep in school in order to 
train in the appropriate way to “question authority.”  
The question of how to train Palestinian children, and in what setting, took on more 
significance when it became clear that the Palestinians were intent on continuing the struggle.  
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The Israeli government shut down many schools after the Intifada started “saying they had 
become breeding grounds for conspiracy that fed the uprising.” Reporter Joel Brinkley, who 
often covered the conflict for the New York Times, wrote about the schools, often called 
neighborhood, underground, or Intifada schools, that sprang-up to replace the official school 
structure.  In his article, he details a new, more participatory student.  One teacher described his 
pupils this way: “When I try to tell them something about Chemistry, they jump up to ask about 
the soldiers and the Intifada.  These are things they wouldn’t have had the courage to ask in 
regular schools, and I couldn’t have answered them.  Now I can answer them, and I do.”  The 
students also spoke about the changes taking place in their education as a consequence of the 
Intifada.  One 11-year-old student said simply, “I like this school better.  There are no tests.  The 
courses are better.  The teachers explain things they never explained before.”
94
 Brinkley’s article 
also highlighted the differences in curriculum in the underground schools.  One teacher reflected 
on the teaching methods, saying, “When we teach math to elementary students, now for the 
numbers we have them count the homes the Israelis have demolished or the number of 
Palestinians they’ve put in prison.”
95
 In describing the logistics of the schools, Brinkley’s 
reporting also presented an image of a group of children excited about the prospect of 
participating in the conflict, children whose behaviors were encouraged by trusted authority 
figures like school teachers.   
   Israeli efforts to curtail the uprising through containment of children were directly 
related to the guardianship role of Palestinian adults.  Mary Khass’s letters to the AFSC provide 
compelling evidence for the many unanticipated ways in which Palestinians participated in the 
uprising.  In one letter, she paid particular attention to the ways in which the uprising affected the 
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adult women in the camps.  She wrote that, “It seems the Israelis soon found out the important 
role of the women.  They became the distributers, the organizers, and now they are subject to 
harassment.”
96
 According to Khass’s reports, men of the camps were not allowed out of their 
houses when the Israeli authorities briefly lifted curfews, and as a result, the women were “doing 
what needs to be done.” As Khass’s words show, even the smallest of daily life rituals, such as 
grocery shopping, became a call to arms.  Caring for family and ensuring survival through daily 
life activities “even when the stores were bare,” became an action of resistance and a way to 
meet the call for participation.
97
 These small moments instilled a new sense of collective identity 
and created opportunities for Palestinians to acknowledge and enact collective resistance.
98
 
Khass’s notes echoed much of the same excitement from Palestinians that Brinkley’s reports 
presented as she wrote of the women’s role, “I am so proud that our women at last are actively 
sharing in the uprising.”
99
 
Khass’s letters show a glimpse of a population motivated by perceptions of past injustice 
to reclaim the future, and media stories like Brinkely’s corroborated the infectiousness of 
resistance.  Together, the reports showed to those observing the Intifada that children might be 
highly susceptible to the kind of protest behavior demonstrated by their guardians.
100
 If nothing 
else, reports continuously indicated that a disruption in schooling left large numbers of 
Palestinian children with copious amounts of free time on their hands, a situation that led many 
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bored youngsters into participating in the uprising.
101
Indeed, as reports filtered through the media 
about the role of children in the conflict, some saw this as further proof of a “democratic deficit” 
in the region as nefarious adults corrupted the youth and eroded any possibility of a nascent 
democracy.
102
 As a result, the Intifada acted as the catalyst for “more massive and systematic 
western support to Palestinian NGOs.”
103
 This reversed the long-standing trend in which most of 
the support for Palestinian aid came from Arab neighbors, particularly Jordan.  By the time of the 
Oslo Accords, more than 200 international NGOs were active in the area.
104
 In addition, another 
significant trend emerged: a large number of North American NGOs appeared on the horizon.  
Challand reports that prior to the Intifada the USAID funded only five groups working in the 
area.  These included Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, American Near East Refugee 
Aid, American Mid-East Education and Training Services Inc., and Holy Land Christian 
Mission.  By 1994, USAID was funding 20 U.S. groups.  He further argues that while health and 
advocacy efforts secure most of the funding, agriculture, education, and women’s rights have 
also likely been important issues to support.
105
 Nurturing democracy through support of civil 
institutions and development was considered a vital process in the Occupied Territories in order 
to challenge the Palestinian Leadership and “served the political purpose of creating and 
favouring support for various externally sponsored peace initiatives.”
106
 
Reinstituting education appeared to be the most viable means of curbing youth 
enthusiasm for the uprising while simultaneously providing for their human rights and building a 
vibrant democracy.  Schools like the Friends School of Ramallah and educational leaders like 
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Mary Khass continued to plead for support in order to build a strong nation.
107
 Humanitarian 
groups like Save the Children responded with an intensive campaign to restore education.  They 
called on international law to rectify the situation stating that “the right to education is protected 
both by the Jordanian Education Law Number 16 of 1964.” They also cited Article 50 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention that stated an “occupier must facilitate the proper working of all 
institutions devoted to the care and education of children.”
108
 These efforts combined with media 
stories that spotlighted school closures bore some fruit; the Oslo Accords granted authority to the 
Palestinian authority for formal education management.
109
  
While attention and funding was focused on the formal education apparatus to build a 
healthy democracy and protect human rights, other efforts to complete these efforts soon 
developed around peace education.  Although peace education was more informal than 
traditional schooling, it also had a significant role to play in creating support for “various 
externally sponsored peace initiatives.”
110
 The next section looks at why peace education 
attracted a greater role for aid efforts and how peace group efforts managed to maintain 
American attention on the Palestinian issue by providing a concrete solution that reconciled 
traditional stereotypes with a fragile, budding sympathy towards Palestinians.  They did this by 
shaping behavior more receptive to the peace process.    
Peace Education and Efforts to Keep the Conflict in the American View 
Although budding sympathy emerged in US reflections on the Intifada, the residue of traditional 
stereotypes and tropes consistently challenged this new interpretation of the occupation.  
Speaking before Congress in 1990, California Senator Pete Wilson declared that “the US 
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networks have been complicit in a massive deception about the West Bank conflict.” Refuting 
charges that the protest was a spontaneous demonstration, Wilson argued that the PLO leadership 
instigated and directed the entire movement.  He pointed to incidents where young boys, who it 
had been claimed died in Israeli custody or from Israeli bullets, actually died from natural causes 
and that many more were the result of “Palestinians killing other Palestinians.”
111
 Wilson’s 
anecdotal evidence suggested a menacing leadership willingly sacrificing their nation’s most 
precious resource – children.
112
 Even as reports like the PCHR and Mary Khass’s notes 
highlighted the effects of the Intifada on children, some observers drew a stark line between the 
anxious children portrayed in the reports and those that actively participated in the conflict.  For 
example, although Berueter used disrupted education as a means to critique Israel, his statements 
did not apply equally to all children in the Intifada.  He stated in the report hearings that his 
concerns were not addressed to “rock-throwing teenagers” who he implied clearly understood 
their actions and remained reluctant to engage in sensible, orderly dialogue.
113
 Even before 
Breuter’s congressional statement, a 1989 Los Angeles Times article pointed to similar 
apprehensions about children’s roles in the Intifada.  The article described the Intifada as “an 
uprising of mere boys and girls, some barely old enough to spell the word Intifada” and used 
their own word and voices to open a lens on youth activity for readers in the United States.  They 
asked one 14-year-old if “they would give in to parents who ordered them to stay indoors.” The 
youth “laugh[ed] out loud” and replied “No, absolutely not.  This is our battle.  The older people 
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should not stand in our way.”
114
   Bertueter’s words, and articles like the LA Times that amplified 
them, suggested that the political perceptions of Palestinian children and youth, their will to act 
on those perceptions, and their intransigence in changing those opinions mattered in 
understanding the nature of the conflict and the ensuing provision of aid.  Like others struggling 
with the conceptual underpinnings of human rights, Bertueter’s comments underscored the 
reluctance to validate the human rights of children taking part in the conflict when their behavior 
departed from accepted understandings of the pitiable victim.   
 The rights campaign to get students back into schools did answer the call to protect the 
basic human rights of children, but it left other concerns related to behavior unanswered.  The 
youth that appeared hidden behind face scarves and unwilling to listen to their elders appeared 
too far out of control to revert back to Berueter’s image and ate away at public support of the 
resistance.  Late reports of the Intifada called the movement “self-destructive” and cited that it 
had devolved into “an internecine struggle between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and 
supporters of Hamas, the fundamentalist group that opposes the peace process.”
115
 With the 
movement dragging on and reports from inside Palestine citing concerns about “uncontrolled 
cadres – emotional teenagers who are so charged against the peace conference” questions soon 
arose around the effects of the movement on the peace process and Palestinian willingness to 
engage in a productive manner with the ongoing process.
116
  However, rather than dismissing aid 
out of hand as happened in Biafra when aid victim behavior acted beyond prescribed boundaries, 
humanitarian aid groups managed to build on U.S. sympathy by focusing on characteristics of 
the conflict that would resonate with the American people.  In this case, groups focused on 
reshaping questionable youth behavior and participation in the conflict.  Peace education 
                                                             
114
 Daniel Williams, “Defy Israelis, Parents: Children of the Intifada ‘Our Battle,’ LA Times 18 Feb. 1989. 
115
 Tom Hundley, “Turning Inward, ‘The Intifada Has Become Self-Destructive,’” The Sun 20 October 1991.  
116
Ibid. 
231 
 
programs provided the avenue for changing behavior while simultaneously harnessing public 
sympathy and attention for the region.  If international groups like Save the Children and 
UNICEF took up the call to reinstitute formal education, some U.S. groups offered informal 
peace education that emphasized personal accountability, a call that directly answered concerns 
voiced by some observers in the United States.   
Such a focus in peace education on the individual, personal responsibility, and 
accountability dovetailed neatly with the reigning neo-liberal thought that predominated in the 
United States.
117
 It also helps to explain why peace education was so readily employed.  The role 
of personal responsibility and accountability in individual life, a hallmark of neo-liberal thought, 
reached new heights under the Reagan administration in the United States.
118
 Increasingly, 
events that happened in one’s personal life were construed as a direct result of individual 
responsibility.  Personal responsibility and accountability, often referred to by the U.S. idiom of 
“pulling one’s self up by the bootstraps” became a deafening mantra in the United States and set 
the terms of how many domestic concerns were to be conceptualized.
119
  
Such an emphasis on personal responsibility inserted itself in increasingly visible ways 
into various aspects of American life.  One of the most visible ways was through the struggle 
over welfare rights and the controversy that raged over such rights.  Influential arguments of 
conservative economists like Charles Murray were put forth.  The sum of his arguments claimed 
“the perverse incentives of welfare fostered fecklessness, dependency, and promiscuity among 
the poor- and worse than that- rewarded such behaviors by fleecing the hardworking 
                                                             
117
 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
118
 Monica Prasad, “The Popular Origins of Neoliberalism in the Reagan Tax cut of 1981,” The Journal of Policy 
History 24 (2012):352;  David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
119
 Sugure, Sweet Land of Liberty, 514-515. 
232 
 
taxpayers.”
120
 Charles Murray’s words about welfare recipients implied that there was only one 
choice that could legitimately be pursued.  One had to rely on one’s own internal resources 
regardless of the system one was operating within.  In outlining the situation as one of choice, or 
personal responsibility, other social, economic, and racial inequalities were quietly dismissed.  
Personal responsibility took on ever greater weight in U.S. debates about how to understand what 
happened in community, state, and nation.
121
 
The rhetoric of personal accountability informed conversations about international 
events.  The influence of personal accountability, for example, was deployed in the language 
used by President Reagan in a radio speech specifically addressing the subject of terrorism.  
When speaking of terrorism, he began by saying that, “For too long the world was paralyzed by 
the argument that terrorism could not be stopped until the grievances of terrorists were 
addressed.  The complicated and heartrending issues that perplex mankind are no excuse for 
violent, inhumane attacks, nor do they excuse not taking aggressive action against those who 
deliberately slaughter innocent people.” In referencing the use of excuses, Reagan’s speech 
draws heavily on a discursive framework of choice used to describe the underclass.
122
 Both 
terrorists and the underclass faced “complicated and heartrending issues,” but what they made of 
those circumstances was directly reflected in the kinds of choices they made.  The circumstances 
one faced, whether one was a member of the underclass or a potential terrorist, were no excuse 
for behavior considered deviant.  They could either chart a course of legitimate action and 
behavior or they could succumb to their deviant tendencies.  Either way a choice had to be made.   
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Peace education as practiced in the Intifada reflected the idea that each individual faced a 
choice about the direction of their life.  Previously, peace education reached maturation during 
the 1980s when efforts “to overcome violence in its various forms,”  the concern with peace 
education lay with finding societal peace.
123
 Peace education programming reflected such a 
concern and emphasized analysis of structural and societal conditions that undergirded human 
interaction.
124
 As the 1980s drew to a close peace education underwent a reorientation and 
shifted from societal peace to individual peace, a shift that affected the kind of peace 
programming taking place in the territories.  At this time, peace education became intensely 
focused on the individual and what the individual could do to promote peace for the community, 
society, and world.
125
 What each individual did in their life, their community, and their society 
was a function of personal responsibility; each individual was personally responsible and 
accountable for what occurred at these sites through the kinds of personal choices they made.  
Often peace education was distilled down to a matter of personal choice as shown by one peace 
participant who proclaimed, “The very first step we have to take right now is not only to want for 
your own people but to really want, really desire for the other.”
126
  Personal accountability 
framed the continuation of conflicts as a choice to overcome personal prejudices or not, eliding 
other important elements such as economic, racial, and social discrimination that undergirded 
many sites of violence.  The causes of conflict were represented in a way that neatly aligned neo-
liberal formulations of personal accountability and “self-responsible individuals.”
127
 That is, 
                                                             
123
 Robin Burns and Robert Aspeslagh, “Peace education and the comparative study of education,” in Three Decades 
of Peace Education Around the World: An Anthology, ed. Robin Burns and Robert Aspeslagh (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1996), 10. 
124
 Burns, 10. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 John Wallach, The Enemy has a face:The Seeds of Peace Experience (Washington: US Institute of Peace,2000), 
2. 
127
 Wendy Larner, “Neoliberalism?,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 (2003): 509-512.  
234 
 
peace would result only when individuals made the proper choices to overcome their personal 
hatreds and prejudices. 
In trying to make sense of international conflicts, the language of personal accountability 
and responsibility that so many in the United States were familiar with was easily mapped onto 
the violence that took place within other nations’ borders.  As experts and educators, typically 
from developed nations, brought their knowledge of peace education to areas of conflict, which 
were typically in less developed areas, certain spaces of children’s lives became highly infused 
with a neo-liberal conceptualization of peace that focused on personal responsibility.
128
 One 
peace group that developed in direct response to the conflict in the Occupied Territories was 
Seeds of Peace.  Seeds of Peace was a distinctly American endeavor in peace education.  Every 
summer the camp flew in Arab and Israeli youth from the Middle East to spend the summer in 
Maine with the intention that “the enemy” would be seen as a human being.  Understanding “the 
enemy”  as another human, another teenager, allows “fears and suspicions and the ‘warnings’ of 
their friends back home” to disappear as “they find out how easy it is to live in the same bunk or 
play on the same team as someone from the ‘other side.’”
129
 A crucial part of the camp 
experience was the daily coexistence session.  These were two hour sessions where four Israeli 
youth, four Palestinian youth, and four youth from either the United States or another country in 
the Middle East were brought together in attempt to be “honest and frank” about their thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, and reactions to each other.  Each session was facilitated by two camp 
counselors.   
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The sessions focused primarily on addressing stereotypes and personal prejudices of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Goals of the camp included raising the awareness of each individual 
to become ‘aware that their knowledge of history is biased and incomplete,” learning that “they 
have power over their own identity,” and that they “make a conscious decision to be 
peacemakers.”
130
 The role of the individual is so central to the camp’s message that a section of 
the camp’s handbook is in fact entitled “Self-Regulation: Ending the Argument.” Youth who 
take the action of ending the discussion, or the argument, over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are 
seen making as a major breakthrough.  For example, coexistence sessions during this time period 
focused on specifics steps to overcome personal prejudice and stereotyping.   One of the goals of 
these sessions was for youth “to become honest” with each other about the views they held.  To 
facilitate honesty, youth participated in an activity to deconstruct stereotypes.  In this activity 
students were expected to write down the first things that came to their minds when they heard 
the words “Israelis” and “Palestinians.” Discussion would then take place over how to look for 
and avoid stereotypes.  This is, of course, an important piece in understanding life in this region, 
but critical questions were never raised about how those stereotypes were put to use in larger 
structures.  Little was said of the way these stereotypes around ethnicity tied Palestinians to 
Israel via economic structures as often happened in the Gaza Strip during the 1990s.  Little is 
said, of the significant numbers of Palestinians who worked in Israel largely through a black 
market labor force.
131
 Typically, Palestinians in this black market filled open positions in 
agriculture, construction, and services which were occupations not easily filled by Israelis.
132
 In 
the Seeds of Peace handbook personal responsibility was a primary feature of not only how to 
understand conflict, but also how to address conflict.  The individual became the primary bearer 
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of responsibility for change in individual circumstances.  Little attention was given to larger 
structural process in which individual interactions take place.   
Most significantly, it left little room for protest movements like the Intifada, let alone 
daily resistance.  The experience of a Palestinian man in a peace camp underscores how groups 
utilized peace discourse and the ways in which it opened up a very narrow understanding of the 
conflict and how “dominant groups establish terms and conditions” and the ways “in which 
subordinate groups negotiate terms and conditions.”
133
  TH was a Palestinian man who was 
heavily involved in peace education during the mid-1990s while living in Hebron.  During this 
time period he was high school aged.  He participated in a form of peace education that could 
most accurately be described as a peace conference.  TH, and several other Palestinian youth, 
were invited to a several days long conference in Austria to discuss violence in general, and 
more specifically, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.   The conference was sponsored 
and organized by the Viennese government.  Meetings were held in a former UN building and 
there was a combination of large group discussions, seminars, and small group break-out 
sessions where groups involved in  a particular conflict would come together to discuss what was 
happening in that conflict.  As a Palestinian, TH met in the small group sessions with Israelis.  
The Palestinians and Israelis formed only one contingent of invitees.  There were also groups 
from Jordan, Egypt, and some groups from Europe.   
 As TH described his experiences with this particular form of peace education he noted 
three experiences that were particularly troubling to him.  The first instance created a sense of 
unease with peace education for him and began to show he termed the “hypocrisy” of peace 
education.  During the first conference, it had been set that each of the groups in attendance 
would be invited to dine with their respective embassies.  As all the groups left for their evening 
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with their embassies the Palestinian group found themselves alone because they did not have an 
embassy to host them.  It is interesting to note that even as the Palestinian group did not have a 
formal embassy activity to engage in, the organizers of the conference did not feel it necessary to 
provide them with any kind of activity at all during this evening.  In reflecting on the experience, 
TH asked “why should we be different?”
134
  
 TH’s ambivalence towards peace education further intensified after a particularly 
troubling episode.  During one of the peace conferences, TH formed a friendship with an Israeli 
who was also in attendance at the conference.  While in Austria, and away from the realities of 
life in their home region, the friendship appeared as though it would blossom.  Once the 
conference ended both young men returned home.  A few days after their return, TH was stopped 
at a checkpoint along the road.  TH described his humiliation at the checkpoint
135
 as the Israeli 
officer asked him various questions.  During this course of the interaction between TH and the 
officer, TH looked up to see that one of the officers was the same young man he had started a 
friendship with at the peace conference.  As soon as the officer noticed TH he ran over and asked 
his fellow officer to release TH.  Once released the Israeli officer tried to hug TH.  When TH 
asked the officer about the incongruity between what had happened at the peace conference and 
what was currently happening at the checkpoint, the officer replied, “I am serving my country.” 
TH noted that the young officer gave no indication that there was any discrepancy between the 
conversations of peace that took place in the conference and the actions that were happening at 
the checkpoint. 
 TH’s final break with peace education came around 1997 when the organizers of the 
Austrian peace conferences decided to bring the conferences to Israel.  TH noted that even 
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though the conference was closer to Palestinians than it had ever been it felt farther away than 
ever before.  This was because many Palestinians were unable to attend the peace conference 
because of daily security measures instituted by the Israelis.  More specifically, many 
Palestinians could not get to the peace conference because they had been detained at various 
checkpoints.  Witnessing an inability of Palestinians to get to a peace conference that had been 
instituted for the specific purpose of thinking about and discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
became an absurd situation for TH.  He described that prior to this point he really used to believe 
in peace education, but with this event, “his thinking shifted away.”
136
 For TH peace education 
became a way for the “United States and Israeli government to ‘educate’ us about the kind of 
peace they wanted.” With the experience he was left feeling that there would never be a peace 
afforded to Palestinians and Israelis in the way that he, as a member of a subordinated group, 
understood it. 
 While peace education may have failed for some participants at the individual level, it 
served as an important example of the power of humanitarian ideology in the United States by 
the end of the 1980s.  Peace education served as a shining example of how humanitarian groups 
could transform individual lives.  The potential to change the world in such a drastically different 
way even inspired to Bill Clinton to recognize the importance of NGO humanitarian and peace 
work.  When the White House hosted the 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles, he invited the first cohort of Seeds of Peace campers declaring of the youth, “no one 
is more important that the group of Israeli and Arab children who are seated here with us 
today...For too long, the young of the Middle East have been caught in a web of hatred not of 
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their own making.  For too long, they have been taught from the chronicles of war.  Now we can 
give them the chance to know the season of peace.”
137
  
Conclusion 
Clinton’s words spoke of an implicit promise to keep the conflict in American consciousness as a 
way to protect and transform the lives of Palestinian youth, and that promise was a direct result 
of NGO influence.  When compared with Biafra, they had come a long way.  The Intifada 
presented similar conditions faced by the humanitarian community in Biafra: children lay at the 
center of the conflict, questions ensued about responsibility and the tangled relationship of 
guardian and child, and U.S.  support rested on a fragile foundation that the belief that the 
victims were both pitiable and possessed redemptive qualities.  The response of the humanitarian 
community was strikingly different in the case of Palestine, however.  By the time of the 
Intifada, humanitarian ideology had gained enough strength and had enough adherents that 
interested NGOs were able to keep emergency consumers from simply writing off the conflict as 
hopeless when it appeared that adult guardians purposely misdirected youth and children towards 
the violence of the Intifada.  Like Biafra, NGO groups faced a public that was reluctant to aid 
and leery of the very aid recipients they were trying to help.  However, in the ensuring years 
between Biafra and the Intifada, NGO groups had proven their ability to adapt to public 
reception of emergencies by validating and building on their anxieties and fears of emergency 
victims.  In the case of the Intifada, they did this by bolstering the sturdy foundation of 
humanitarian ideology with new tools at their disposal.  They used human rights discourses as a 
way to reinforce the neoliberal emphasis that focused on personal accountability.  Yet, even 
these new tools would have been meaningless if they had not built upon a credible ideology that 
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resonated with the American public.   By commoditizing emergencies as a transformative event 
and articulating emergency efforts as the duty of citizens rather than the government, 
humanitarian groups were able to persuade the American people that the children of the Intifada 
deserved more than the children of Biafra.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
Analyzing emergencies from Biafra, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Palestine help piece together a more 
coherent story of the rise of American humanitarianism than occurs when cases, these or others, 
are studied in isolation.  To study emergencies in isolation from each other disengages with 
important questions about the origin, extent, and nature of modern humanitarianism.  The 
isolated nature of this framework also works to uphold the narrative of the United States as a 
benevolent presence and evades an important dialogue about how many in the United States 
view the victims that they are purporting to aid.  Such perceptions of the aid victims go the heart 
of why some emergencies capture American attention and others do not.  In contrast, this work 
has studied humanitarian events in relation to each other as a means to help better explain these 
perceptions of aid victims which, in turn, speaks to the gap between American rhetoric of 
humanitarianism and the reality of its performance.
1
 What all of these events share, and why they 
were chosen, is the theme of children.  Taken together they highlight how conceptions and 
perceptions of children have been central to the rise of an American humanitarian ideology more 
than any other variable, including patriotism, nationalism, Cold War politics, or altruism.  
Children in emergencies have been the catalyst for U.S. involvement in manmade and natural 
disasters abroad.  They have also been the means by which the American public and aid groups 
have advanced and modified specific ideals of that humanitarian involvement.  Just as 
importantly they have been a striking reason for many in the U.S. to reaffirm their commitment 
to humanitarian aid.  Early on aid groups recognized the importance of children to the American 
people and realized they would have to deftly manage the competing understandings of 
childhood and children that emanated from donor and those that received donations.   
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Between 1959 and 1987 ever increasing numbers of the American public voiced their 
concern for people beyond their borders.  Often, these voices crossed religious, racial, economic, 
and political lines.  Debates became less about whether the United States should offer relief or 
aid and more about the technicalities of sending aid; more and more people assumed that 
America would be providing relief for people beyond their borders.  The large scale buy-in of aid 
solutions stemmed directly from new understandings of humanitarianism as a use-value 
transaction, claiming it as a citizen’s responsibility, and reimagining futures through the process 
of transformation.  NGOs played a pivotal role in the rise of a humanitarian ideology.  They 
presented humanitarianism in such a way that interwove citizen responsibility and consumerism 
and provided a new understanding of relief that resonated with large segments of the American 
people.  By the late 1980s, humanitarianism had come unto its own.  The American people and 
the NGO groups they worked with understood humanitarianism and the ideas that guided it as an 
important alternative to pursue future visions of the world when U.S. policy appeared 
unpalatable or even non-existent.   
 The willingness of Americans to turn to these ideas and apply them in regions considered 
volatile and hopeless underscores the sway humanitarian ideology held by the end of the Cold 
War.   By this time, humanitarianism had grown into one of the most important ideologies 
guiding American interaction with the world.  While the core tenets of humanitarian ideology 
remained intact, the flexibility of this set of ideas reinforced its durability.  As Michael Hunt 
states ideology is not an automatic equation to specific policy.  Indeed, the success of most 
ideologies lay in their explicit lack of rigid policy expectation and its malleability as Nicholas 
Danforth calls it.  This nebulousness allowed Americans to frame some emergencies in ways that 
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made sense to them, provided a rationale for action, and allowed other emergencies to fall off the 
radar.  In this way, ideology helped make some emergencies matter more than others.   
Such flexibility and its effect of elevating some emergencies was especially important in the 
wake of the violent conflicts that were loosed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War.   In 
trying to make sense of the individual role in the new world, many Americans came to rely on 
the humanitarian spirit and ideals that had formulated in the previous decades.   This new 
humanitarianism pushed many Americans to participate in and embrace the explosion of NGO 
growth in the post-war world.  Ironically, the very groups and organizations that Americans 
rushed to embrace because of the belief in their difference aided in the perpetuation of violence 
abroad.  This was in large part because NGOs articulated views of the future that were much 
more similar to the government’s vision of the future than was pleasant to discuss.
1
  Both wanted 
to bring developing nations and people in crisis into the fold of a world ordered on neoliberal 
market values.  
The discourses and rhetoric of humanitarianism that had been building since 1959 proved 
even more important after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  According to the decades-long Cold War 
rhetoric of American presidents and policy makers, once the Cold War ended with an American 
victory, the world would experience unprecedented security, growth, and prosperity.  The reality 
did not coincide so neatly with expectations once the wall tumbled down.  The 1990s 
experienced a wave of violent conflicts: Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.  It 
appeared that although the United States may no longer have had to do battle with a superpower 
threat like the former Soviet Union, they did face the equally formidable foe of moral corruption 
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and evil.  As the United States grappled with the new international order and its response to these 
emergencies, humanitarian ideology gave many groups and individuals a language and set of 
guiding ideals to chart future action in the absence of superpower tensions.  The resounding 
success of humanitarianism as a framework for understanding the world inspired a new policy, 
humanitarian intervention, which married humanitarianism with military intervention.   This 
policy, under the directorship of President Clinton, established a reckoning with world events 
that would include specific humanitarian calculations.  The success of the humanitarian story that 
emerged from the 1959 campaign shows how entrenched the concept of caring for others across 
borders became even when children were not at the center of emergencies.  While aid groups and 
public representations of children were responsible for advancing this humanitarian ideology, by 
the end of the Cold War the meanings attached to aid that developed out of debates around 
children in emergencies no longer needed to rest on the literal bodies of children in emergencies.  
Children’s backs carried the powerful impulses of humanitarian aid in such a way that aid 
providers evoked their presence and the intertwined messages between them and aid even when 
their bodies were not the central focus of an emergency.   
For example, one of the first conflicts to test the humanitarian ideology on offer and 
seemingly vindicate its legitimacy as a worthwhile mandate took place in Yugoslavia while  the 
world saw genocide unfold as the country plummeted into a nationalist nightmare.
2
 War crimes 
took place in the open, almost daring a world response.  As the international community 
convened to discuss the course of action to take, they ultimately pursued humanitarian 
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intervention spurred in large part by Washington impulses.
3
 As blue helmeted UN peace keepers 
trundled down the roads of Bosnia, NATO troops supported them underscoring the legitimacy of 
humanitarianism as a necessary and expected mode of American interaction with the world.  
Richard Holbrooke declared as much when he said, “We are re-engaged in the world, and Bosnia 
was the test.”
4
  Bosnia, and the intervention it merited, reflected the maturation and entrenched 
influence of a fully coherent humanitarian ideology in the United States that rested on the 
fundamental tenet of transformation.  Americans were set to reinvigorate their role in the new 
world order through their humanitarian efforts.  As they set on their path, children once again 
acted as important guideposts in the new humanitarian sphere.   
Events of the war seemed to validate Holbrooke’s words.  One of the most powerful 
moments to emerge from the war, and persuade Americans of the might of humanitarianism, 
came from the tragic love story of young Admira, a Muslim, and Bosko, an Eastern Orthodox 
Serb.
5
  The two fell in love and when trying to escape the violence of Bosnia were gunned down 
by participants in the conflict.
6
 The news story of the tragic death of the couple dubbed the 
“Romeo and Juliet of Bosnia” reinforced the need for an intervention that was more than just a 
political maneuver.  For the Romeo and Juliet story proved to many the worthiness of a 
humanitarian effort in Bosnia by extolling the potential for transformation; if two young lovers 
from different cultural backgrounds could ignore differences and find love, then surely there 
were redemptive qualities in the society from which they sprang.  In the wake of constant news 
coverage, Americans consumed reports of the war with a vengeance and sought out explanations 
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of the events from prominent media outlets.
7
 The media interrogation of Bosnia further reminded 
those watching along with aid groups that they had a responsibility to insure a peaceful world, a 
role motivated by different impulses than those that moved their elected officials.   
 The purported success of Bosnia would suggest that a U.S. humanitarian ideology 
propelled forward and cemented the making of what some scholars call an “empire of humanity” 
as the United States sought to make sense of its role in a post-Cold War world.
8
 But other 
emergencies during the 1990s suggest that this ideology acted in the opposite direction-- it 
framed emergencies in specific ways, encouraging action in some places and discouraging action 
in others, making some emergencies matter more than others.  Far from creating a humanitarian 
empire, humanitarian ideology allowed Americans to place self-imposed limits on this 
humanitarian empire that justified when and where U.S. engagement would take place.  The self-
imposed limits discussed in this work rarely make it into public discussions about the nature of 
U.S. humanitarianism.  Somalia, for example, became a vivid reminder that aid victims had to 
first prove their worthiness and ability to transform before Americans would commit to their 
humanitarian effort.  As Somalia showed, failure in this test resulted in termination of aid. 
 While Somalia showed Americans as reluctant to engage with the full responsibility of 
humanitarian action when it cost lives for suffering peoples considered unworthy, humanitarian 
ideology did allow and even encouraged many to continue their engagement with the world at a 
safer distance through consumption.  As Biafra, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Palestine showed, 
concerned citizens could fulfill their responsibility to alleviate suffering on American terms.  
Thus, while wars raged in the Congo, Liberia, and Uganda during the 1990s, Americans could 
wring their hands and bemoan the tragedy of Africa and still contribute to its salvation.  This 
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often happened by contributing funds to giant aid groups like Save the Children.  
Commodification of emergencies distilled tragedy into bite-sized units that emergency 
consumers could participate in when and where they chose.  By the 2000’s bite-sized 
humanitarian consumption had been perfected.  Nowhere was the convergence of consumerism 
and humanitarianism inscribed in a typical, daily activity more visible than in the decision of the 
Starbuck’s coffee chain to sell Ishmael Beah’s A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier.   
As consumers bought their coffee, they also bought the book – 62,000 copies in its first three 
weeks at the registers.
9
 Ishmael’s narrative rested on themes of hope and redemption for a former 
child soldier managing to reintegrate into African and then Western society, and in no small way 
contributed to rearticulating Africans and their conflicts as worthy of attention and aid.  If 
consumers were upset to hear about the violent conflict on the African continent, Ishmael’s book 
could provide some comfort to them as a way to improve their understanding of world conditions 
and through their literal and figurative consumption could help right some of those wrongs.
10
   
 If transformation and consumption remained important guideposts for how to interact 
with the world in a humanitarian capacity, so too did the concept of citizen responsibility.  This 
lesson was reinforced early on as 1994 in Rwanda.  President Clinton’s apology for a lack of 
U.S. leadership in preventing the genocide only seemed to confirm that that government and 
their leaders held dear too many political considerations that would obfuscate the need to help 
mankind.   In Rwanda it appeared that a lack of immediate strategic imperatives rendered the 
massacre of almost a million lives acceptable.  In an effort to repair such an obvious breach of 
humanitarian impulses, donors and aid agencies poured money and services into the aftercare of 
the emergency hoping to make-up for the lack of will demonstrated by official leaders.  More 
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than ever, it appeared that the citizens and the NGOs that led them would have to carefully guard 
their position in the new world in order to prevent further atrocities.  Citizen awareness and 
responsibility stood as one of the fundamental lessons repeated in the many documentaries and 
feature films that were later produced about Rwanda.
11
 
 While a humanitarian ideology helps explain how Americans interpreted their new role in 
the years after the Cold War, more needs to be said about the consequences of this guiding 
framework – perhaps even its overuse and abuse in recent years.  One of the more troubling 
aspects of the cultural ubiquity of humanitarianism is its propensity to deflect the many political 
considerations that travel with many emergencies.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, 
remains firmly entrenched, a tortuous protracted refugee situation.  The aid money that finds its 
way to self-help and relief programs has done little to move forward a political situation that can 
resolve the plight of both Israel and the Palestinians.  Indeed, there have been many reports in 
recent years that suggest humanitarianism at times worsens situation around the world.  For 
example, economists have analyzed the effects on local economies of the phenomenon of Tom’s 
Shoes, the shoe company that donates a pair of shoes to impoverished communities for every 
pair of shoes purchased in the United States.  Researchers have shown that the shoes, given in 
hopes of providing for a specific need, have actually distorted the local cobbling industry in areas 
where donations are given leading to further strain.
12
 
 More also needs to be said about the duality of aid that so often permeates emergencies 
and stems from entrenched assumptions about both the donor and the receiver of aid.  The 
duality of both is a critical component of how many in the humanitarian orbit view their aid 
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efforts.   Many emergency reports often relay a deep ambivalence towards those whom aid is 
purporting to help by mapping the victim as at once inside and outside the circle of humanity.  
On the one hand, victims are brothers in humanity that simply want an end to their suffering.  On 
the other, constant cultural, political, and historical filters remind observers that not all victims 
can easily transform into the kind of global, cosmopolitan citizen that is needed for a functioning 
neoliberal world.  There are other dimensions to this duality that are often less talked about.  In 
particular is the duality of the American response.  While so many like to believe in the 
benevolence of American aid, as the previous pages have shown the affirmation of American 
commitment to aid rests on how well emergency victims perform in the role they are assigned by 
the U.S. relief community, a community that involves practitioners, donors, and observers.    
The September 2015 death of Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi is one of the most profound and 
recent examples of duality that characterizes both aid giver and aid receiver.  Photos of the tragic 
drowning shook the world: a Turkish policeman cradling Kurdi’s tiny body as he found it 
washed up on the sandy shore, the officer’s faced turned away from the toddler’s own perhaps 
because he could not bear to see a child so young dead, glimpses of blue shorts and a red shirt 
that accompanied sturdy brown shoes suggesting the care that his mother took in dressing him 
for a long, unknown journey.  A public outpouring raged across the world asking for world 
leaders to take more responsibility in allowing asylum seekers into the borders of the mostly 
West European nations.  The furor was an extension of the public rhetoric established in the 
1959 World Refugee Year campaign that claimed to cherish and esteem the innocence of youth 
and seek out justice when that innocence encountered an undeserved fate.  In a nod to the rising 
anger, the Obama administration raised the refugee quota to ten thousand.  Yet, even as it 
appeared that the captured image of Kurdi’s lost life would bring change, little more was 
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effectively done to actually change the situation.  It was reminiscent of Edward Mark’s 1959 
assurance to magazine readers that the numbers of victims allowed into the U.S. were merely 
token numbers, a suggestion that reminded readers that the commitment of a U.S. humanitarian 
aid effort depended on the perceptions of the worthiness of the victim.   The same sentiments 
colored the tensions swirling around Kurdi and the larger crisis of humanity that he represented.  
While humanitarian discourse upheld his life as innocent, depictions of the crisis continued to 
play on lingering fears of the potential danger housed within small bodies like Kurdi’s.  
Humanitarianism is a complex moment, saturated with elements of power and vulnerability.  To 
truly grapple with this complicated structure, to understand that even the smallest transaction has 
multiple layers of meaning and expectations, is to understand that whether intended or not, 
humanitarianism has profound consequences that remain long after the exchange has been 
concluded.  To reckon with the weighty consequences of humanitarian action, close attention 
needs to be paid to the ideas that undergird any impulse of charity and the many dimensions of 
these ideas. 
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